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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains three chapters that study how public policies in Latin America
affect labor market outcomes, educational choices, and ways to improve policy evaluation methods.
The overarching theme of this thesis is to better understand what works to improve the living
standards of individuals and households in developing countries. First, I study how government
regulation affects labor markets, since the majority of people in developing countries obtain most
of their income from work-related activities. Second, I analyze whether low-income students’
higher education choices respond to receiving statistics on the average benefits and costs of college,
information which is drawn from an online system paid for by the government. Last, I explore how
widely used econometric methods fare when researchers ignore geographic correlations, which
are often found in socioeconomic data. Determining the reliability of statistical tools is critical
for policy evaluation, especially when the resulting estimates are intended as input for program
design. Together, these three chapters provide rigorous empirical evidence on the strengths and
weaknesses of public policies that can contribute to the way we think about economic development.
The individual abstracts for each chapter are presented below.
Chapter 1: The Consequences of Legal Minimum Wages in Honduras
Minimum wage policies are implemented in most developing countries, so understanding
their consequences is critical to determine their effectiveness. This chapter studies the labor mar-
ket and poverty effects of Honduran minimum wages from 2005-2012. In this period, there were
annual reforms to multiple minimum wages, a 60% increase, and changes in the number of min-
imum wage categories. Using 13 household surveys as repeated cross-sections, I estimate the net
effects of minimum wage hikes using large variation within categories over time. Evidence shows
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that employers partially comply with minimum wage laws, and respond to hikes by increasing
their level of non-compliance. Higher minimum wages reduce covered (formal) employment and
increase uncovered (informal) employment. Formal sector wages increase but rising labor supply
in the informal sector leads to a negative net effect on wages. The latter is often expected but rarely
found in the literature. I find no evidence that raising minimum wages reduces poverty.
Chapter 2: Information Policies and Higher Education Choices: Experimental Evidence from
Colombia
Governments have been devoting resources to implement online Labor Observatories that
provide educational and labor market statistics to help students make higher education choices.
This chapter studies the extent to which this information influences low-income students’ knowl-
edge and beliefs about college, test scores, and enrollment decisions by means of a randomized
controlled trial. We survey over 6,000 students in 115 public schools in Bogota´, Colombia. Stu-
dents in 58 schools listened to a 35-minute presentation that provides Labor Observatory statistics:
average earning premiums upon completing college, available funding options to cover costs, and
the importance of test scores for admittance and financing. Average effects of the information
treatment are modest and there is no evidence that some students benefit more than others. We
conclude that informational campaigns based on data from online Labor Observatories are ineffec-
tive to motivate college enrollment for low-income students.
Chapter 3: How Important is Spatial Correlation in Randomized Controlled Trials?
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) provide researchers with unbiased estimates of a pro-
gram’s causal effects. This chapter focuses on RCTs that assign treatment status over clusters in
geographical proximity but evaluate individual-level outcomes. We study how ignoring spatial
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correlation in outcomes and unobservables at the cluster-level affects individual-level difference-
in-difference estimates (DD). Monte Carlo simulations reveal that spatially-correlated outcomes
result in upward bias and low power while spatially-correlated unobservables only reduce power.
Small RCTs are more sensitive to spatial correlation than large interventions. Spatial DD over-
comes these issues, even in RCTs with few clusters. An application of our framework to Progresa,
a large RCT, shows that existing estimates are robust to spatial correlation. We conclude that
incorporating spatial methods in RCT evaluation provides several benefits at relatively low cost.
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Chapter 1
The Consequences of Legal Minimum
Wages in Honduras1
1.1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature in developed countries, particularly the United States, that studies
the consequences of minimum wage hikes. Research for the US has found higher minimum wages
can lead to job losses, no effect on jobs, or even job growth.2 In developing countries, minimum
wages tend to be set higher (Maloney and Mendez, 2004), are less likely to be rigorously enforced
(Kanbur and Ronconi, 2016), and labor markets are often segmented into formal and informal
sectors with minimum wage policy only covering formal workers (Fields, 1990). Given these
differences and that minimum wage policies are widespread in developing countries, understanding
how minimum wages affect labor markets and welfare is critical for economic growth, developing
1 I would like to acknowledge support from the Tinker Foundation and the Center for Latin American and Caribbean
Studies (CLACS) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This paper was conceived in CEDLAS’ IDRC
project “Labour markets for inclusive growth in Latin America” (http://www.labor-AL.org). I am thankful to the
National Statistics Institute (INE) for access to the household survey data, especially to Marı´a Auxiliadora Lo´pez and
Rene´ Soler. Additional data and insight were provided by Jaime Escobar at the Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
Marcela Herrera at the employers’ organization (COHEP), and Jose´ Garcı´a at the central workers’ union (CGT).
Earlier versions have benefited from discussions with Richard Akresh, Mary Arends-Kuenning, Kathy Baylis, Ben
Crost, Guillermo Cruces, Werner Baer, Marcelo Be´rgolo, Leonardo Bonilla, Nicolas Bottan, Kristine Brown, Pablo
Flores, Philip Garcı´a, Tim Gindling, Carl Nelson, Mark Borgschulte, Ignacio Sarmiento, and Walter Sosa Escudero,
as well as participants at numerous workshops and seminars. Any errors and omissions are entirely my own.
2See Card (1992), Card and Krueger (1994), Neumark and Wascher (2008), and Dube et al. (2010).
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effective labor policy, and poverty alleviation.
This paper evaluates recent minimum wage policy in Honduras. Similar to other developing
countries, Honduras sets high minimum wages that are weakly enforced in a segmented labor
market. Assessments of minimum wage policy often rely on variation in the structure of minimum
wages (Gindling and Terrell, 2009, Lemos, 2009, Alaniz et al., 2011, Comola and Mello, 2011,
Khamis, 2013), large increases (Castillo-Freeman and Freeman, 1992, Harasztosi and Lindner,
2015, Muravyev and Oshchepkov, 2016), or institutional reforms to wage floor systems (Gindling
and Terrell, 2007). Here, I exploit category-level variation from all three sources to quantify the
consequences of minimum wages on compliance, labor market outcomes, and poverty. Estimates
are drawn from 13 household surveys assembled into repeated cross-sections. These data cover
eight wage floor hikes from 2005-2012 and provide information on almost 330,000 individuals in
the Honduran labor force (approximately 41,000 per year).
Theoretically, the effectiveness of a country’s minimum wage policy depends on whether it is
able to redistribute earnings to low-paid workers without generating employment loss. Empirical
work in developing countries often disagrees on which of these effects prevails.3 Evaluating the
consequences of higher minimum wages is thus an empirical question. To accurately estimate the
impact of minimum wage hikes requires finding a source of exogenous variation in wage floors.
Minimum wages are usually updated to account for inflation or aggregate economic conditions.
Changing commodity prices cause shifts in labor supply and demand. Thus wage floors, wages,
and employment are simultaneously determined, so regressing minimum wages on socioeconomic
outcomes suffers from endogeneity bias.
3See Lemos (2007) and Neumark and Wascher (2008) for literature surveys.
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Recent events in Honduras created natural experiments that generate plausibly exogenous min-
imum wage shocks. Honduras sets multiple minima that have differed across regional, industrial,
and firm-size categories. This category-level structure is my main source of variation, which is
akin to using state-level differences in the US. From 2005-2012, this variation was affected by
annual minimum wage reforms, a large increase, and changes in the number of minimum wages.
The largest shocks are due to the latter two events. First, President Manuel Zelaya authorized a
60% average increase in real minimum wages aiming to equalize floors across categories in 2009.
Second, the number of minimum wages changed from industry firm-size minimum wages (23 cat-
egories) to regional floors (2 categories) in 2009, to region and firm-size minima (6 categories)
in 2010, and returned permanently to a modified version of industry firm-size minimum wages in
2011 (37 categories). On average, real minimum wages in Honduras increased 10.8% over this
period. Differential changes across categories encompass declines of -11.1 to hikes of 204.5%.
While minimum wage increases are the most visible component of this policy, enforcement and
compliance are also key elements. Increasing legal minimum wages that are imperfectly enforced
often results in non-compliance (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979, Bhorat et al., 2015). About one of
every three covered workers earns sub-minimum wages in Honduras (Gindling and Terrell, 2009),
with some paid much less than their legally entitled wage (Ham, 2015). I take advantage of rela-
tively constant enforcement levels over this period to test for partial compliance and approximate
the effect of minimum wage hikes on non-compliance in the covered sector. The resulting evi-
dence indicates that large employers partially comply with the regulation but small businesses do
not comply. Moreover, large covered employers increase their level of non-compliance in response
to higher minimum wages by 36%.
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Because the Honduran labor market is segmented, I test the predictions of the dual-sector
minimum wage model (Harris and Todaro, 1970, Boeri et al., 2011). In this framework, rising
wage floors should lead to employment losses and higher average wages in the covered sector,
and viceversa for the uncovered sector. Following the legislation, I define these sectors using
occupational categories. Results provide strong and robust evidence in support of this model. A
10% increase in minimum wages lowers the likelihood of covered employment by about 8% and
increases the probability of uncovered sector employment just over 5%. The data indicate that
individuals substitute wage earning jobs for self-employment as a direct consequence of minimum
wage hikes. Consequently, covered sector wages increase but rising labor supply in the uncovered
sector leads to a negative net effect on informal wages.
Therefore, minimum wage increases contribute to the growth of the informal sector, consistent
with findings in Comola and Mello (2011) and Muravyev and Oshchepkov (2016). Unlike most of
the literature, I do find evidence of negative effects on wages in the uncovered sector. This result is
driven by the large influx of wage earners into self-employment, suggesting that Hondurans would
rather work in uncovered jobs than remain unemployed.
Since uncovered sector jobs in Honduras tend to be lower-paid part-time positions, average
earnings in this sector often lie below covered sector incomes. Hence, there is a potentially adverse
effect on individual well-being from a larger informal sector. I test whether minimum wages
affect the likelihood of falling below national poverty lines, finding that increases in poverty for
the uncovered labor force outweigh potential reductions for the covered labor force. This result
indicates that higher wages for the covered workforce are unable to compensate for the resulting
income losses in the uncovered sector that occur because of changes in labor force composition.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the dual-sector
minimum wage model and reviews the empirical evidence. Section 1.3 describes minimum wage
policy in Honduras and my identification strategy. Section 1.4 presents the data. Section 1.5 studies
enforcement and compliance with minimum wages and Section 1.6 estimates the net effects of
minimum wage increases on labor market outcomes and poverty. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 MinimumWages in Developing Countries
1.2.1 Theory
Minimum wages in developing countries are commonly studied using a competitive dual-sector
model that classifies workers as covered (formal) or uncovered (informal) first proposed by Harris
and Todaro (1970).4 The former are entitled to wage floors, while the latter are not. Each sector
s = {c, u} has its own labor demand and supply, so that equilibrium wages (ws) and employment
(Es) are determined by the intersection of these curves. The key assumption is that wages in the
uncovered sector, wu, are more flexible than in the covered sector, wc. This implies that mobility
between sectors is possible, but limited. Individuals can migrate from covered to uncovered jobs
freely, but moving from uncovered to covered employment is more difficult because wage rigidity
causes segmentation between sectors (Mazumdar, 1989).
Figure 1.1 details the expected consequences of a binding minimum wage hike. Wages in the
covered sector increase but some individuals lose their jobs. Displaced workers may either seek
uncovered employment or choose to remain unemployed. If some decide to migrate, uncovered
labor supply shifts from Ls to L
′
s. Since wages in the uncovered sector are flexible, this market
4Alternative minimum wage models may be found in Card and Krueger (1995), Manning (2003), and Boeri and van
Ours (2008).
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clears with higher employment but a lower equilibrium wage. In summary, the covered (uncovered)
sector will have employment losses (gains) and higher (lower) average wages.
These are not the only potential consequences of minimum wage increases. Higher minima
may also affect intensive margin employment by changing the amount of hours worked. A priori,
effects could go either way. Differences in firm technology may lead to a rise or fall in hours (Strobl
and Walsh, 2011). Effects on hours worked may also respond to different firing costs (Gindling
and Terrell, 2007). If layoffs are costly, we may see a reduction in hours rather than employment,
or a decline in both. But if termination costs are low, employers may downsize part-time staff
while increasing hours worked by remaining employees.
Minimum wage increases may also have consequences that extend beyond the labor market.
Since many workers rely on earnings as their main source of income, changing wage floors could
indirectly affect poverty. If the predictions of the dual-sector model are borne out, the risk of
income deprivation is expected to increase. This result is driven by covered employment loss and
migration towards the lower-paid uncovered sector. However, poverty responses will also depend
on whether minimum wage workers are in low income families, the level of wage floors relative to
the poverty line, and intra-household factors.5
An unspoken assumption in this framework is that covered sector employers comply with min-
imum wage laws because governments effectively enforce them. However, regulation tends to
be lax in most developing countries, which often leads to non-compliance (Ronconi, 2012). En-
forcement affects firm-level compliance decisions, which play a key role in determining minimum
wage impact. In fact, Basu et al. (2010) show that “a simple deviation from perfect to imperfect
5See Lustig and McLeod (1997), Saget (2001), Neumark and Wascher (2002), Fields and Kanbur (2005), and Gindling
and Terrell (2010) for a more in-depth discussion of these factors.
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enforcement is sufficient for theoretical predictions to be overturned”.
Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) first modeled firm-level compliance decisions, with subsequent
papers modifying and extending their approach.6 Employers decide whether to comply with min-
imum wage laws based on their expected profits. Profits depend on revenue, costs, and the prob-
ability of getting caught non-complying (λ ∈ [0, 1]), which rises as enforcement becomes more
strict. After a minimum wage hike, total profits decrease because labor costs rise. Under perfect
enforcement, employers adjust their behavior according to theory. However, when enforcement is
imperfect, firms may employ workers at wages below the minimum as long as they remain unde-
tected. In practice, there is likely to be partial minimum wage compliance in developing countries,
with both compliant and non-compliant employers (Bhorat et al., 2015).
1.2.2 Evidence
Most developing country studies find that minimum wages increase covered sector wages but have
ambiguous employment effects. A few studies find no job losses (Lemos, 2009, Dinkelman and
Ranchhod, 2012, Bhorat et al., 2013b), although many find evidence of modest declines in covered
jobs (Bell, 1997, Fajnzylber, 2001, Maloney and Mendez, 2004, Gindling and Terrell, 2007, Alaniz
et al., 2011, Comola and Mello, 2011, Bhorat et al., 2014).
Wage floor effects on the uncovered sector are unclear. Two studies find evidence of migration
towards the informal sector (Comola and Mello, 2011, Muravyev and Oshchepkov, 2016). How-
ever, many authors find no effect on uncovered employment or wages. Perhaps the most striking
result in the empirical literature is that minimum wage increases sometimes raise uncovered sector
6Bhorat et al. (2015) provide an excellent description of this literature.
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wages.7 This finding has been labeled the “lighthouse effect”, since the primary explanation is that
wage floors act as a numeraire in the uncovered labor market.8
Available evidence has differing assessments of minimum wage impact on poverty. Most stud-
ies, usually those that find null or small employment losses, report that minimum wage hikes lower
deprivation (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1995, Lustig and McLeod, 1997, de Barros et al., 2001,
Saget, 2001, Devereux, 2005, Bird and Manning, 2008, Gindling and Terrell, 2010, Alaniz et al.,
2011). However, these authors do not advocate wage floor policies because the potential costs of
employment loss outweigh their possible distributional gains. Morley (1995) adds that poverty
responses will vary depending on whether wage floor increases occur during growth or recession.
Poverty will fall under the former and grow during the latter. Other papers have found that min-
imum wages increase poverty (Neumark et al., 2006, Arango and Pacho´n, 2007), often in cases
when wage floors lead to adverse labor market effects.
Most research estimates minimum wage effects under weak enforcement and partial compli-
ance. Average non-compliance in developing countries ranges between 10-70% (Rani et al., 2013).
However, only a handful of studies recognize how this may affect their results and conclusions.
Two countries that increase wage floors by the same amount but have different compliance rates
may thus experience distinct consequences. Therefore, measuring enforcement and its subsequent
impact on compliance is arguably as important to evaluate minimum wage policies than estimating
its labor market and welfare effects.
Two studies analyze the effect of minimum wages in Honduras. Both define sectors using
7Such effects have been found in Brazil (Neri et al., 2000, Lemos, 2009), Argentina (Khamis, 2013), Costa Rica
(Gindling and Terrell, 2005), and other Latin American countries (Maloney and Mendez, 2004).
8Alternative explanations are explored in Boeri et al. (2011).
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minimum wage laws, where wage earners are covered and the self-employed are uncovered. The
first, Gindling and Terrell (2009), finds a negative employment elasticity of -0.46 that dominates
a positive wage effect of 0.29 for covered workers in large firms using industry-level panel data
for 1990-2004. No wage or employment effects are found for wage earners in small firms and the
uncovered sector. The second was carried out by the same authors on individual data from 2001-
2004, and studies whether minimum wages reduce poverty (Gindling and Terrell, 2010). They find
a 10% increase in mandated minima lowers the probability of extreme poverty by 2.2% but find no
effect on overall poverty rates (extreme plus moderate).
This study contributes to the empirical minimum wage literature in several ways. First, it pro-
vides a comprehensive evaluation of the net labor market and welfare consequences of minimum
wage policy in a developing country. Unlike previous work that often uses a single shock to quan-
tify minimum wage effects, I exploit several sources of cross-sectional and temporal variation in
multiple minimum wages. Second, it updates previous results for Honduras. Last, I also focus
on enforcement and compliance with legal minimum wages. This broad approach allows to better
understand how minimum wages affect labor and poverty outcomes, developing and regulating
effective labor policy, and the potential of minimum wages as a tool for poverty alleviation.
1.3 MinimumWage Policy in Honduras
1.3.1 History and attributes
Legal minimum wages in Honduras were first implemented in 1974 and are regulated by the Gen-
eral Directorate of Wages (DGS, in Spanish), which belongs to the Ministry of Labor. There have
been about 30 updates since then, most of them during the past two decades. Annual adjustments
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are negotiated by a committee of Government, employer, and worker representatives. Discussions
generally stall because the parties cannot agree on the amount of the increase. If this impasse can-
not be resolved, a final decision is taken by the president. The resulting wage floors are published
as decrees in the Senate’s Newspaper, La Gaceta. Upon careful inspection of this legislation,
several distinctive characteristics stand out.
First, multiple minimum wages exist at the same time, which vary by region, industry, and firm-
size. Floors have usually been set for 23 categories, following the ISIC industrial classification:
agriculture, non-metallic mining, metallic mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, retail,
transport, real estate, business services, financial services, communal and personal services, and
the export (or maquila) sector.9 Except for metallic mining, utilities, and the export sector, different
minimum wages were set for small (1-15 employees) and large (16+ employees) firms until 2008.
This structure has experienced several reforms. It changed to regional minima (2 categories) in
2009, to region and firm-size floors (6 categories) in 2010, and returned permanently to industry
firm-size minimum wages in 2011 (37 categories).
Second, Honduras frequently sets daily wage floors. According to the DGS, full-time employ-
ees should be paid 30 daily minimum wages per month. Third, minima directly cover wage earners
in private firms. Public employees are indirectly covered, since some are paid in multiples of the
minimum wage (Gindling and Terrell, 2009). However, the public sector is not subject to labor
inspections nor required to make collateral payments for mandated benefits.10 Domestic work is
9The export industry in Honduras produces textiles and apparel, electric components for automobiles, imports and
sells spare parts for machinery, and provides data processing services (de Hoyos et al., 2008).
10Employers must contribute a percentage of the worker’s wage to a Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, severance,
social security payments, paid leave, contributions to the national training center (INFOP), housing contributions
(RAP), and an educational transfer (COHEP, 2016).
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considered a salaried occupation and thus protected by the Labor Code. Nevertheless, employers
are not required to pay wage floors, so compliance is voluntary. This means that legally, employ-
ers, the self-employed, and unpaid family workers are the uncovered sector in Honduras. Fourth,
covered employers can pay less than the legal minimum wage if they grant certain forms of in-kind
compensation. Workers who receive food or housing may be paid 80% of the minimum wage, and
70% if provided both.
Last, similar to most countries, average minimum wage changes are indexed to inflation. His-
torically, the inflation rate served as a guide but was not always employed in negotiations. In
2013, a new mechanism incorporated productivity measures into minimum wage setting (Garcı´a,
2011).11 The correlation between changes in real floors and previous-year inflation is 0.594 and
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This implies that a regression of minimum wages on
labor market outcomes and poverty is endogenous because wage floors, wages, and employment
are simultaneously determined. To isolate the effects of rising minimum wages requires finding
exogenous variation unrelated to the economic cycle. Using the attributes of Honduran minima
and some unique policy circumstances, I propose several exogenous shocks.
1.3.2 Identifying exogenous variation in Honduran minimum wages
Exogenous variation in Honduran minimum wages may be obtained by exploiting category-level
variation. From 2005-2012, this variation was affected by annual minimum wage updates, a large
increase, and changes in the number of minimum wages. The DGS usually set 23 different industry
11The new mechanism is based on two equations: 1) MW = Epit+1 +P and 2) MW > pit, where pi denotes inflation
(measured by the Central Bank) and P denotes productivity (measured by the Ministry of Labor). The first equation
calculates the minimum wage increase as the sum of expected price changes and actual productivity gains or losses.
The second equation requires that the calculated value is higher than actual inflation. For example, if the inflation
forecast is 7% and productivity fell by 1.5%, the corresponding increase is 5.5%. If actual inflation is above this value
(say 6%), then the mandated increase changes to six percent.
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firm-size minimum wages in this period. For comparability, I maintain these categories throughout
the analysis and convert decreed values into real hourly minimum wages.12
Table 1.1 shows yearly changes in real minimum wages for each industry firm-size category.
Trends are plotted in Appendix Figure A.1. The average increase in real minimum wages was
10.8%. There is substantial variation across categories (the standard deviation is 26.4%), ranging
from declines of -11.1% to increases of 204.5%. Hence, even if the average increase may depend
on previous inflation, each category experiences different rates of change. After controlling for
cross-sectional variation across categories (using industry firm-size and region effects) and the
average change in the minimum wage (using time dummies), all remaining variation is arguably
driven by the structure of minima and not the economic cycle.
Much of the observed variation was generated by a large increase in minimum wages. In
2009, during the last year of his elected term, minima were set unilaterally by President Manuel
Zelaya. He raised average real minimum wages by about 60 percent with redistributive purposes.13
The measure was unexpected. It was announced on December 23, decreed on the 27th, and took
effect four days later. More importantly, it was unrelated to aggregate economic conditions. If
endogenous, this update would respond to continuous growth and inflation, which is not supported
by the data (see Appendix Table A.2). In fact, the increase was approved in spite of an anticipated
economic downturn due to the global financial crisis (Cordero, 2009). An additional concern is that
Zelaya operated under political motives, benefiting loyal districts who voted for his presidency four
12The procedure follows Gindling and Terrell (2009). I homogenize daily floors into monthly values and compute:
Hourly MW = Monthly MW / (44 × 4.3). Calculated values for each industry firm-size category over time are shown
in Appendix Table A.1.
13Appendix Figure A.2 shows this by plotting the percent change for each industry firm-size category and its pre-policy
minimum wage. Categories with lower wage floors experienced the largest hikes from the policy.
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years earlier. Appendix Table A.3 shows that this is not the case, as minimum wage increases in
districts that voted for Zelaya were not significantly higher compared to communities who voted
for the opposing candidate.
I also employ variation due to reforms in the number of minimum wage categories. In 2009,
the system went from 23 minima set by industry firm-size categories to 2 regional floors, urban
and rural. In 2010, the number of categories rose to six, urban and rural floors for 1-20, 21-50, 51+
employees. In 2011, setting returned to industry firm-size but was expanded to encompass four
firm sizes, 1-10, 11-50, 51-150, 151+ employees, for a total of 37 minima.14 These changes were
due to concern with how to deliver minimum wages more efficiently and not in response to labor
market conditions.
Jointly, these events provide variation within categories and over time in legal wage floors that
is plausibly exogenous. Compared to previous studies, there is greater variation across multiple
minimum wages, as Figure 1.2 shows. The Honduran case thus presents a singular opportunity to
evaluate the labor market and welfare consequences of minimum wages in a developing country.
1.4 Data
I construct repeated cross-section data from Honduran household surveys, the Encuesta Perma-
nente de Hogares de Propo´sitos Mu´ltiples (EPHPM). The EPHPM is nationally representative
and conducted twice a year —May and September— by the National Statistics Institute (INE). It
gathers detailed information on demographics, education, employment, earnings, and household
14Ten industries have been considered since 2011: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, retail,
transport, financial/real estate/business services, communal and personal services, and export. Mining was unified into
a single category and business services, real estate, and financial services were also aggregated.
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poverty status. Thirteen waves collected between 2005-2012 are joined for this study. All vari-
ables are identically defined to ensure comparability over time. Unfortunately, panel data on labor
market and welfare outcomes are unavailable.
Survey data are augmented with information from two sources. The first are minimum wage
tables published in La Gaceta.15 Using the decrees, I assign the corresponding wage floor to each
individual based on their self-reported industry and firm-size. Since the surveys identify whether
respondents receive food or housing from their employer, minimum wages are adjusted to account
for this compensation. The second source is the Honduran Central Bank (BCH), which provides
aggregate and industry-level information. Following standard practice, consumer price indexes
are used to deflate minimum wages and actual wages. Industry-level variables are used to control
for changing market conditions over time in each sector of production.16 On one hand, I use the
monthly production index for each industry (IMAE) since there is more than one survey per year.
On the other, I employ the BCH’s estimates of value added (VA) to account for differential yearly
growth in production.
My population of interest are Hondurans in the labor force, classified into covered (formal) and
uncovered (informal) sectors. Following the legislation, I define the covered sector as occupations
directly and indirectly covered by minimum wages: privately employed wage earners –in large and
small firms–, public sector employees, and domestic workers. The uncovered sector comprises
the self-employed, unpaid family workers, and employers. To consider differences within these
15Appendix Table A.4 lists the selected EPHPM surveys and valid decrees at the time of data recollection. During the
period, most minimum wage changes became effective on January 1st of the respective calendar year. The exception
was 2010, when the update applied on September 1st. Hence, in the data, the 2009 scheme was still applicable at the
time when fieldwork for the May 2010 survey was undertaken.
16The BCH’s classification of industries does not coincide with the minimum wage decrees. However, all wage floor
categories are nested within the BCH’s nine aggregate groupings.
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definitions, some results are presented separately by occupation.
The data provide complete information for the employed but not the unemployed. Surveys ask
the latter their occupation and industry of previous employment, but do not inquire about firm size.
Labor force entrants into unemployment have no information on previous occupation or industry,
so are excluded from the analysis. Employed individuals are assigned their category-specific min-
imum wage while the unemployed are imputed the large firm wage floor for the industry of their
last reported job.17 Therefore, estimates for the entire labor force will require aggregating industry
firm-size categories at the industry-level. Nevertheless, variation and trends are unchanged when
using fewer categories (see Appendix Table A.5). Following the literature, the analysis focuses on
adults 15 years or older. I further restrict the employed sample to individuals who report working
less than 84 hours per week and earn below the 99th percentile of real wages. This leaves 327,764
valid observations, about 41,000 individuals per year (or 25,200 per wave).
Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics by sector.18 About 95% of the covered labor force is
employed and 5% is unemployed. Employed individuals are paid an average of 13.06 Lempiras
an hour (about US$1.31) and work full-time jobs, 44 hours per week. Slightly over 27% dwell in
extremely poor households using the official poverty classification in Honduras.19 Over half live
in a poor household. Just under two thirds are male and less than half are married. On average,
the covered workforce has 7.5 years of education, equivalent to incomplete secondary schooling.
Most live in urban areas, with large families, and are not the heads of their household. Individuals
17Since large firm minimum wages increased less than small firms in this period (see Table 1.1), this assigns the
unemployed the lowest change in minimum wages. Results are unchanged when imputing minimum wages for small
firms (largest increase) or the average between the two. These estimates are not reported here but are available upon
request.
18Appendix Table A.6 shows descriptive statistics by occupation.
19See Sobrado and Clavijo (2008) for a description of poverty measurement in Honduras.
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in the covered sector work or have worked mostly in services, agriculture, retail, manufacturing,
construction, and the export sector.
The uncovered labor force is almost entirely employed (99% vs 1%) in part-time jobs (34
hours per week) and earns approximately 10.91 Lempiras an hour (US$1.09). Compared to the
covered sector, almost twice as many workers live in extremely poor households. This sector has
marginally fewer men but more married individuals. Uncovered workers accumulate 5 years of
formal education, less than complete primary. These individuals are usually located in rural areas
and are often the household heads of large families. Hondurans in the uncovered sector are mainly
attached to agriculture, retail, and manufacturing.
Table 1.3 presents annual trends in labor market outcomes and poverty. Given that average
minimum wages increased throughout the period, overall employment rates change slightly in re-
sponse. Figure 1.3 focuses on trends in labor force composition. The share of employed individuals
in the covered sector falls while uncovered employment and overall unemployment rise. Covered
sector wages increase after minimum wage hikes while uncovered wages decrease. These trends
suggest that the raw data are in line with the predictions of the dual-sector minimum wage model.
1.5 Enforcement and Compliance
1.5.1 Patterns and trends
Honduran minima may affect many workers because they are set high relative to average wages.
To show this, I plot a widely used measure of the minimum wage’s “bite” in Figure 1.4, its ratio to
the mean covered sector wage: ¯MW/w¯c. This indicator grew from 0.66 in 2005 to 1.13 in 2012.
ILO (2008) estimates from for over 50 countries indicate that this estimated minimum to mean
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wage ratio lies within range of other developing labor markets such as Argentina, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Nepal, Paraguay, and Venezuela.
Labor regulation in developing countries is often imperfectly enforced, mostly due to budget
constraints (Gindling et al., 2015). Honduras is no exception, with only 139 inspectors in 20
regional offices available to monitor labor code violations (UPEG, 2016). Among other duties,
inspectors visit firms to assess compliance with minimum wage laws. Gindling and Terrell (2009)
point out that large firms are more likely to be inspected than small businesses. Enforcement
changed slightly throughout the period (see Supplementary material for Chapter 1 Figure A.3). In
fact, fewer inspections were performed after the 2009 increase. Lax regulation is also reflected in
low fines. If an employer commits an infraction, lump-sum penalties range between 1000-5000
Lempiras (US$50-250) and occasionally require reinstating back pay.
Given the complexity of wage floors in Honduras, I examine compliance by analyzing the
distribution of wages in covered versus uncovered occupations. Figure 1.5 plots kernel densities
for the distribution of log hourly wages minus log minimum wages for occupations with valid
earnings. This re-centers the distribution so that 0 = MW . If covered firms comply with mandated
minima, we should see censoring from below at zero and a higher spike at this value. I find differing
levels of compliance across occupations. Minimum wages are mostly complied with in large firms
and the public sector but small businesses and domestic employers do not comply. In all covered
jobs, there is evidence of some non-compliance from employers. Densities for the self-employed
and employers show no indication of compliance in uncovered occupations.
Table 1.4 presents non-compliance indicators for the sample. It begins with the fraction of
workers earning below, at, and above the hourly minimum wage. About 47% of directly covered
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employees earn below mandated minima, consistent with rates in other countries (Rani et al.,
2013) and previous estimates for Honduras (Gindling and Terrell, 2009). Non-compliance also
varies across industries and regions (Ham, 2015), and as shown here, by occupation. On one hand,
it is 31.9% and 62.4% for large and small firm wage earners, respectively. On the other, 9.5%
of public employees and 66% of domestic workers earn sub-minimum wages. In the uncovered
sector, almost 63% of the self-employed earn below the minimum wage while just one in four
employers earns lower wages than the minimum.
While compliance rates are informative, they do not tell the entire story. Recent research
argues that the depth of non-compliance is also relevant (Bhorat et al., 2013a). Similar to poverty
measures, these papers report the incidence, gap, and severity of minimum wage violations. They
propose computing average shortfalls, the ratio between the gap and incidence of non-compliance,
to measure how far actual wages are from minimum wages. These estimates are shown in Table
1.4. Underpaid wage earners in large firms earn 36% less than their corresponding wage floor and
50% less in small firms. This shows that in addition to being paid below the legally entitled wage,
some workers earn much less on average.
The remainder of Table 1.4 compares compliance before and after 2009. I conduct t-tests for
the null hypothesis that estimated indicators were unchanged over time. Non-compliance rates
increased significantly for all occupations. The fraction of underpaid large firm wage earners
rose by 12 percentage points and small firm non-compliance increased by 23 percentage points.
Changes are smaller for public employees. Differences in the average shortfall of wages from
minimum wages reflect similar patterns. This evidence suggests that employers adjust both the
level and depth of non-compliance after minimum wage increases.
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These estimates may potentially suffer from measurement error. Perhaps transforming min-
imum wages into hourly values generates noise because the surveys ask respondents for their
monthly labor income. To check this, I re-estimate densities and shares using monthly minimum
wages and earnings for full-time workers in Figure A.4 and Table A.7 in the Appendix. Overall, the
resulting conclusions are unchanged. Inability to measure some forms of non-monetary payments
may also affect compliance estimates (Gindling and Terrell, 2009). For instance, apprentices may
be paid below the minimum during their first six months on the job. Similarly, some industries
compensate workers by piece rate (manufacturing), commissions (retail), and tips (services). Er-
rors in these cases could go either way. However, there is no possibility to assess these factors
from the available data.
This analysis reveals some patterns of the relationship between enforcement and compliance
with minimum wages in Honduras. First, enforcement is weak and remained relatively stable
during 2005-2012, despite multiple policy changes. Second, there are varying levels of compli-
ance within the covered sector. Minimum wages are complied with by large firms but not small
businesses, although legal wage floors apply to both employers. Interestingly, the public sector
is largely compliant despite not being subject to regulation. Last, the depth of non-compliance
matters, since some covered workers are substantially underpaid.
1.5.2 Testing for partial compliance with minimum wages
Obtaining estimates of minimum wage impact on employers’ incentives to comply is challenging
for several reasons. First, appropriate data are not always available (Hamermesh, 1991). Firm-level
records can mislead researchers because employers are expected to misreport labor violations. Sec-
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ond, compliance decisions depend on wage floors and enforcement (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979,
Bhorat et al., 2015). Although minimum wages are readily measurable, data on enforcement tend
to be scarce. Moreover, it is hard to isolate the impact of each channel. Last, clearly identifying
treatment and control groups is an arduous task.
The Honduran case helps overcome some of these issues. Following the literature, I use
employee data since it measures non-compliance more precisely than firm-level records. Since
enforcement remained relatively stable over this period, compliance adjustments may be mostly
attributed to changing wage floors. Coverage definitions and recent reforms generate a policy
experiment. On the one hand, treated employers include large and small firms, since they must
pay minimum wages and are actively regulated. A suitable comparison would comprise firms not
required to pay legal wage floors nor subject to inspections, but which still comply. As shown
beforehand, the public sector is such an employer. On the other hand, comparing non-compliance
before and after 2009 provides variation over time.
Figure 1.6 plots non-compliance rates for large firm, small firm, and public employees. The
public sector has the lowest non-compliance rate, followed by large and small employers, respec-
tively. Before 2009, trends behave similarly across occupations. After 2009, non-compliance
slightly increases in the public sector. Observed changes are higher for large employers and more
striking for small firms. This suggests that directly affected employers are actively choosing to pay
more workers below the minimum wage after a large hike.
These conditions allow using a difference-in-differences strategy to test for partial compliance
with minimum wages.20 This method assumes that in absence of changes to Honduran minimum
20Two studies have tested partial compliance with minimum wage laws. Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) employ
a method that is informative as long as minimum wages have no employment effects. Bhorat et al. (2015) use a
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wage policy, compliance in large and small firms would have behaved similarly to the public
sector. Any significant differences between covered occupations and the public sector indicate
that some regulated firms decide not to comply with the minimum wage increase, denoting partial
compliance. I estimate the following equation by OLS:
NCijt = αT + β(Post× T ) + γXijt + θZjt + λj + δt + uijt (1.1)
where NCijt is a binary variable that identifies if worker i in industry firm-size category j at time
t is paid below the minimum wage. Post is an indicator variable equal to unity after 2009 and
T identifies whether the worker is a wage earner. I also consider wage earners in large or small
firms separately. The coefficient on the interaction term captures the average difference in non-
compliance across treatment and control groups before and after 2009. An expanded version of
Equation (1.1) is also estimated where the treatment identifier is interacted with dummy variables
for each year. This allows testing the parallel trends assumption of difference-in-differences since
several years of pre-policy data are available. It also permits identifying any heterogeneous effects
over time. Given limitations with the data and other potential confounders, these estimates cannot
be interpreted as the causal effects of wage floor hikes on non-compliance.
Since workers across occupations are different, I control for observable characteristics in Xijt,
including a constant, gender, marital status, years of education, potential experience and its square,
and a dummy for urban residence. I also condition on time-varying industry-level attributes (Zjt):
the log of the monthly production index (IMAE) for each wave and the log of yearly value added
difference-in-differences strategy that compares covered and uncovered groups. My strategy is similar to the latter,
which imposes fewer restrictions on expected labor market effects.
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(VA), which control for changes in industry-level demand conditions. Finally, I include industry
firm-size fixed effects (λj) to capture cross-sectional variation across minimum wage categories
and time dummies for each wave to account for secular trends (δt). Standard errors are clustered
by the 23 industry firm-size categories.
Results in Table 1.5 reveal that non-compliance rates in covered occupations increase after a
large minimum hike. Panel A denotes that relative to the public sector, the share of wage earners
who are paid sub-minimum wages increases by 32% on average. Separating wage earners into
large and small firms shows that non-compliance increases about 36% for the former and 26% for
the latter. Panel B shows results by year. There are no differential trends when comparing wage
earners and large firms to the public sector, but one significant pre-policy difference for small firms
(in 2006). For both firm sizes, there is an increase in 2009. However, non-compliance continues to
rise in large firms but not small firms.
These findings indicate that large employers partially comply with minimum wages but small
businesses do not comply. After a 60% increase, some large employers comply and others avoid
the regulation. Small firms do not change their practices. These results are depicted in Appendix
Figure A.5, which plots the distribution of log wages minus log minimum wages before and after
2009. The distribution for large firms compresses around the minimum wage but the lower tail
increases, denoting partial compliance. The distribution shifts to the left for small firms, with no
indication of bunching around the minimum wage.
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1.6 The Net Consequences of MinimumWages
1.6.1 Estimation strategy
I estimate the net effects of legal minimum wages on labor market outcomes and poverty using a
specification commonly found in the literature (Neumark and Wascher, 2008):
yijt = α + βMWjt + γXijt + θZjt + λj + δt + uijt (1.2)
Here, yijt is the outcome for individual i in minimum wage category j at time t. MWjt is the
log real hourly minimum wage corresponding to their self-reported category. This specification
controls for the same individual and industry-level covariates, category, and survey wave effects in
Equation (1.1). A second specification adds linear time trends to account for heterogeneous time
effects across minimum wage categories (Allegretto et al., 2013).
I present estimates of minimum wage impact on employment, labor force composition, hours,
wages, and poverty. Employment, composition, and poverty estimates use within industry variation
in minimum wages over time since they include all Hondurans in the labor force. Hours and
wage equations use within industry firm-size variation over time in minimum wages since these
outcomes are available for employed individuals. The selected estimation methods are Probit for
employment and poverty, Multinomial Logit for labor force composition, and OLS for hours and
wages. I also consider alternative specifications, which are discussed in the next sub-section.
Standard errors are clustered by industry (or industry firm-size) depending on the variation used to
identify each equation.21
21Given the changes in minimum wage categories over time, multiple clustering options were tested. For comparability,
I selected the 13 aggregate categories for estimates that include Hondurans in the labor force and 23 categories for
employed individuals. Results are unchanged when using a different number of clusters.
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The coefficient of interest in all relationships is β. Once controlling for covariates and fixed
effects, this parameter captures the net effect of deviations from the average change in minimum
wages within categories over time. We may interpret employment, composition, hours, and poverty
estimates as elasticities, i.e. the net effect of a 1% increase in legal minimum wages. This inter-
pretation is not possible for wages. Statistically significant wage estimates may be due to changing
wage floors and/or composition effects. In the covered sector, average wages may be affected be-
cause: i) some workers are paid the new minimum wage, ii) some accept higher sub-minimum
wages to keep their jobs, and iii) some lose their jobs and are no longer included in the sample
to compute average wages (Gindling and Terrell, 2009). In the uncovered sector, significant wage
effects could be due to “lighthouse” effects or market adjustment if there is evidence of changing
labor supply in this sector.
The dual-sector model predicts that minimum wage increases should lead to employment losses
and higher average wages in the covered sector, and viceversa for the uncovered sector. The effect
on hours worked depends on firing costs. The Honduran labor code requires employers to pay
high severance, so we should also expect a reduction in hours, at least for the covered sector.22
Poverty impact is conditional on labor market results. If the predictions of the dual-sector model
are borne out, the probability of income deprivation is expected to increase. Otherwise, poverty
may decrease or remain unaffected.
22Severance depends on whether layoff is justified or not. If justified, employees are compensated for any remaining
vacation days, as well as their accumulated mid-year and Christmas bonuses. If unjustified, they also receive two
months compensation as notice and one monthly salary per year of employment.
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1.6.2 Labor Market Outcomes
Table 1.6 reports the estimated net effects of minimum wages on the Honduran labor market.
Employment results are presented for the full sample, regardless of sector or occupation. These
coefficients report the change in the probability that an average individual is employed relative to
being unemployed. A 10% increase in legal minimum wages reduces overall employment by 0.9%
for the basic specification and by 1.1% when including linear category time trends.23
These negative coefficients may arise because wage floors reduce employment or increase un-
employment by attracting more individuals into the labor force. Since the sample does not include
new entrants into unemployment, employment loss is more likely. Moreover, an analysis from the
raw surveys reveals that most labor market entrants have ensured jobs (93%) while very few are
unemployed (7%). Therefore, minimum wages cause modest employment declines in Honduras,
of similar magnitude to reported estimates in other studies.
While wage floors slightly reduce the probability of employment relative to unemployment,
this does not rule out migration among sectors. To test for evidence of such movements, I estimate
a Multinomial Logit model. The dependent variable identifies three categories: unemployed (0),
employed in the covered sector (1), and employed in the uncovered sector (2). For comparability
with the employment results, the base category is unemployment. The coefficients on the mini-
mum wage variable identify the change in the probability that an average individual is employed
in the covered or uncovered sector relative to being unemployed. Results indicate that labor force
composition changes as minimum wages increase. A 10% hike in minimum wages lowers the
23Given that these coefficients are estimated from a Probit, they indicate that a 10% increase in the real minimum
wage reduces the probability of being employed by 0.0085 and 0.0108. Relative to the mean employment rate, this
indicates that a 10% increase in minimum wages reduces employment between (0.0085/0.971) × 100 = 0.9%. and
(0.0108/0.971)× 100 = 1.1%.
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probability of covered employment between 8 and 10 percent and increases the likelihood of em-
ployment in the uncovered sector by 5 to 7 percent. These findings suggest that the estimated
employment effect for the full sample is averaging significant declines in covered jobs and gains
in uncovered employment.
To further investigate this change in labor force composition, I estimate a Multinomial Logit
where the individual’s occupation is the dependent variable. Marginal effects are shown in Panel
B, columns 4-9. The decline in covered sector employment is mainly driven by a loss of wage
earning jobs, since effects on public sector and domestic workers are close to zero and precisely
estimated. Rising labor supply in the uncovered sector is mainly due to a higher likelihood of
self-employment and a small rise in the probability of carrying out unpaid work.
Results for intensive margin employment indicate that minimum wages lower the amount of
hours worked for the full sample. This result is driven by reductions in the covered sector, where
a 10% increase in minimum wages lowers hours worked by about 2%. Estimates by occupation
reveal that some adjustment takes place for wage earners, but larger declines are observed for
public sector employees and domestic workers. There is no evidence that minimum wages affect
the number of hours worked in the uncovered sector.
Table 1.6 concludes with the wage equations. Minimum wages have no effect on wages for the
full sample. Once again, this masks differences across sectors. Higher minimum wages increase
covered sector wages, with coefficients ranging between 0.24 and 0.29. Since legal wage floors do
not apply in the uncovered sector, parameter estimates reflect indirect consequences. Wage coeffi-
cients for the uncovered sector are negative, between -0.52 and -0.69, and statistically significant.
Estimates by occupation show that an increase in mandated minima increases hourly pay for wage
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earners, public sector employees, and domestic workers. The negative net effect on the uncovered
sector is driven by downward pressure on wages for self-employed workers since employer wages
are unaffected. Unreported results that use monthly earnings as the dependent variable and control
for hours worked and their square provide similar findings.
These findings are robust to alternative estimation methods, as shown in Appendix Table A.8.
For overall employment, results are fairly similar when estimating OLS or IV regressions that use
minimum wages lagged one year as an instrument (the latter approach follows Gindling and Terrell
(2007)). Estimating labor force composition effects using Multinomial Probit, which relaxes the
assumptions of Multinomial Logit, also provides similar results.24 Alternative specifications for
hours and wages in the covered sector are robust to specification choice. Uncovered sector results
are noisier, due in part to lagged minimum wages being a weak instrument with a small first stage
coefficient and larger standard error.
Since minimum wages vary by industry firm-size categories, another robustness exercise in-
volves aggregating the data to this level and taking advantage of the panel structure, a method used
in a previous study for Honduras (Gindling and Terrell, 2009). Results are shown in Appendix
Table A.9.25 Aggregate results are in line with my reported findings, but are mostly insignificant.
Only wage effects for the covered sector are different from zero. Aggregating heterogeneous indi-
viduals is known to cause a loss of information and statistical power (Bertrand et al., 2004). Not
24Multinomial Logit assumes independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Multinomial Probit is more flexible since it
allows arbitrary correlation across alternatives. However, it has practical limitations with five or more alternatives and
thus cannot be estimated by occupation. See page 649 in Wooldridge (2010) for details.
25I report three specifications: the within estimator (FE), the within estimator including a lag of the dependent vari-
able (FE-LDV), and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimates that use lags of the dependent variable as instruments
(GMM-DIF). First differences and system-GMM were estimated but not reported. Standard errors are robust to het-
eroscedasticity and clustering, and were estimated by block bootstrap with 200 replications when possible. Since there
are 23 industry firm-size categories, block bootstrap results in less precision as forewarned by Bertrand et al. (2004).
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surprisingly, confidence intervals for many coefficients on the minimum wage variable include the
estimates in Table 1.6 obtained from individual-level data.
These results provide strong evidence in support of the dual-sector minimum wage model.
Findings are consistent with previous evidence for Honduras, with estimates for the covered sector
within the confidence intervals reported in Gindling and Terrell (2009). Although they find no
effects on the uncovered sector, I do find evidence of higher employment and lower wages in that
sector. Higher uncovered sector employment is consistent with findings in Comola and Mello
(2011) for Indonesia and Muravyev and Oshchepkov (2016) in Russia. However, unlike these two
studies, I find evidence of negative net effects on wages in the uncovered sector. This result seems
to be driven by a substitution from formal to informal employment, mostly wage earners becoming
self-employed workers. In line with the theory, the uncovered labor market in Honduras adjusts to
this influx by lowering average wages.
1.6.3 Poverty
Given the net labor market effects of minimum wage policy in Honduras, we should expect a
higher risk of deprivation, especially for the uncovered workforce. Since informal jobs are mostly
lower-paid part-time positions, uncovered sector earnings often lie below covered sector income
(see Appendix Figure A.6). Therefore, a growing informal sector generates income losses that may
push some individuals into poverty. However, if income gains for the covered sector outweigh such
losses, minimum wages may actually reduce poverty.
Income deprivation in Honduras is measured by the poverty line method, which yields two
classifications of poverty: extreme and moderate. The former includes households whose per
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capita income impedes affording a basic food basket and the latter identifies families who are able
to purchase food but cannot cover additional expenses (housing, education, health, transport, etc.).
Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, with extreme poverty levels close to
50% and moderate poverty around 18%, so overall poverty is 68%.
We would like to approximate the effect of wage floors on household poverty, since deprivation
is measured at this level. I follow Gindling and Terrell (2010) and multiply the survey weights by
the ratio of household size and the number of workers (ω× N
Nw
) to obtain an estimate of minimum
wage effects on the average household, not just the labor force. Estimates that use unadjusted
weights are not reported but provide largely similar results.
Table 1.7 presents Probit estimates of the net effects of minimum wages on extreme and overall
poverty (extreme plus moderate). Relative to being non-poor, minimum wage increases have a
small positive effect on extreme and overall poverty for the full sample. This result averages
opposing impact across sectors. A 10% increase in minimum wages has a negative but insignificant
effect on the probability of extreme poverty for the covered labor force. The same minimum wage
hike significantly raises the odds of extreme deprivation for uncovered individuals between 1.6-
4%. There are no effects on overall poverty for the covered workforce but positive and significant
impact for the uncovered labor force.
These results hold when considering alternative specifications (see Appendix Table A.10). I
also estimate separate regressions by occupation to determine whether some workers are more
vulnerable to fall into poverty. Wage earners have a lower likelihood of deprivation but the effect
is insignificant. Public sector workers and domestic workers are more vulnerable. Hondurans in
self-employed jobs are the most adversely affected. A 10% hike in minimum wages increases the
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probability of extreme poverty by 2-4% and the likelihood of overall poverty between 1-2% for
this uncovered occupation. Employers are mostly unaffected.
My findings oppose those in Gindling and Terrell (2010), who find that minimum wage in-
creases modestly reduce extreme poverty. Given the findings in the previous sub-section, the sce-
narios are different. Hondurans obtain 90.4% of their total income from earnings, so the observed
growth in lower-paid informal employment is pushing some households below poverty thresholds.
From 2005-2012, increases in poverty for the uncovered labor force outweigh reductions for the
covered labor force due to the large minimum wage hikes over the period. These conditions imply
that raising minimum wages does not reduce poverty.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates recent Honduran minimum wage policy. Using repeated cross-section data
and exploiting large category-level variation in wage floors, I estimate their net effects on com-
pliance, labor market outcomes, and poverty. Results provide credible evidence in support of the
dual-sector minimum wage model. While employment losses are small, I find changes in labor
force composition. A 10% increase in minimum wages lowers the likelihood of covered employ-
ment by 8% and increases the probability of uncovered sector employment by 5%. Specifically,
wage earning employment falls while self-employment rises. Covered wages increase but rising
labor supply in the uncovered sector leads to a negative net effect on wages and earnings. These
labor market effects result in a higher risk of poverty for the uncovered labor force that is not
compensated by poverty reduction in the covered sector.
The negative impact of minimum wages occurs in an institutional context with weak enforce-
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ment of labor regulation. This setting leads to partial compliance with mandated minima, where
compliant and non-compliant employers co-exist. In Honduras, large employers are mostly com-
pliant while small businesses do not comply. After a large minimum wage hike, large firms increase
their average non-compliance rate by 36%. This result suggests that compliant employers mitigate
the adverse effects of minimum wage increases by avoiding the regulation. Without credible en-
forcement from governments, labor violations are likely to continue rising. Adverse minimum
wage effects on the formal sector may worsen because of non-compliance. In Honduras, compli-
ance is about 51%, which suggests that employment losses would double under full compliance.
While the estimated net effects of minimum wages in Honduras are seemingly robust, they are
not definitive. The most important limitation in this study is the absence of panel data. Inabil-
ity to track the same individuals over time does not allow observing transitions across or within
sectors to estimate a structural model that captures the dynamics behind the estimated net effects.
Such results would lead to a better understanding of how the adverse consequences of minimum
wages come to pass. Despite these and other potential limitations, this study updates and improves
upon previous work for Honduras, while also overcoming common empirical issues in the broader
minimum wage literature.
The policy implication of these results is that setting high minimum wages has detrimental
effects on labor markets, well-being, and compliance. While Honduran minimum wage policy is
unlikely to offer a template for other nations, it provides a cautionary tale. To fully understand
how minimum wage policies ultimately fare and how that differs from what we would like them to
accomplish we need to better understand the informal economy, why people enter this sector, and
the long-term consequences of participating in such activities.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1. Yearly changes in real hourly minimum wages by industry firm-size categories
Category Firm size 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Agriculture 1-15 6.9 4.2 -2.2 59.3 -3.2 -3.3 1.1
16+ 4.4 2.3 -1.3 33.8 1.1 -7.3 2.0
Non-metallic mining 1-15 6.9 4.1 -1.3 67.6 -8.3 19.7 1.1
16+ 4.4 2.3 -0.4 42.1 -6.6 21.0 0.6
Metallic mining All 4.4 -0.5 -4.0 16.0 -7.1 15.2 -1.9
Manufacturing 1-15 6.9 4.1 -1.3 71.9 -4.8 15.2 6.7
16+ 4.4 2.3 -0.4 44.3 2.3 9.4 -0.1
Utilities All 4.4 -0.5 -0.4 22.9 -0.8 19.5 2.1
Construction 1-15 6.9 4.1 -1.3 69.4 -4.6 20.5 6.9
16+ 4.4 2.3 -0.4 45.8 -1.6 11.2 0.4
Retail 1-15 6.9 4.1 -1.3 77.2 -3.8 13.2 5.9
16+ 4.4 2.3 -0.4 50.0 -0.1 7.4 1.0
Transport 1-15 6.9 4.1 -2.2 52.8 -6.2 19.9 5.6
16+ 4.4 2.3 -0.4 53.4 1.4 7.3 1.2
Real Estate 1-15 6.9 4.1 -2.2 58.4 0.7 9.2 5.2
16+ 4.4 2.3 -0.4 51.0 5.7 8.0 -0.8
Business Services 1-15 -3.7 -6.2 -11.1 204.5 -3.5 12.9 4.8
16+ -3.7 -6.2 -11.1 164.7 -0.3 10.6 0.6
Financial Services 1-15 5.5 5.1 0.0 24.3 -6.1 14.8 5.2
16+ 5.5 4.1 0.0 27.3 1.5 8.4 1.6
Communal and Personal Services 1-15 6.9 4.1 -1.3 74.0 -4.0 16.1 7.8
16+ 4.4 2.3 -0.4 49.8 -2.6 7.4 0.7
Export All 4.4 -0.5 -4.0 -5.7 2.6 6.0 1.4
Average 4.7 2.0 -2.1 58.9 -2.1 11.4 2.6
Source: Own calculations from real hourly minimum wage values in Appendix Table A.1.
Notes: The table shows percentage changes in legal minimum wages relative to the previous year.
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Table 1.2. Descriptive statistics by sector, averages for 2005-2012
Full sample Covered Uncovered
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Employment, hours, and wages
Employment rate 0.971 (0.168) 0.947 (0.223) 0.993 (0.083)
Hours per week 38.99 (17.351) 44.12 (14.433) 34.26 (18.435)
Share full-time (≥44 hpw) 0.432 (0.495) 0.577 (0.494) 0.299 (0.458)
Real Hourly Wages 12.11 (14.017) 13.06 (13.450) 10.91 (14.614)
Household poverty status
Extremely Poor 0.376 (0.484) 0.276 (0.447) 0.477 (0.499)
Poor 0.594 (0.491) 0.519 (0.500) 0.669 (0.471)
Individual & household characteristics
Males 0.644 (0.479) 0.653 (0.476) 0.634 (0.482)
Married 0.550 (0.497) 0.483 (0.500) 0.614 (0.487)
Years of education 6.23 (4.425) 7.51 (4.592) 5.02 (3.890)
Potential experience 24.1 (17.234) 18.5 (13.922) 29.4 (18.369)
Household size 5.44 (2.472) 5.41 (2.453) 5.47 (2.489)
Is household head 0.451 (0.498) 0.390 (0.488) 0.509 (0.500)
Lives in urban area 0.490 (0.500) 0.604 (0.489) 0.381 (0.486)
Composition across industries
Agriculture 0.343 (0.475) 0.222 (0.415) 0.458 (0.498)
Non-metallic mining 0.002 (0.045) 0.002 (0.046) 0.002 (0.043)
Metallic mining 0.001 (0.024) 0.001 (0.032) 0.000 (0.014)
Manufacturing 0.097 (0.296) 0.099 (0.299) 0.095 (0.293)
Utilities 0.004 (0.066) 0.009 (0.092) 0.000 (0.019)
Construction 0.063 (0.243) 0.085 (0.279) 0.042 (0.201)
Retail 0.222 (0.415) 0.163 (0.369) 0.277 (0.448)
Transport 0.035 (0.185) 0.039 (0.194) 0.032 (0.175)
Real Estate 0.002 (0.041) 0.003 (0.051) 0.001 (0.029)
Business Services 0.021 (0.143) 0.030 (0.171) 0.012 (0.108)
Financial Services 0.011 (0.106) 0.023 (0.148) 0.001 (0.028)
Communal and Personal Services 0.151 (0.358) 0.251 (0.433) 0.057 (0.232)
Export 0.048 (0.214) 0.075 (0.263) 0.023 (0.149)
N 327,764 166,976 160,788
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: All statistics are weighted. Wages are expressed in real Lempiras. The average real exchange rate for the
period is 10 Lempiras per $1 USD.
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Table 1.3. Labor market and poverty trends by sector
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Average Hourly MW 7.07 7.47 7.66 7.52 11.55 11.00 11.95 12.62 8.71
Employment rate
Covered 0.946 0.952 0.960 0.957 0.949 0.934 0.939 0.943 0.947
Uncovered 0.993 0.995 0.994 0.992 0.995 0.990 0.993 0.994 0.993
Employment composition
Covered employed 0.496 0.470 0.479 0.483 0.465 0.438 0.451 0.421 0.462
Uncovered employed 0.473 0.504 0.498 0.491 0.508 0.526 0.516 0.550 0.509
Unemployed 0.031 0.026 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.036 0.033 0.029 0.029
Hours per week
Covered 45.93 45.44 44.49 44.26 42.66 42.78 43.67 44.32 44.12
Uncovered 37.14 35.89 35.53 34.63 31.97 31.29 34.46 34.64 34.26
Real wages
Covered 12.07 12.48 12.90 13.13 13.74 13.46 13.38 13.04 13.06
Uncovered 10.23 10.70 12.48 11.08 11.81 10.49 10.98 9.22 10.91
Extreme Poverty
Covered 0.304 0.273 0.278 0.251 0.261 0.289 0.276 0.286 0.276
Uncovered 0.549 0.526 0.453 0.428 0.423 0.485 0.472 0.524 0.477
Poverty
Covered 0.529 0.500 0.535 0.499 0.500 0.532 0.525 0.535 0.519
Uncovered 0.716 0.692 0.670 0.631 0.619 0.673 0.667 0.713 0.669
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: All statistics are weighted. Wages are expressed in real Lempiras. The average real exchange rate for the period
is 10 Lempiras per $1 USD.
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Table 1.4. Compliance with legal minimum wages
Large firm
wage
earners
Small firm
wage
earners
Public
sector
workers
Domestic
workers Self-employed Employers
A. Incidence measures
Below MW 0.319 0.624 0.095 0.657 0.629 0.265
At MW 0.179 0.108 0.076 0.089 0.064 0.055
Above MW 0.502 0.269 0.830 0.254 0.307 0.680
B. Depth measures
Shortfall from MW 0.360 0.504 0.408 0.512 0.661 0.544
C. Changes over time
(i) Share below MW
Pre (2005-2008) 0.264 0.509 0.072 0.518 0.524 0.148
Post (2009-2012) 0.386 0.739 0.119 0.799 0.717 0.380
Difference 0.122 0.230 0.046 0.281 0.194 0.232
H0 : Pre = Post 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(ii) Shortfall from MW
Pre (2005-2008) 0.263 0.411 0.309 0.395 0.607 0.467
Post (2009-2012) 0.291 0.498 0.308 0.533 0.642 0.505
Difference 0.028 0.088 -0.002 0.138 0.034 0.037
H0 : Pre = Post 0.004 0.000 0.962 0.006 0.227 0.085
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: Incidence measures expressed in shares of workers. Below includes individuals with wages less than 0.90 of the
hourly MW; at counts those earning between [0.90,1.10] of the hourly MW, and above refers to those earning more than
1.10 times the hourly MW. The depth of non-compliance is calculated as the shortfall indicator (Bhorat et al., 2013a),
which measures how far actual wages are from minimum wages. Changes in Share Below MW over time are calculated by
regression. Differences in the Shortfall from MW are estimated by block bootstrap with 100 replications. Reported p-values
are drawn from t-tests where the null hypothesis is that non-compliance rates and depth are unchanged over time.
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Table 1.5. Tests for partial compliance with legal minimum wages
Wage earners (T) and
Public sector (C)
Large firms (T) and
Public sector (C)
Small firms (T) and
Public sector (C)
Panel A: Pre/Post
Post × T 0.123 0.096 0.132
(0.031)*** (0.025)*** (0.066)*
R2 0.293 0.186 0.354
N 143,095 82,029 82,492
Panel B: By year
2006×T 0.027 0.016 0.050
(0.018) (0.028) (0.011)***
2007×T 0.022 0.029 0.015
(0.032) (0.046) (0.027)
2008×T -0.019 0.000 -0.042
(0.043) (0.053) (0.046)
2009×T 0.101 0.068 0.119
(0.033)*** (0.034)* (0.068)*
2010×T 0.099 0.084 0.101
(0.044)** (0.046)* (0.080)
2011×T 0.148 0.144 0.134
(0.058)** (0.051)** (0.109)
2012×T 0.177 0.146 0.174
(0.068)** (0.060)** (0.116)
R2 0.293 0.186 0.355
N 143,095 82,029 82,492
Mean non-compliance (2005-2008) 0.387 0.264 0.509
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: Each panel and column presents a separate regression. Clustered standard errors by industry firm-size categories in
parentheses. Covariates include a constant, a dummy for males, married, years of education, potential experience and its square
(in years), a dummy variable for urban residence, the logarithm of industry-level IMAE index (by month) and value added (by
year). All regressions are weighted.
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
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Table 1.6. Net effects of legal minimum wages on labor market outcomes
Sector Occupation
Full Sample Covered Uncovered Wage earners Public sector
Domestic
workers
Self-
employed
Unpaid
workers Employers
A. Overall employment
(1) Probit -0.085
(0.023)***
(2) Probit -0.108
(0.008)***
Mean employment rate 0.971
Observations 327,764
B. Labor force composition
(1) Multinomial Logit -0.363 0.274 -0.272 0.002 0.000 0.259 0.026 0.000
(0.102)*** (0.092)*** (0.109)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.076)*** (0.012)** (0.004)
(2) Multinomial Logit -0.446 0.338 -0.311 0.000 0.000 0.368 0.029 0.004
(0.094)*** (0.098)*** (0.098)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.103)*** (0.014)** (0.005)
Mean employment share 0.462 0.509 0.371 0.064 0.026 0.392 0.093 0.024
Observations 327,764 327,764
C. Log Hours per week
(1) OLS -0.411 -0.173 -0.053 -0.088 -0.259 -0.410 -0.040 0.019 -0.232
(0.166)** (0.067)** (0.088) (0.026)*** (0.012)*** (0.003)*** (0.093) (0.108) (0.108)**
(2) OLS -0.480 -0.194 0.008 -0.100 -0.267 -0.412 0.004 0.116 -0.181
(0.177)** (0.072)** (0.096) (0.028)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.093) (0.129) (0.153)
Observations 305,441 153,695 151,746 123,173 21,797 8,725 116,955 26,930 7,861
D. Log Hourly Wages
(1) OLS 0.136 0.244 -0.691 0.142 0.148 0.073 -0.717 0.113
(0.161) (0.087)** (0.324)** (0.040)*** (0.032)*** (0.004)*** (0.335)** (0.188)
(2) OLS 0.205 0.286 -0.518 0.170 0.157 0.074 -0.548 0.044
(0.175) (0.097)*** (0.172)*** (0.048)*** (0.021)*** (0.005)*** (0.170)*** (0.243)
Observations 261,004 151,769 109,235 121,669 21,426 8,674 102,172 7,063
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: Clustered standard errors by industry (Panels A and B) and industry firm-size categories (Panels C and D) in parentheses. Panels A, C, and D present separate regressions. Estimates in
columns 2-3 and 4-10 of Panel B are from two separate Multinomial Logit regressions where the base category is unemployment. Covariates include a constant, a dummy for males, married, years
of education, potential experience and its square (in years), a dummy variable for urban residence, the logarithm of industry-level IMAE index (by month) and value added (by year). Specification
(1) controls for industry (or industry firm-size) and survey wave fixed effects. Specification (2) also includes linear category time trends. Coefficients for Probit and Multinomial Logit are marginal
effects with all other covariates at their mean. All regressions are weighted.
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
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Table 1.7. Net effects of legal minimum wages on poverty
Sector Occupation
Full Sample Covered Uncovered
Wage
earners
Public
sector
Domestic
workers
Self-
employed
Unpaid
workers Employers
A. Extreme Poverty
(1) Probit 0.051 -0.014 0.229 -0.015 0.062 0.307 0.227 0.159 0.201
(0.025)** (0.021) (0.041)*** (0.023) (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.051)*** (0.044)*** (0.042)***
(2) Probit 0.042 -0.013 0.089 -0.015 0.064 0.307 0.093 0.039 0.129
(0.038) (0.027) (0.037)** (0.033) (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.039)** (0.022)* (0.080)
Mean poverty rate 0.459 0.368 0.554 0.404 0.115 0.424 0.561 0.628 0.202
Observations 313,852 165,035 148,817 133,156 23,137 9,354 115,674 24,643 7,817
B. Poverty
(1) Probit 0.057 0.026 0.147 -0.002 0.106 0.383 0.151 0.078 0.086
(0.031)* (0.032) (0.035)*** (0.015) (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.039)*** (0.057) (0.037)**
(2) Probit 0.058 0.035 0.044 0.007 0.111 0.384 0.060 -0.013 -0.037
(0.037) (0.033) (0.023)* (0.021) (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.027)** (0.028) (0.071)
Mean poverty rate 0.680 0.624 0.738 0.667 0.337 0.663 0.750 0.778 0.392
Observations 313,852 165,035 148,817 133,156 23,137 9,360 115,674 24,651 7,866
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: Each column corresponds to a separate regression. Clustered standard errors by industry categories in parentheses. Covariates include a constant, a dummy for
males, married, years of education, potential experience and its square (in years), a dummy variable for urban residence, the logarithm of industry-level IMAE index (by
month) and value added (by year). Specification (1) controls for industry (or industry firm-size) and survey wave fixed effects. Specification (2) also includes linear category
time trends. Coefficients for Probit and Multinomial Logit are marginal effects with all other covariates at their mean. All regressions are weighted.
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
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Figure 1.1. Predicted effects of a minimum wage increase in a dual labor market
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Source: Own elaboration from Harris and Todaro (1970) and Boeri et al. (2011).
Figure 1.2. Variation in real minimum wages by year
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Source: Own calculations from Honduran minimum wage decrees.
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Figure 1.3. Minimum wage and labor force composition trends, 2005-2012
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Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Figure 1.4. Ratio of minimum wages to mean covered sector wages, 2005-2012
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Figure 1.5. Kernel densities of log wages minus log minimum wages
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Notes: These densities are average distributions from 2005-2012 and are centered so that MW = 0.
Figure 1.6. Non-compliance rates for large, small, and public workers, 2005-2012
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Chapter 2
Information Policies and Higher Education
Choices: Experimental Evidence from
Colombia1
with Leonardo Bonilla and Nicolas L. Bottan
2.1 Introduction
Motivated by the increasing demand for higher human capital in the labor market, governments
(and in some cases, non-profits) in developing countries have created Labor Market Observatories.
These institutions are tasked with improving the information available to high school students
deciding whether to pursue higher education and for universities determining what programs to
offer. They typically compile and publish statistics on average starting wages, higher education
supply, and employment rates for recent graduates by colleges, degrees and fields.2 Despite the
1We would like to thank the Department of Economics at the University of Illinois for financial support. Special
thanks are due to Richard Akresh and Martin Perry for their guidance, advice, and encouragement. We are grateful to
the Secretary of Education of Bogota´ for its interest in this project and authorization to visit the schools, to ICFES and
the Ministry of Education for the exit exam data and enrollment data sets, and to the field work team. Earlier versions
benefited from useful comments by Geoffrey Hewings, Dan Bernhardt, Adam Osman, Rebecca Thornton, Marieke
Kleemans, Seema Jayachandran, Paul Glewwe, Walter McMahon, Julian Cristia, Felipe Barrera-Osorio, Francisco
Gallego, Oscar Mitnik, Alejandro Ganimian, Guillermo Cruces, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and participants at various
seminars and conferences. This project was reviewed and approved in advance by the Institutional Review Board for
the protection of human subjects of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (IRB #13570). The approval letter
is in the Supplementary material for Chapter 2. All remaining errors and omissions are our sole responsibility.
2These data are typically constructed from matching college graduates to social security data.
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recent interest and allocated resources in implementing these online information systems, there
remains relatively little evidence on the role they play on high school students’ college decisions.
In this paper we explore the extent to which this information influences students’ knowledge
and beliefs about college, test scores, and higher education decisions. For this purpose, we conduct
a randomized controlled trial among senior high school students in 115 public schools in Bogota´,
Colombia, the country with the longest running Labor Observatory in Latin America.
A month after the beginning of the 2013 school year, 11th grade students in 58 schools were
given a 35-minute presentation delivered by young Colombian college graduates along with a
handout. The presentation covered three main topics: i) showing average statistics on the earning
premiums associated with graduating from college and mean salary differences between selected
colleges, degrees, and fields (also introducing the Labor Observatory website for students to visit
on their own), ii) the availability of student loan programs for financing higher education, and
iii) the importance of exit exam scores for college admission and obtaining financial aid. We
collect survey data that measures students’ knowledge of information and funding programs, as
well as their beliefs on average earnings for different levels of education. The experimental data are
then matched to administrative records that contain high school exit exam test scores and college
enrollment information (i.e. whether the student enrolled and their institution, degree, and field).
At baseline, our sample is mostly unaware of the existence of the Labor Observatory, funding
programs, and is misinformed about the average earnings of college graduates. Students over-
estimate the returns to college by almost 100%, consistent with previous evidence (Gamboa and
Rodrı´guez, 2014). The average effects of the information treatment on knowledge and earning
beliefs are modest. Student awareness of the Labor Observatory and a city-wide funding program
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(FESBO) are unaffected. The treatment does increase their familiarity with ICETEX, the largest
funding program in Colombia, by around 6.6%. We also find that the intervention does not signif-
icantly change earning beliefs, a result that is robust to different definitions of student perceptions.
Test scores and college enrollment rates show virtually no change, consistent with previous
studies that assess similar programs. We do find that students who enroll attend more prestigious
colleges because of the intervention. Though small in magnitude (between 0.5-0.6 percentage
points), this effect is economically significant and robust. It represents an increase of approxi-
mately 50% with respect to the control group’s average. This result indicates that providing in-
formation nudges some students to more selective colleges, achieving comparable effects to more
personalized and expensive information programs (Hastings et al., 2015, Busso et al., 2016).
Our estimates for the average effects of information on these outcomes are correctly sized,
since we have enough statistical power to detect small effects on knowledge, beliefs, test scores,
and higher education choices. The experimental design is comparable to previous studies that
evaluate information policies. We also allow for the possibility that our findings may be driven
by chance rather than the treatment, unlike most other papers. We adjust all reported p-values
for multiple hypothesis testing using a Bonferroni correction that accounts for correlation among
outcomes in a group, following Aker et al. (2012). Therefore, we are confident that our design is
correct and estimates do not capture spurious correlations or may be driven by specification choice.
We then test for suggestive evidence that some students may benefit from Labor Observatory
information more than others. Selected attributes include gender, family income, direction of er-
ror in baseline beliefs (underestimating or overestimating), students’ perceived academic ranking,
perceived self-efficacy, risk aversion, and perceived likelihood of college enrollment. Results con-
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sistently show no indication of heterogeneous impact of information across these dimensions.
These results may be interpreted as evidence that campaigns which employ data from online
information systems are unable to affect knowledge and beliefs, test scores, and higher education
choices for low-income students in a developing country. Since this is the objective of Labor
Market Observatories, their ability to motivate educational investment is perhaps overestimated.
Our study is part of a rapidly growing literature that explores how low-cost information treat-
ments affect educational choices. Given the success of these programs in primary schools (Nguyen,
2008, Jensen, 2010), the literature has proceeded to study their effectiveness at keeping students in
high school (Dinkelman and Martı´nez, 2014, Avitabile and De Hoyos Navarro, 2015) and motivat-
ing college enrollment (Booij et al., 2012, Loyalka et al., 2013, Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013,
Hastings et al., 2015, Pekkala-Kerr et al., 2015, Busso et al., 2016, Fryer Jr., 2016, McGuigan et al.,
2016, Rao, 2016). We contribute to a relevant policy discussion because governments are currently
devoting resources to maintaining online information systems and relying on dissemination cam-
paigns due to their documented effectiveness and low cost. However, these programs vary in their
capacity to increase enrollment rates for low-income students at secondary and higher educational
levels, as this paper and most of the related literature shows.
The results in this study also address concerns about unequal access to college education. De-
spite the significant returns to higher education, enrollment among disadvantaged students remains
low (McMahon, 2009). Three different policies are often proposed to reduce this inequity: alle-
viating credit constraints (Manski, 1992, Kane, 1994, Ellwood and Kane, 2000, Solis, 2013), in-
creasing financial aid take-up among the poor (Bettinger et al., 2012, Dynarski and Scott-Clayton,
2013), and eliminating the gap between expected and actual returns to college (Manski, 1993a).
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In our analysis, we test how the latter of these initiatives affects decisions by low-income students
and compare our results to existing evidence on the other two policies in Colombia.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides background on
Colombia’s higher education system. Section 2.3 outlines the experimental framework and de-
scribes the informational intervention based on Labor Observatory data. Section 2.4 presents the
data and empirical strategy. Section 2.5 reports average and heterogeneous impacts of the interven-
tion. Section 2.6 concludes by discussing our findings and potential directions for future research.
2.2 Higher education in Colombia
The Colombian higher education system consists of many institutions offering different degrees
in multiple fields. In total, there are 327 colleges in the country, with 132 located in the Bogota´
metropolitan area. These institutions differ in the degrees they grant, their administration, and
prestige. They offer vocational (2-year) and academic (4-year) degrees across 55 different fields of
study. Vocational degrees are granted in 92 technical/technological institutes, while 40 universities
supply most of the academic programs. There are 23 public and 109 private institutions. Six of the
top-10 universities in Colombia are located in Bogota´.3
Each institution has its own admissions criteria. Most colleges use a merit-based system con-
tingent on educational performance and a minimum test score on the SABER 11 high school exit
exam, but thresholds vary widely across institutions. While not always required to graduate from
high school, the majority of students take the exit exam at least once.4 However, it is a requirement
3The best universities in Colombia are ranked based on their students’ average performance on university exit exams,
the SABER PRO. In 2012, six institutions in Bogota´ were in the top-10: Universidad de los Andes, Universidad
Nacional, Universidad del Rosario, Universidad Externado, Universidad de la Sabana, and Pontificia Universidad
Javeriana. All institutions are private, except for the Universidad Nacional.
4Students are allowed to retake the SABER 11 exam for a fee of US$21.
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for college entry and as described below, a determinant factor for financial aid applications.
Higher education in Colombia is not free, and tuition costs are markedly different across col-
leges. On the one hand, students in public institutions pay tuition under a progressive system based
on family income. Costs per semester in public colleges can be as low as 0.1 minimum wages5,
about $29 (or $58 per year). On the other hand, tuition costs at top-tier private universities may
rise to 13.2 minimum wages or $3,800 per semester ($7,600 a year).
Two funding sources are available to college students in Bogota´. The Colombian Public Stu-
dent Loans Institution (ICETEX) runs the largest student loan program in the country. It funds
vocational, academic, and postgraduate studies in Colombia and abroad. Approximately 22% of
college students in Bogota´ received funding from this source during 2013. Recent reforms have
introduced zero-interest loans for low-income students at great success (Melguizo et al., 2016).
Bogota´’s Secretary of Education offers a second funding option for low-income students educated
in the city’s public schools: the Fund for Higher Education of Bogota´ (FESBO). This fund has
two financing options. The first targets high achieving students and offers loans for careers in any
college, degree, and field. The second provides non-targeted loans to pursue vocational degrees.
In both cases a fraction of the debt can be forgiven upon degree completion.
Students must fulfill several requirements in order to obtain a student loan. These include
Colombian citizenship, voluntarily providing their socioeconomic information, having an admit-
tance letter from an accredited college, and obtaining a minimum score on the SABER 11 high
school exit exam.6 However, perhaps the most important requirement is that all loans must be
5Hereafter, we express monetary variables in monthly minimum wages, a commonly used measure in Colombia. The
2013 monthly minimum wage was 535,600 Colombian Pesos (roughly 288 US dollars).
6Specific requirements on test scores have changed over time, since ICETEX offers different loan types. See http:
//www.icetex.gov.co/dnnpro5/en-us/cr%C3%A9ditoeducativo/pregrado.aspx for more information.
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backed by an approved co-debtor. This restriction is particularly binding for low-income families
because proposed co-debtors must pass a credit check and show evidence of financial capacity to
repay the full cost of the loan. In this sense, the Colombian system is less flexible compared to
Chile, where the government often backs student loans.7
The average benefits of higher education in the labor market are also heterogeneous. Figure
2.1 plots mean monthly earnings for college graduates in their first three years as well as the
interquartile range of these salaries (25th and 75th percentile). Differences in average salaries
and their spread are sizable across colleges, degrees, and fields. For example, mean earnings for
recent graduates from public institutions are 2 minimum wages versus 2.9 minimum wages for
private college graduates. The interquartile range shows that private college graduates in the 25th
percentile earn more than public institution graduates at the 75th percentile. On average, earnings
are higher for individuals with academic degrees, from top-10 institutions, and whose field is
classified as Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM).8 Earnings inequality is
substantial when comparing salaries between prestigious colleges and fields.
Given this heterogeneity in the Colombian higher education system, the government started the
Labor Observatory for Education in 2005 (http://www.graduadoscolombia.edu.co/). Its mission is
to “provide valuable information about the relevance of educational investment and help students
make higher education decisions”. It is the longest running labor observatory in Latin America,
predating similar initiatives in Mexico and Chile. The observatory provides statistics on average
starting wages for college graduates, how long it takes them to gain employment, and paints a
7See Gonza´lez-Velosa et al. (2015) for a detailed comparison of higher education systems in Chile and Colombia.
8STEM fields include agronomy, animal sciences, veterinary medicine, medicine, bacteriology, biology, physics,
mathematics, chemistry, geology, business, accounting, economics, and all engineering programs.
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picture of labor demand patterns across fields and regions. We will study students’ awareness of
the Labor Observatory and whether an informational intervention that uses data from this source
affects their beliefs, test scores, and higher education choices.
2.3 Experimental setting
In order to answer our research question, we conduct a randomized control trial in Bogota´. Public
school students enrolled in their senior year of high school (11th grade) are our population of
interest. Public schools face a disadvantage in higher education access relative to private schools
(see Supplementary material for Chapter 2 Table B.1). Most students in the public schooling
system come from low socioeconomic status and perform consistently worse on the SABER 11
exit exam, and therefore have lower enrollment rates; especially in academic programs, prestigious
colleges, and STEM fields.
Using administrative data, we select a representative sample of 120 public school-shifts out
of the 570 that offer an academic track.9 These institutions are all mixed-sex high schools with
at least 20 students enrolled in eleventh grade the year before our intervention. Half of the se-
lected schools are randomly assigned to receive an informational talk detailing earning premiums
by college, degree, and field while also discussing funding opportunities based on data from the
Labor Observatory. The remaining institutions serve as our comparison group. Despite numerous
attempts, we were unable to visit five schools, yielding a final sample of 115 schools. Schools
we could not reach corresponded to 3 treatment and 2 control schools. The inability to interview
9Most public high schools in Bogota´ have two shifts: morning and afternoon. Each shift has different students
and most importantly, different teachers and staff. Hence, each school-shift may be considered as an independent
educational institution. In what follows, we refer to school-shifts as schools.
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students at these schools does not affect the validity of our randomization procedure as our balance
tests will show. Overall, schools in our sample cover almost all neighborhoods in Bogota´, with
treatment and control schools relatively spread out over the city (see Supplementary material for
Chapter 2 Figure B.1).
Because selected schools vary in size, we decided to interview at most two classrooms in each
visit. In schools with only one or two classrooms of seniors, all eleventh grade students were
interviewed. In larger schools, we randomly selected two grade 11 classrooms to take part in our
study. Our sample consists of all students present in school on the days of our visits.
The timing of our intervention is summarized in Figure 2.2. In line with the academic cycle
for public institutions, which begins in February and ends in December, we arranged our visits at
certain key points over the 2013 school year. Baseline fieldwork and the intervention took place
during March, about a month after the beginning of the schooling cycle. We carried out one follow
up visit in August, just before students took the high school exit exam. Using these scores, students
apply to college between September and December. We use administrative data to measure test
scores and enrollment outcomes, which are described in the next section.
Baseline visits to all schools involved students responding a survey designed for this study.
After the surveys were collected, visits concluded in control schools. Students in treatment schools
were given a 35-minute presentation delivered by young Colombian college graduates.10 The
presentation covered three main topics: i) showing average statistics on the earning premiums
associated with graduating from college and mean salary differences between selected colleges,
degrees, and fields (while introducing websites where students could find this information on their
10We opted for local college graduates based on findings in Nguyen (2008), where information provided by role models
is shown to be more effective in comparison to researchers.
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own), ii) the availability of student loan programs for financing higher education, and iii) the
importance of exit exam scores for college admission and obtaining financial aid.
The first topic began by showing statistics on the average monthly earnings for individuals
with incomplete (0.9 minimum wages) and complete secondary (1.1 minimum wages) in graphical
form. These values were then compared to the mean monthly salary for individuals who have com-
pleted higher education, differentiating by vocational (2 minimum wages) and academic degrees
(2.9 minimum wages).11 Next, we introduced students to two websites where they could find very
detailed information on the labor market outcomes of college graduates: the Labor Observatory
and Finanzas Personales.12 Using these resources, students were shown how to find information
on average wages by means of examples (e.g. geographer v. geologist at the same institution
and medicine at different universities), the supply of degrees and fields across institutions, and the
average employment probabilities by college, degree, and field.
The second part of the talk focused on the two main funding programs available to students in
Bogota´: ICETEX and FESBO. For each program, we provided basic information regarding ben-
efits, application requirements, and deadlines. Students were encouraged to visit each program’s
website to collect more information on their own. We emphasized the fact that college education
can be affordable, even if they choose a relatively expensive university.
In the final portion of the talk, we highlighted the importance of good performance on the
SABER 11 high school exit exam. As mentioned in the previous section, this test is a determinant
factor for admission in most colleges and minimum scores are required to obtain funding. Students
11Reference earnings for incomplete and complete secondary were estimated from household survey data for 2011.
12This site is maintained by Semana publications, one of the leading media groups in Colombia. Its information
system is based on data from the Labor Observatory presented in a user-friendly way. The page is located at http:
//www.finanzaspersonales.com.co/calculadoras/articulo/salarios-profesion-para-graduados/45541.
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were allowed time for questions and were given a one-page handout summarizing the main points
of the talk, which also provided links to all websites mentioned during the presentation.13
2.4 Data and estimation strategy
2.4.1 Data
We employ two sources of data in our analysis: surveys and administrative records. Students in
selected schools answered a baseline and follow up questionnaire. The baseline survey was com-
pleted by 6,601 students, and inquired about demographics, family background, socioeconomic
status, educational history, knowledge and beliefs about the higher education system, aspirations,
and attitudes towards risk. The follow up survey was completed by 5,503 students in the same
schools. It mainly followed up on baseline questions about knowledge, beliefs, and aspirations.
Given the lower response rates at follow up, we test for evidence of selective attrition. There is
no indication that baseline and follow up respondents differ by treatment status (Supplementary
material for Chapter 2 Table B.2).14 Observed attrition is likely due to absences on the day of our
second visit since we are able to match most of the baseline sample to administrative data collected
at the end of the year.
Administrative records are matched to the experimental sample to measure exit exam per-
formance and college enrollment after the intervention. First, we use data from the Colombian
Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education (ICFES). These data contain students’ raw scores
on the high school exit exam across eight different subject areas and their overall performance.
13The original and translated copy of this handout may be found in the Supplementary material for Chapter 2.
14In unreported results, we also compared observable characteristics across respondents and non-respondents and found
little difference between both samples.
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They also gather information on demographics, family background, and socioeconomic attributes.
When constructing individual and household-level controls we use administrative data, replacing
any missing information from our surveys. The matching rate with ICFES data is approximately
95.7%, and shows no significant differences across treatment and control groups (column 2 of
Table B.2). Second, enrollment information is provided by the National Information System for
Higher Education (SNIES). These data help us track students in our sample who enrolled in col-
lege, and identify their institution, degree, and field. About 95.4% of the experimental sample with
valid test scores are matched to SNIES data (column 3 of Table B.2).
Given our objective lies in exploring whether an information treatment using Labor Observa-
tory data affects knowledge and beliefs, test scores, and higher education choices; we focus on
three sets of variables:
1. Knowledge and beliefs. In both baseline and follow up surveys, we asked students to indi-
cate whether they were familiar with the Labor Observatory website and available funding
programs (ICETEX and FESBO). Their answers were in Yes/No form, and we construct
dummy variables equal to one if Yes and zero otherwise.
Next, we elicited beliefs about expected earnings across different levels of education. Specif-
ically, we asked: “How much do you think an average individual who recently began to work
earns per month (in minimum wages) in each of the following situations? a) completed high
school but does not go to college, b) completes a vocational degree, and c) completes an
academic degree.” The options range between 1 to 10 or more minimum wages. Using the
responses, we construct perceived earning errors for vocational and academic degrees as
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the percentage error in beliefs relative to earning estimates from household surveys. These
measures are similar to the ones used in Hastings et al. (2015).
2. Test scores. We examine the effect of our intervention on students’ overall, math, and lan-
guage scores (the two most heavily weighted fields).15 Since our matched data contains raw
scores, these values are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of 1 with
respect to the control group for ease of interpretation.
3. Higher education choices. Because the matched data contains information on observed ca-
reer choices, we first measure enrollment with a dummy variable equal to one if a student
enrolled in any higher education program and zero otherwise (College Enrollment). Then,
we take advantage of data on the institution, degree, and field of enrollment. We define four
outcomes: a dummy variable that indicates whether the student is pursuing an Academic
Degree, a dummy variable that equals one if enrolled in a Private College, a dummy variable
that equals one if enrolled in a Top-10 College, and a dummy variable that equals one if their
program of study is classified as a STEM field.
Table 2.1 presents baseline statistics for knowledge and belief outcomes, student attributes,
and school characteristics across treatment and control schools. The final column presents p-
values for the hypothesis that means are equal across groups, which are estimated by regression
with clustered standard errors at the school-level. Both groups are statistically identical before the
intervention, indicating that our randomization was successful. A joint test for the significance of
15The official weights are: mathematics (3), language (3), social sciences (2), biology (1), physics (1), chemistry (1)
and philosophy (1).
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student and school variables on the likelihood of attending a treatment school indicates that they
are uncorrelated (p-value of 0.239).
Individuals in our sample are almost 18 years old and about 47.3% are male. Students mainly
come from low socioeconomic status: only 16.5% of their parents have completed college and
68% report that family income lies below 2 minimum wages ($576 per month). About 17% are
employed while attending high school. To measure academic self-concept, we asked students to
rank their academic performance relative to their peers on a Likert-scale from 1-10 where the latter
is the highest value. As a measure of self-efficacy, students rated how often they achieved their
goals (from 1 to 10, where 1 is never and 10 is always). Individuals above the median response
are classified as high academic self-concept and self-efficacy, while those below constitute the low
group. Given that risk aversion has been found to play an important role in educational decisions,
students were asked to play a game at baseline.16 The resulting classification indicates that 85%
of our sample is risk averse. We also asked students’ perceived probability of college enrollment.
Over 84% reported in the baseline survey that they were likely to enroll.
2.4.2 Estimation strategy
Given the random assignment of treatment status, we quantify the effect of providing Labor Ob-
servatory information to public school students in Bogota´ using cross-sectional or difference-in-
difference regressions depending on whether outcomes are observed once or twice.
For cross-sectional outcomes that are only observed after the intervention we estimate:
16Students face the following hypothetical scenario: They were just hired for a new short-term job and can choose
between a fixed salary or a lottery in which earnings are determined by a coin flip. By varying the optimistic scenario
payment, we classify students in a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 is extremely risk averse and 4 is risk loving. We consider
a student risk averse if they are classified 1 or 2.
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yis,t=1 = α + βTs + θXis,t=0 + uis,t=1 (2.1)
where yis,t=1 is the outcome for student i attending school s at the follow up, t = 1. We include
an intercept, α, and control for baseline student and household-level attributes (male, age, age
squared, family income, and parental education), school characteristics (average scores on the exit
exam in previous years, whether the school has a computer lab, shift indicators, and school size),
and neighborhood fixed effects in Xis,t=0. Given that take-up depends on the level of attention
placed by students, β captures the intent-to-treat effect of the informational intervention. uis,t+1
is a mean-zero error term assumed to be uncorrelated with the treatment indicator since it was
randomly assigned. Equation (2.1) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)17 with clustered
standard errors at the school-level.
For outcomes available at both baseline and follow up, we employ two specifications. First, we
estimate Equation (2.1), but include the baseline outcome as a control. This ANCOVA approach
may provide additional power when autocorrelation in outcomes is low (McKenzie, 2012). Second,
we estimate a difference-in-difference specification with student-level fixed effects:
yist = αPost+ β(Ts × Post) + µi + uist (2.2)
where Post is a dummy variable that equals one after information exposure and zero otherwise. α
estimates changes in the outcome over time and µi is a student-specific effect that controls for time-
invariant characteristics. Again, β is our coefficient of interest, which measures the intent-to-treat
effect of the information treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the school-level.
17We also estimate Probit regressions. Because results are largely unchanged, only OLS estimates are shown.
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Given that we are testing whether the intervention affected multiple outcomes, there is the pos-
sibility that our findings may be driven by chance rather than by the treatment. For all our estimates
we adjust the resulting p-values for multiple hypothesis testing using a Bonferroni correction that
accounts for correlation among outcomes in a group, following Aker et al. (2012).18 We distinguish
between three groups of outcomes when calculating adjusted p-values: knowledge and beliefs (5
outcomes), test scores (3 outcomes), and higher education choices (5 outcomes).
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Average effects
Descriptive statistics for knowledge and beliefs are presented in Table 2.1. Only 7.7% of students
are aware of the existence of the Labor Observatory. Funding programs are slightly better known.
Almost 70% of students express familiarity with ICETEX and 17.5% with FESBO. Students in
our sample tend to overestimate college earnings. They believe average monthly earnings for
vocational and academic graduates exceed observed salaries by about 64% and 95%, respectively.
Figure 2.3 plots the distribution of these errors to study belief dispersion. Individual perceptions are
not far from actual vocational earnings, with 76.2% reporting beliefs within one standard deviation
of the true salary. Beliefs for academic degrees are more disperse: 43.1% of students are within
one standard deviation, 46.2% between one and three standard deviations, and 10.7% more than
three standard deviations. Knowledge and belief outcomes are balanced at baseline. These results
are consistent with previous evidence for Colombia (Gamboa and Rodrı´guez, 2014) and other
countries (Pekkala-Kerr et al., 2015, Hastings et al., 2015, McGuigan et al., 2016).
18The adjusted p-value for the k-th variable in a group of K different outcomes is given by 1− (1− pk)K1−r−k where
p is the usual p-value and r−k is the average correlation among all other outcomes excluding k.
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The effects of the information treatment on knowledge and beliefs are reported in Table 2.2.
Panel A reports ANCOVA regressions and Panel B presents difference-in-difference estimates with
individual fixed-effects. On average, student awareness of the Labor Observatory was unchanged
by the informational talk. Results are robust to specification choice and are further confirmed by
adjusting p-values for multiple hypothesis testing. The intervention does have a positive and sig-
nificant effect on student knowledge of the largest funding program, ICETEX. Average awareness
increases by at least 4.6 percentage points, or 6.6% of the baseline mean. This estimate remains
significant even after correcting for multiple testing, with p-values between 0.009 and 0.051. The
evidence also indicates that knowledge of FESBO was unaffected.
Results show that earning beliefs are unchanged for the sample. ANCOVA estimates are close
to zero and insignificant while difference-in-difference coefficients are slightly positive but also
not significant at any conventional level. In fact, adjusted p-values are close to 1, indicating that
the information treatment does not change students’ expectations about the average earnings for
college graduates. Perhaps students are not considering an average individual as a reference point
but themselves. To explore this possibility, we compare reported beliefs with salaries for students’
aspired careers. In the survey, they were asked to list their ideal college, degree, and field. Using
this alternate comparison point, we find similar results (see Supplementary material for Chapter 2
Table B.3). We also estimate effects on aspirations: ideal college, degree, and field, and find no
impact (Supplementary material for Chapter 2 Table B.4).
Given these results, we now explore whether the intervention changes test scores and higher
education choices. We present estimates from cross-section regressions for students interviewed at
baseline that are matched to the administrative records (full sample) and students observed in both
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in-school surveys who are successfully matched to administrative data (balanced sample).
The SABER 11 exit exam was taken by students in our sample five months after the inter-
vention. We focus on overall performance and scores on the two most heavily weighted subjects:
mathematics and language.19 All scores are standardized with mean zero and standard deviation
one with respect to the control group. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.3 present the average effects of the
treatment on test scores. Overall, there is no evidence that students exposed to Labor Observatory
information adjust their effort on the exam. While estimated coefficients are consistently positive
for mathematics and only marginally insignificant even when adjusting for multiple hypothesis
tests, we conclude that the information intervention had no effects on test scores.
We now study higher education choices. College enrollment rates for our sample are low, since
only about 44% attend a higher education institution (including both vocational and academic
programs). The majority pursue vocational degrees (34.6%) and the rest choose academic careers
(9.6%). Few public school students attend private institutions (15%) and top-10 colleges (1.1%).
Only about 5.2% opt for careers in STEM fields. Columns 4 to 8 of Table 2.3 show treatment effect
estimates for these outcomes. We find no effect of information on the probability of enrolling
in college, which is robust across samples and to multiple hypothesis corrections. Results for
degree type and private colleges are slightly positive but insignificant. There is a positive effect
on the likelihood of enrolling in a top-10 college. The estimated effects lie between 0.5 and 0.6
percentage points, depending on the sample, and remain statistically significant after adjusting for
multiple testing. Though small in magnitude, this impact is economically significant. It represents
an increase of approximately 50% with respect to the control group’s average. Estimated effects
19Estimated treatment effects for other subjects show no effects.
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on careers in STEM fields are also positive but not statistically significant.
Our results are consistent with previous literature. Most work analyzing information treatments
finds no effect of disclosing information on college enrollment (Booij et al., 2012, Oreopoulos and
Dunn, 2013, Pekkala-Kerr et al., 2015, Wiswall and Zafar, 2015, Fryer Jr., 2016, McGuigan et al.,
2016). Intensive margin effects on college type are comparable to interventions that focus on stu-
dents who are already applying to college and have a high probability of enrollment (Hoxby and
Turner, 2013, Hastings et al., 2015). Opting for a top-10 college may have large implications on
long-run earnings (conditional on graduating). Recall from Figure 2.1 that students who gradu-
ate from a top-10 college in Colombia earn significantly more than non-top college students (1
minimum wage more on average). Therefore, while providing information may not lead more
individuals to attend college, it does affect what colleges are chosen by those who do enroll.
Overall, an informational nudge using data from an online information system that intends to
help students make educational decisions is ineffective on a representative sample of public high
school students in a developing country. Our experimental design has enough statistical power to
detect small effects (see Supplementary material for Chapter 2 Table B.5) and most of our estimates
are fairly precise, so an explanation for the lack of impact lies elsewhere. In particular, we now test
whether the informational intervention affects only a small fraction of students and discuss other
potential obstacles that limit the success of information policies in the conclusion.
2.5.2 Heterogeneous effects
Even though we find modest effects of providing Labor Observatory information on average, it
may be possible that some students benefited more than others from our intervention. Given the
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richness of our data, we test for differential effects across student and household-level attributes.
These include gender, family income, direction of error in baseline beliefs (underestimating or
overestimating), students’ perceived academic ranking, perceived self-efficacy, risk aversion, and
perceived likelihood of college enrollment. These results should be interpreted as suggestive,
because the data and experiment were not stratified by these characteristics. Despite this limitation,
the analysis may provide further insight into whether and how information programs work.
Depending on the outcomes, we estimate ANCOVA or difference-in-difference regressions
that interact a dummy variable for each group with the treatment indicator and all other right hand
side variables. This procedure estimates differential effects for the informational intervention but
also allows the coefficients on included controls to vary across groups. Regressions are estimated
by OLS with clustered standard errors at the school-level. We adjust all p-values for multiple
hypothesis testing using the procedure in Aker et al. (2012), also accounting for the fact that we
calculate three coefficients: the reference group treatment effect, an interaction, and their sum.
Table 2.4 presents estimates for knowledge and belief outcomes by gender, family income,
and direction of perceived errors at baseline. Results for knowledge of the Labor Observatory
are mostly insignificant and do not differ across groups. Estimated coefficients on familiarity with
ICETEX are significant for boys and students who underestimate college returns at baseline but are
not statistically different from effects on girls and overestimators. We find no differential effects on
knowledge of FESBO. Effects on beliefs are mostly insignificant, although we note that students
who underestimate at baseline seem to adjust their earning expectations upwards. However, these
estimates are noisy. In the Appendix, we also report effects by self-perception and risk aversion
(see Table B.6). Similar to the above results, only coefficients on knowledge of ICETEX are
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significant. Students with low perceived academic ranking and high self-efficacy report increased
awareness of this funding program. However, we cannot reject that these coefficients are different
from the estimates for students with high perceived ranking and low self-efficacy, respectively.
Differential effects for test scores are presented in the first three columns of Table 2.5. Overall,
we do not find any heterogeneous impact across gender, income, and baseline error direction.
There is some suggestive evidence that the treatment improved language scores for high self-
efficacy students, and the difference is significant compared to individuals with low perceived
self-efficacy (see Table B.7). The analysis finds no other differences across baseline attributes.
We also explore potential heterogeneity across the score distribution in test scores by estimating
quantile specifications of our cross-sectional regressions. Figure B.2 in the Appendix shows no
evidence of heterogeneous impact across the distribution of test scores.
The remainder of Table 2.5 presents heterogeneous effects for higher education choices. There
are no subgroup differences across the selected characteristics, including self-perception and risk
aversion (Table B.7). Some coefficients are positive, but most are statistically insignificant. While
we found positive and robust average effects on enrollment in a top-10 college, there is no indica-
tion from our data that certain students enrolled in these institutions more than others.
This analysis indicates that in addition to modest average effects, the information treatment
had no differential impact on students. However, these results are relatively imprecise and only
suggestive since data limitations restrict our ability to identify small heterogeneous effects.
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2.6 Conclusion
The growth in online information systems by developing country governments has led to an in-
crease in available data on educational and labor market outcomes. These websites are targeted
towards high school students in the process of making higher education decisions. This paper
evaluates whether an information treatment that uses data from Colombia’s Labor Observatory, the
longest running college information system in Latin America, affects the decision-making process
of public school students in the capital city of Bogota´. We conduct a randomized controlled trial in
115 schools, 58 of which received a 35-minute presentation by young college graduates that dis-
cussed the average earning premiums upon completing college, available funding options to cover
costs, and the importance of test scores for college admission and obtaining financing.
Using surveys and administrative data, we find modest effects of this informational nudge on
individual outcomes. Students do not increase their knowledge of the Labor Observatory or sig-
nificantly change their beliefs, but do become more familiar with the ICETEX funding program.
Test scores and college enrollment are also unaffected, although students who enroll choose more
prestigious colleges (top-10 institutions) because of the intervention. We also explore the pos-
sibility that some students benefit from information more than others, but find little evidence to
suggest that is the case. Our findings are consistent with previous studies that assess similar pro-
grams in different settings. We interpret these results as evidence that campaigns to raise awareness
for government-maintained information systems are unable to affect knowledge and beliefs, test
scores, and higher education choices for low-income students in a developing country.
Given the success of information programs in primary and secondary, our results suggest that
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these policies are less effective in college. Information is thus unable to raise enrollment at all
levels, as has been implied in the literature. Access to higher education is challenging in Colom-
bia, since financial, academic, and information constraints play a role. In our follow up survey, we
asked students to list what they believed was the most significant barrier to enroll in college. 64.5%
reported that they believed college was unaffordable while 32% claimed that obtaining admission
was the largest obstacle. Our results here show that incorrect information is also a problem, but that
low cost informational interventions are unable to raise enrollment rates by themselves. This evi-
dence suggests that we should be less optimistic about the ability for online information systems to
motivate education. In Colombia, programs that provide funding through zero-interest loans (Mel-
guizo et al., 2016) and merit-based scholarships (London˜o-Ve´lez et al., 2017) have been highly
successful in increasing college enrollment rates in Colombia, especially among poorer students.
However, informational programs have potentially more to offer. Given their low costs, ad-
ditional investment on personalized interventions may successfully target students who are more
likely to benefit. Studies evaluating these initiatives find slightly better results than we report here
(Bettinger et al., 2012, Hastings et al., 2015, Avitabile and De Hoyos Navarro, 2015, Busso et al.,
2016). Improving informational campaigns for education requires further research. Who should be
targeted by information policies? What is the relevant information for higher education decisions?
When is the best time to disclose this knowledge? How can we properly ensure and measure in-
formation take-up? We are hopeful that the growing literature to which our study contributes will
seek answers to these unanswered questions to help governments improve college access among
the poor, thereby facilitating upward social and economic mobility.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1. Baseline outcomes and characteristics for experimental sample
Control Treatment Difference
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p-value
Knowledge
Knows Labor Observatory 0.072 (0.258) 0.082 (0.274) 0.200
Knows ICETEX 0.699 (0.459) 0.688 (0.463) 0.646
Knows FESBO 0.181 (0.385) 0.168 (0.374) 0.254
Perceived earning errors
Vocational 0.656 (0.978) 0.617 (0.939) 0.308
Academic 0.976 (0.834) 0.923 (0.834) 0.120
Student attributes
Male 0.475 (0.499) 0.472 (0.499) 0.831
Age 17.639 (0.925) 17.663 (0.942) 0.504
Parent completed secondary 0.398 (0.489) 0.392 (0.488) 0.719
Parent completed higher education 0.176 (0.381) 0.155 (0.362) 0.270
Family income (<1 minimum wage) 0.136 (0.343) 0.151 (0.358) 0.289
Family income (1-2 minimum wages) 0.538 (0.499) 0.539 (0.499) 0.941
Family income (>2 minimum wages) 0.320 (0.467) 0.307 (0.461) 0.589
Student works 0.164 (0.370) 0.176 (0.381) 0.352
Perceived high academic ranking 0.424 (0.494) 0.395 (0.489) 0.128
Perceived high self-efficacy 0.350 (0.477) 0.355 (0.479) 0.749
Risk averse 0.857 (0.350) 0.845 (0.362) 0.374
Perceived in likelihood of enrollment 0.841 (0.366) 0.844 (0.363) 0.832
School characteristics
Number of students (2010-2012) 95.264 (48.292) 92.349 (31.826) 0.718
SABER 11 score (2010-2012) 0.160 (0.216) 0.118 (0.275) 0.381
Morning shift 0.647 (0.478) 0.625 (0.484) 0.811
Afternoon shift 0.330 (0.470) 0.359 (0.480) 0.748
Single shift 0.023 (0.150) 0.016 (0.125) 0.803
School has computer lab 0.969 (0.173) 0.958 (0.201) 0.749
Total number of students 3,224 3,377
Total number of schools 58 57
Source: Authors’ calculations from surveys matched to administrative data.
Notes: Using date of birth, we compute each student’s age on December 31, 2013. The number of students is
the average number of individuals who sat for the SABER 11 exam in each year from 2010-2012. SABER 11
scores are standardized with respect to each year’s national average. The last column presents the p-value of the
difference in the attribute between treatment and control groups calculated by regression with clustered standard
errors at the school-level. A joint significance test for student and school variables accepts that these characteristics
are unable to explain the likelihood of attending a treatment school, with an estimated p-value of 0.239.
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Table 2.2. Average effects on knowledge and beliefs
Knowledge Perceived earning errors
Labor Observatory ICETEX FESBO Vocational Academic
A. ANCOVA
Treatment 0.008 0.049*** 0.016 -0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.016) (0.012) (0.027) (0.029)
Adjusted p-value 0.761 0.009 0.608 1.000 1.000
Observations 5,080 5,365 5,112 5,121 5,169
B. Difference-in-differences
Treatment × Post -0.005 0.046** 0.007 0.037 0.035
(0.010) (0.018) (0.014) (0.038) (0.035)
Adjusted p-value 0.978 0.051 0.986 0.844 0.832
Observations 10,556 10,861 10,591 10,599 10,656
Baseline mean 0.077 0.694 0.175 0.636 0.949
Source: Authors’ calculations from survey data.
Notes: Each column and panel correspond to separate OLS regressions. Panel A presents coefficients of AN-
COVA regressions that control for student and household-level attributes (male, age, age squared, family income,
and parental education), school characteristics (average scores on exit exam in previous years, has computer lab,
shift indicators, and school size), and neighborhood fixed effects. Panel B presents coefficients for difference-
in-difference regressions that control for individual fixed-effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at school-level. We report adjusted p-values for multiple hypothesis testing using a Bonferroni correction that
accounts for correlation among outcomes in a group (see Section 2.4.2 for details).
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.3. Average effects on test scores and higher education choices
Test scores Higher education choices
Overall College Academic Private Top-10 STEM
score Math Language enrollment degree college college field
A. Full sample
Treatment -0.002 0.045 -0.004 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.005** 0.005
(0.038) (0.042) (0.033) (0.022) (0.008) (0.012) (0.003) (0.006)
Adjusted p-value 0.997 0.343 0.952 0.997 0.754 0.593 0.086 0.872
Observations 6,318 6,318 6,318 6,298 6,298 6,298 6,298 6,298
B. Balanced sample
Treatment 0.019 0.065 0.011 -0.001 0.010 0.012 0.006** 0.006
(0.039) (0.041) (0.035) (0.023) (0.008) (0.013) (0.003) (0.006)
Adjusted p-value 0.858 0.144 0.826 1.000 0.601 0.719 0.082 0.779
Observations 5,427 5,427 5,427 5,414 5,414 5,414 5,414 5,414
Baseline mean 0.438 0.096 0.150 0.011 0.052
Source: Authors’ calculations from surveys matched to administrative data.
Notes: Each column and panel correspond to separate OLS regressions that control for student and household-level attributes (male, age, age
squared, family income, and parental education), school characteristics (average scores on exit exam in previous years, has computer lab, shift
indicators, and school size), and neighborhood fixed effects. Panel A presents results for students interviewed at baseline that are matched to
the administrative records (full sample) and Panel B for students observed in both in-school surveys who are matched to administrative data
(balanced sample). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at school-level. We report adjusted p-values for multiple hypothesis testing using
a Bonferroni correction that accounts for correlation among outcomes in a group (see Section 2.4.2 for details).
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.4. Heterogeneous effects on knowledge and beliefs
Knowledge Perceived earning errors
Labor Observatory ICETEX FESBO Vocational Academic
A. Gender
Female -0.012 0.033 -0.005 0.047 0.068
(0.013) (0.023) (0.019) (0.053) (0.046)
Male 0.002 0.060* 0.021 0.025 -0.003
(0.015) (0.024) (0.019) (0.042) (0.042)
p-value (Female=Male) 0.998 0.963 0.969 1.000 0.891
Observations 10,556 10,861 10,591 10,599 10,656
B. Family income
Low (≤2 MW) -0.003 0.051 0.004 0.020 0.032
(0.011) (0.021) (0.016) (0.048) (0.039)
Middle (>2 MW) -0.009 0.035 0.013 0.073 0.045
(0.016) (0.024) (0.025) (0.047) (0.051)
p-value (Low=Middle) 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.996 1.000
Observations 10,556 10,861 10,591 10,599 10,656
C. Perceived earning errors (academic)
Under or equal -0.010 0.162** 0.080 0.195 0.119
(0.040) (0.051) (0.048) (0.100) (0.090)
Over -0.006 0.038 0.002 0.025 0.022
(0.011) (0.019) (0.015) (0.037) (0.035)
p-value (Under=Over) 1.000 0.141 0.738 0.603 0.978
Observations 10,147 10,422 10,178 10,318 10,417
Source: Authors’ calculations from survey data.
Notes: Each column and panel correspond to separate difference-in-difference regressions that interact a dummy variable for each group with the
treatment indicator and all controls. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at school-level. Reported significance levels and p-values are adjusted
for multiple hypothesis testing.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.5. Heterogeneous effects on test scores and higher education choices
Test scores Higher education choices
Overall College Academic Private Top-10 STEM
score Math Language enrollment degree college college field
A. Gender
Female -0.030 0.029 -0.045 -0.014 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.001
(0.043) (0.047) (0.041) (0.026) (0.015) (0.003) (0.011) (0.007)
Male 0.030 0.063 0.043 0.025 0.021 0.007 0.011 0.008
(0.048) (0.050) (0.041) (0.024) (0.014) (0.004) (0.013) (0.010)
p-value (Female=Male) 0.632 0.677 0.133 0.659 0.961 0.991 1.000 0.998
Observations 6,318 6,318 6,318 6,298 6,298 6,298 6,298 6,298
B. Family income
Low (≤2 MW) -0.022 0.022 -0.017 0.006 0.024 0.004 0.013 0.005
(0.042) (0.043) (0.039) (0.023) (0.011) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
Middle (>2 MW) 0.042 0.096 0.026 0.000 -0.010 0.009 -0.002 0.004
(0.049) (0.055) (0.046) (0.027) (0.021) (0.006) (0.016) (0.013)
p-value (Low=Middle) 0.541 0.221 0.591 1.000 0.492 0.974 0.986 1.000
Observations 6,318 6,318 6,318 6,298 6,298 6,298 6,298 6,298
C. Perceived earning errors (academic)
Under or equal 0.004 0.081 0.033 0.056 0.027 -0.001 0.030 0.032
(0.099) (0.099) (0.094) (0.045) (0.034) (0.008) (0.033) (0.018)
Over -0.008 0.043 -0.011 -0.006 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.037) (0.041) (0.034) (0.022) (0.013) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
p-value (Under=Over) 1.000 0.853 0.826 0.636 0.998 0.959 0.994 0.620
Observations 6,021 6,021 6,021 6,003 6,003 6,003 6,003 6,003
Source: Authors’ calculations from surveys matched to administrative data.
Notes: Each column and panel correspond to separate OLS regressions that interact a dummy variable for each group with the treatment indicator and all
controls. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at school-level. Reported significance levels and p-values are adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 2.1. Average monthly earnings of recent college graduates
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from Labor Observatory data.
Notes: Monthly earnings are expressed in minimum wages (1 minimum wage ≈ $288 US dollars), and correspond to
the average entry-level salaries for recent graduates by college, level, and field (in the first three years). The lower
and upper bounds identify the 25th and 75th percentiles.
Figure 2.2. Intervention timing and primary data collection
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Figure 2.3. Distribution of perceived earning errors at baseline
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from survey data.
Notes: We calculate perceived earning errors as the difference between perceived and actual earnings divided by actual earnings. Let yj denote earnings, with
j = {actual,perceived}. Errors are calculated as (yperceived − yactual)/yactual.
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Chapter 3
How Important is Spatial Correlation in
Randomized Controlled Trials?1
with Kathy Baylis
3.1 Introduction
Socioeconomic data tend to be correlated over time and space. However, randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) inspired by clinical experiments do not account for the latter relationship because
cross-sectional correlation is uncommon in medical data. RCTs provide researchers with a simple
and credible way to estimate the unbiased causal effect of a randomized intervention (Duflo et al.,
2008), which has led to a vast amount of evidence on the effectiveness of educational, financial,
health, labor market policies, information, and other programs on individual and household-level
outcomes.2
This paper studies the consequences of ignoring cross-sectional correlation over space on re-
1We would like to thank Richard Akresh, Giuseppe Arbia, Mary Arends-Kuenning, Andre Avelino, Anil Bera,
Leonardo Bonilla, Ben Crost, Raymond Florax, Don Fullerton, Rafael Gardun˜o-Rivera, Geoffrey Hewings, Roger
Koenker, Esteban Lo´pez, Daniel McMillen, Dusan Paredes, Paolo Postiglione, and Ignacio Sarmiento for fruitful and
engaging discussions on this research; as well as seminar participants at the University of Illinois, the 2014 North
American Regional Science Conference, the 2015 Midwest International Development Conference, and the 2015
AAEA & WAEA Joint Meeting. Marin Thompson provided outstanding research assistance. All remaining errors and
omissions are entirely our own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Illinois.
2RCTs have also been criticized. The most debated issues include their lack of external validity and replicability (Ro-
drik, 2008), agnosticism with respect to behavioral changes (Ravallion, 2009), partial equilibrium approach (Deaton,
2010), and interference or spillover effects (Manski, 1993b).
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searchers’ ability to evaluate randomized programs using difference-in-differences (DD). Treat-
ment status in RCTs is often assigned at the individual or cluster-level. This study focuses on the
latter designs. We evaluate DD methods because they are commonly used to estimate treatment
effects in settings that collect data before and after treatment. When treatment varies at the cluster-
level and outcomes are measured at the individual-level, most authors cluster DD standard errors
to correct for within-cluster dependence and serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004, Cameron and
Miller, 2015), which assumes that between-cluster correlation is zero.
Many outcomes of interest in RCTs are variables that at least in other contexts, show some
degree of spatial correlation (Barrios et al., 2012). Using baseline data from Mexico’s Progresa
program, we estimate spatial correlation coefficients for secondary enrollment rates and log per
capita income (Moran, 1948). Figure 3.1 plots the empirical relationship between villages and
their nearest neighbor. Spatial correlation in secondary enrollment is 0.285, indicating that more
educated individuals tend to cluster in neighboring villages. We find a stronger relationship for
per capita income, which has a coefficient of 0.427. Assuming zero between-cluster correlation is
therefore at odds with RCT data. Despite the availability of spatial econometric methods to deal
with spatial correlation, they remain largely overlooked in the RCT literature.
Spatial econometrics has mainly studied the consequences of spatial correlation in cross sec-
tion and panel data settings on regional data (Anselin, 1988, Arbia, 2006). Our approach considers
differences-in-difference scenarios that use individual-level data but where spatial correlation oc-
curs at the cluster-level, which also happens to be the randomization unit. In theory, omitting
spatially-correlated outcomes results in biased and inefficient estimates while ignoring spatially-
correlated unobservables lowers efficiency. We therefore simulate a scholarship program that raises
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test scores by 0.25 standard deviations to test the performance of difference-in-differences with
clustered standard errors for both types of spatial correlation.
Monte Carlo results confirm these predictions, especially for strong levels of spatial correla-
tion. When the outcome of interest is spatially correlated, difference-in-differences will estimate
program effects between 0.29 and 0.98 standard deviations, a bias ranging from 15-300 percent.
Researchers will find a statistically significant effect of the scholarship program only about 32-64
percent of the time. Power can be improved by increasing the number of clusters, but bias remains
unaffected. Omitting a spatially-correlated unobservable will not affect bias but reduces statistical
power, correctly rejecting the null hypothesis of no effect 13-70 percent of the time. Program size
improves efficiency unless spatial correlation is persistent (≥0.90). Thus, smaller RCTs are more
sensitive to spatial correlation than larger interventions.
We evaluate several methods to account for spatial correlation in RCTs. Adding cluster or
individual-level fixed effects to control for time-invariant attributes provides no visible gains with
either individual or village-level data. The best performing alternative is a spatial difference-in-
difference specification that controls for correlation in the outcome or unobservable. Spatial DD
provides satisfactory results in terms of bias and power even with few clusters. While efficiency
for all estimation procedures improves as program size grows, only spatial DD is able to account
for bias or inefficiency due to persistent levels of spatial correlation.
The empirical framework is then applied to Mexico’s conditional cash transfer program, Pro-
gresa. We test previously evaluated outcomes in the literature for evidence of spatial correlation,
finding statistically significant relationships across villages. Primary and secondary enrollment,
female labor supply, and household income show evidence that the source of correlation is the
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outcome itself, while a spatially-correlated unobservable is more likely for per capita consump-
tion. However, estimated correlations are low. Given our Monte Carlo results and the size of the
program, we find that difference-in-difference estimates are robust to spatial correlation when us-
ing either individual or village-level data for different spatial networks. We also argue that spatial
methods can facilitate the estimation of direct and indirect effects of randomized programs and
identify geographic mechanisms that drive results.
Our research contributes to the randomization literature by rigorously inspecting the reliabil-
ity of difference-in-difference estimators. It shares similar motivation with previous work that
studies this method’s performance in the presence of correlation over time (Bertrand et al., 2004,
McKenzie, 2012), although we focus on cross-sectional dependence. It also complements the
growing body of evidence on the consequences of spillovers in RCTs (Hudgens and Halloran,
2008, Aronow, 2012, Aronow and Samii, 2013). However, unlike the majority of papers analyzing
within-cluster spillovers3, we address between-cluster spillovers and show that randomization per
se does not guarantee that the influence of spatial correlation is eliminated.
This paper also contributes to the spatial econometrics literature. Studies in this area have
mostly focused on aggregate units of measurement but not microdata. Recent research has stud-
ied the effects of a spatially-correlated treatment variable in cross-section (Barrios et al., 2012)
and difference-in-difference settings (Dube´ et al., 2014, Delgado and Florax, 2015, Chagas et al.,
2016). However, our approach takes a further step by implementing spatial models that account
for correlation at the cluster-level without sacrificing individual-level variation. To our knowledge,
3Within-cluster spillovers have been more prominently studied. Some recent papers analyzing within interference
in randomized settings include Duflo and Saez (2003), Angelucci and DeGiorgi (2009), Bobonis and Finan (2009),
Lalive and Cattaneo (2009), Babcock and Hartman (2010), Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011), and Baird et al. (2014).
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this paper and Arbia et al. (2016) are among the first studies in this direction.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the RCT literature to
characterize its treatment of spatial correlation. Section 3.3 derives the expected consequences
of ignoring spatial correlation on difference-in-difference estimators. Section 3.4 provides Monte
Carlo evidence on the performance of difference-in-differences when outcomes or unobservables
are spatially correlated. We then test alternative DD specifications to deal with the resulting con-
sequences. Section 3.5 analyzes spatial correlation patterns and applies our estimation framework
to data from Mexico’s Progresa. Section 3.6 summarizes and concludes.
3.2 Spatial correlation in the RCT literature
We compiled RCT papers from six economics journals between 2000 and 2014.4 Studies were
included if they estimate the effect of a randomly allocated treatment. In total, we found 86 such
papers. Table 3.1 summarizes the randomization method, journal of publication, setting, and main
outcomes of the selected studies.
Fifty-five papers evaluate an individual-level treatment (64%) while thirty-one assess a cluster-
randomized treatment (36%). Forty-two articles study interventions in developing countries and
forty-four in industrialized contexts. The countries with the largest number of published RCTs are
the United States (37), Kenya (8), Mexico (8), and India (7).
The main outcomes in each paper were classified into six categories.5 We counted thirty-four
articles analyzing educational outcomes, sixteen observing consumer behavior, seven discussing
4The journals are the American Economic Review, the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, the Ameri-
can Economic Journal: Policy Economics, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Political Economy, and
the Review of Economic Studies.
5Papers could fall into more than one category. Unfortunately, 16 of the 86 papers were not directly classifiable and
were included in the ‘Other’ category.
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health, five dealing with micro-credit, four focusing on insurance, and four evaluating effects on
investment. Because most studies collect panel data for two points in time (pre and post exposure),
treatment effects are usually estimated by difference-in-differences (DD) with clustered standard
errors that control for within-cluster dependence and serial correlation.
Many socioeconomic outcomes tend to be correlated across space. Consider a frequent out-
come in RCTs, years of education. Evidence shows positive and significant spatial correlation in
educational attainment between US states, which tells us that more educated individuals are lo-
cated in contiguous regions (Barrios et al., 2012). Assuming no between-state correlation is thus
directly at odds with observable patterns in the data, since this correlation does not vanish across
geographic boundaries. Other studies have also found spatial correlation in school enrollment
(Bobba and Gignoux, 2016), consumer behavior (Case, 1991), health outcomes (Duncan et al.,
1993, Miguel and Kremer, 2004), and investment (Cohen and Paul, 2004).
Over a third of the surveyed papers evaluate a cluster-randomized program, but the major-
ity do not consider how correlation across clusters may affect their results.6 Only two studies
have addressed the issue directly. The first, Miguel and Kremer (2004), calculates the effect of a
de-worming treatment randomized across schools on education and health outcomes. Using the
density of treatment within villages as their source of regional treatment variation, they find that
for every additional 1,000 dewormed children living within a 3 kilometer radius, enrollment further
increases by 2 percentage points and rates of moderate to heavy worm infections fall by 26%. The
second, Bobba and Gignoux (2016), estimates the spatial spillovers of Progresa on secondary en-
6A larger fraction of surveyed studies analyze how ineligible individuals within a cluster may be affected by their
eligible peers. See Banerjee et al. (2007), Kremer and Miguel (2007), Angelucci and DeGiorgi (2009), Bobonis and
Finan (2009), Glewwe et al. (2010), Duflo et al. (2011), Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), Attanasio et al.
(2012).
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rollment. They find that besides the 9.7% increase in treated villages, living within five kilometers
of a treatment community further raises secondary attendance by 2.9%.
Two main points are worth noting from this review. First, many RCTs are randomized at the
cluster-level and evaluate their results using difference-in-difference methods that adjust standard
errors for within-cluster dependence and serial correlation. Second, almost no papers control for
between-cluster correlation or discuss how it may affect their estimates. Studies that address spa-
tial relationships in their analysis find this dimension to be highly relevant to their results. Ignoring
observed spatial correlation in outcomes or unobservables may potentially affect the resulting con-
clusions of employing difference-in-difference estimators in RCTs.
3.3 Spatial correlation in difference-in-difference estimation
We now derive the consequences of ignoring spatial correlation on difference-in-difference esti-
mates of treatment effects. We first present the standard randomization framework and then intro-
duce spatial correlation in outcomes and unobservables, respectively.7 This exercise will provide
testable implications for our Monte Carlo simulations.
3.3.1 Randomization benchmark
Randomization facilitates the estimation of causal effects because it solves the counterfactual prob-
lem.8 To illustrate, consider the potential outcomes framework first proposed by Rubin (1974),
where outcomes are determined by a binary indicator, T , that is equal to 1 if an individual is
7See Barrios et al. (2012) and Delgado and Florax (2015) for the expected consequences when the treatment variable
is spatially-correlated.
8For an in-depth treatment of randomization, see Morgan and Winship (2007), Pearl (2009), and Imbens and Rubin
(2015).
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exposed to a treatment and 0 otherwise. For individual i we observe: yi = Ty1i + (1− T )y0i .
Suppose that yi are test scores and T indicates whether the person receives a scholarship. Re-
searchers observe the outcome for individual i if they have the scholarship (y1i ) or if they do not
(y0i ). Hence, calculating individual-specific treatment effects is impossible since we cannot moni-
tor the same person in both states. This situation is known as the counterfactual problem.
One solution to this problem is to randomly assign T across clusters, for example villages. Let
Dj denote the assignment variable. Randomization makes students in recipient and non-recipient
villages comparable on average observable and unobservable characteristics, and different only
in treatment status. Since data on outcomes and covariates are frequently collected pre and post-
exposure, researchers will generally estimate the average treatment effect of an intervention using
difference-in-difference regressions:
yijt = αP + β(P ×Dj) + γDj + θX+ εijt (3.1)
The parameter α captures secular time trends. The coefficient on the interaction term, β, is the
program’s average treatment effect.9. γ controls for pre-existing differences between treatment and
control groups, and X is a matrix of covariates generally included to control for relevant attributes
and increase efficiency. Last, εijt is a mean-zero normally distributed error term assumed to be
uncorrelated with all right-hand side variables.
In Equation (3.1), treatment varies at the cluster-level but outcomes are measured at the indi-
vidual level and may be correlated over time. Therefore, most authors cluster their standard errors
9Technically, this coefficient represents the intent-to-treat effect. Under full take-up however, this effect is identical to
the average treatment effect.
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to correct for within-cluster dependence and serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004).
There is one additional assumption in this model: the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
(SUTVA). SUTVA requires that outcomes for treated and control units depend solely on their own
treatment status and not on what treatment others receive. If this assumption does not hold, there is
interference between units and randomization no longer provides unbiased causal effects because
of spillovers across units.
Three types of SUTVA violations may be identified from the literature, which depend on the
randomization unit. First, when treatment assignment occurs at the individual-level, interference
may be driven by peer effects. Because contamination occurs inside shared networks such as
schools or villages, we refer to these as ‘within’ spillovers. Second, if randomization occurs at the
cluster-level, then correlation between clusters generates interference. Since contamination occurs
among larger units where the internal population are all treated or untreated, we designate them
as ‘between’ spillovers. Finally, both types of interference could be present at once, generating
‘mixed’ spillovers.
In what follows, we argue that depending on whether spatial correlation exists and in what
variables —outcomes or unobservables—, difference-in-difference estimates of treatment effects
with clustered standard errors may be inconsistent, inefficient, or both.
3.3.2 Spatial correlation in randomized settings
Clusters may be interdependent in a number of ways, but the First Law of Geography frames it
succinctly: “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant
things” (Tobler, 1970). Two types of spatial correlation have been the most widely studied in the
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regional economics literature: i) correlated outcomes or spatial lag processes, and ii) correlated
unobservables or spatial error processes.10
Spatial lag: correlated outcomes over space
The spatial lag model tells us that outcomes for village j are influenced by outcomes in neighboring
villages k. Supply constraints may generate this situation. If schools are built to serve multiple
villages, then test scores in villages without a school depend on how the village with the school
performs. Formally, we can rewrite Equation (3.1) as:
yijt = αP + β(P ×Dj) + γDj + ρWy¯kt + θX+ εijt for j 6= k (3.2)
where W is a J × J proximity matrix that describes the spatial network, whose typical element
wjk is 1 if villages j and k are neighbors and zero otherwise. The degree of spatial correlation
is captured by ρ. If positive, villages with higher test scores will have neighbors whose average
scores are also high. If negative, higher scoring villages will have lower performing neighbors. For
most socioeconomic outcomes, we expect a positive spatial correlation coefficient.11
What does the existence of a spatial lag imply for a cluster randomized treatment? Equation
(3.2) tells us that yijt = f(Dj, y¯kt(Dk), P,X). SUTVA is violated because the treatment status of
neighboring villages indirectly affects observed outcomes. While randomization is still valid, be-
tween interference occurs because of existing geographic relationships in outcomes. The expected
consequences are identical to those from omitted variables bias. If ρ > 0, then difference-in-
differences will overestimate the true treatment effect.
10For a textbook treatment, see Anselin (1988) and Arbia (2006).
11While positive spatial correlation is the norm, some outcomes may be negatively correlated. See Kao and Bera (2016)
for an example.
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Note that the dimension of the outcome vector is NT × 1 but the proximity matrix is J × J .
To overcome this dimensionality issue, we assume that if two villages are neighbors, then their
inhabitants are also neighbors. To expandW, we first take the Kronecker product of the proximity
matrix and a symmetric matrix of ones for the population density in each village,WN = W⊗1nj .
Then, we take the Kronecker product of an identity matrix for the number of time periods andWN
to obtain the panel version of the neighbors matrix,WNT = IT ⊗WN .12. Since all terms have the
same dimension, we can rewrite Equation (3.2) to facilitate interpretation:
yijt = (INT − ρWNT )−1 [αP + β(P ×Dj) + γDj + θX+ εijt] (3.3)
The average treatment effect is now β times the inverse of (INT −ρWNT ), or the sum of direct
and indirect effects. Difference-in-differences will provide an estimate that cannot differentiate
between the two. Moreover, the error term is also multiplied by this inverse, so variance esti-
mates will also be affected. Therefore, if an outcome is spatially correlated and this dependence is
ignored, difference-in-differences will be inconsistent and inefficient.
Spatial error: correlated unobservables over space
The spatial error model assumes that there is some unobservable attribute that is spatially corre-
lated and affects the outcome of interest. A prime example is agricultural productivity. Productivity
measures are generally absent in practice and tend to be correlated over space since higher yielding
farming areas tend to be clustered together. Agricultural productivity has been linked with edu-
cational outcomes through the labor market (Ferreira and Schady, 2009). For instance, a positive
12This procedure assumes that the spatial network is time-invariant and was chosen for simplicity. The expansion of
the proximity matrix follows Millo and Piras (2012).
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productivity shock may increase the demand for child labor, attracting students to the fields and
out of the classroom. By exam time, some children may under-perform because of work-related
absences.
Suppose village-level productivity may be modeled as spatially-correlated random noise, ujt ∼
N(0, σ2):
(I − λW)−1ujt (3.4)
where as above,W is the J×J weights matrix. To differentiate from a spatial lag, we measure the
strength of this correlation with the parameter λ. Equation (3.4) tells us that village j’s agricultural
productivity is related to its neighbors’ productivity level, unless λ = 0.
Once again, we expand W to the individual-level and simplify:
νijt = (INT − λWNT )−1ujt (3.5)
and outcomes are:
yijt = αP + β(P ×Dj) + γDj + θX+ νijt + εijt (3.6)
The spatial error model does not lead to such dire consequences as the spatial lag model. Since
outcomes are not directly or indirectly affected by their neighbors’ treatment status, SUTVA is not
violated and difference-in-differences provides an unbiased treatment effect. However, variance
estimates will be inefficient at higher values of λ because of between-cluster correlation in the error
term. Even when controlling for within-cluster dependence and serial correlation, between-cluster
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noise may not be eliminated (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Therefore, omitting spatially-correlated
unobservables will lead to consistent but inefficient difference-in-difference estimates of treatment
effects.
3.4 Monte Carlo Evidence
Suppose a government implements a pilot scholarship program to improve standardized test scores
in the poorest region of the country. The intervention will be scaled up if successful and discarded
otherwise. Mindful about the benefits of randomization to quantify the impact of social programs,
a team of independent researchers designs the pilot so that scholarships are randomly allocated
at the village-level. The team also decides that to avoid within spillovers, all students in treated
villages will receive the transfer while those in control villages will not.
Using simulated panel data for two periods, before and after the intervention, we analyze the
performance of difference-in-difference estimates (DD) with clustered standard errors when ignor-
ing different degrees of spatial correlation in outcomes and unobservables, respectively.
3.4.1 Simulation setup
The simulations are carried out in six steps.13 First, our procedure involves creating villages.
We generate J = {50, 100, 200, 500} villages to test different program sizes and locate them
using random (x, y) coordinates. Second, we define a spatial network using a k-nearest neighbor
approach.14 Results are presented for the simplest case, k = 1, but were also calculated with k = 2
for robustness. Each network is summarized in a proximity matrix,Wk. Figure 3.2 plots a random
13Replication codes for all Monte Carlo simulations are available upon request.
14We do not assume that links between villages are symmetric. Hence, village j may be linked to village k, but the
converse need not apply.
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draw of village locations, treatment status, and their links for the k = 1 spatial network. Figure
C.1 in the Supplementary material for Chapter 3 shows the network for k = 2 neighbors.
Third, villages are randomly assigned into treatment and control groups. We draw a random
number from a uniform distribution on the unit interval as a proxy poverty score and set an ex-
ogenous eligibility threshold at 0.50. Villages with a score above this threshold are allocated to
the treatment group and those below the cut-off are classified as controls. In the fourth step, we
populate villages. For simplicity, we assume each village has 20 students.15 Our results easily
generalize to settings where villages differ in population size. The fifth step simulates the data
generating process (DGP) for a spatially-correlated outcome and unobservable using Equations
(3.3) and (3.6). Finally, we follow the literature and estimate the effects of the scholarship pro-
gram using difference-in-differences with clustered standard errors at the village-level.
Parameter values are: α = 0.04, β = 0.25, γ = 0, θ = (5, 0.025, 0.07, 0.12). The effect
of the scholarship program is β, which indicates that test scores should increase by 0.25 standard
deviations. To ensure that the design is appropriate to estimate the program’s impact, we calculate
the minimum detectable effect (MDE) for the selected number of clusters (Duflo et al., 2008). Fig-
ure C.2 shows that 50 clusters provide enough statistical power to detect the scholarship program’s
effect when within-cluster correlation is below 0.05. Program sizes of 100, 200, and 500 are robust
to within-cluster correlations of 0.15, 0.35, and 1.
In what follows, the villages and spatial network remain fixed, while steps three to six are
repeated 1,000 times each.
15Including more observations in each cluster presents higher computation costs with small benefits compared to in-
creasing the number of clusters, as is well-documented in the randomization literature (Duflo et al., 2008).
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3.4.2 The consequences of omitting spatial correlation
The existence of a spatial lag indicates that outcomes in a village depend on their neighbors’
outcomes. In this hypothetical country, we assume that schools are built to serve multiple commu-
nities, and thus high test scores in one village spur similar results in neighboring villages.
The degree of spatial correlation varies between ρ = {0, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90}, from low
to strong dependence. Given the derivations in the previous section, we expect that this type of
spatial correlation will lead to inconsistent and inefficient difference-in-difference estimates.
Monte Carlo results for spatially-correlated outcomes are presented in Panel A of Table 3.2.
For 50 clusters, we encounter bias when the spatial correlation parameter is 0.50 or higher, with
difference-in-differences overestimating treatment effects by around 15 to 300 percent. In our ex-
ample, researchers would estimate that scholarships raise test scores between 0.29 and 0.98 stan-
dard deviations. At the same time, rejection rates deteriorate as spatial correlation increases. When
correlation is above 0.50, researchers will find a statistically significant effect of the scholarship
program about 32-64 percent of the time (when it should be at least 80 percent, ideally 95). Results
slightly improve when considering a 2 nearest neighbor network, although bias and power issues
are still sizable, as Table C.1 shows. The remaining rows in Panel A of Table 3.2 show findings
for 100, 200, and 500 clusters. Increasing program size improves statistical power but does not
eliminate the resulting bias from spatial correlation.
These findings indicate that difference-in-difference methods provide an incorrect and upward
biased estimate of program impact for any RCT size when the outcome of interest is spatially-
correlated. Such consequences are analogous to the findings in Blundell and Bond (2000), who
find that strongly dependent data over time leads to inconsistency in dynamic panel data estimators.
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Furthermore, small-scale experiments will also suffer from inefficiency caused by low statistical
power, while larger programs are unaffected in terms of efficiency.
If researchers are unable to control for a spatially-correlated unobservable that is unrelated
to all other covariates, then difference-in-difference estimates will be inefficient. This situation
may occur if the scholarship program was rolled out in rural areas and agricultural productivity
measures are not collected. We use the same parameter values to evaluate difference-in-difference
performance, denoting spatial correlation in the unobserved variable with λ.
Panel B of Table 3.2 presents the results. There is no bias from omitting a spatially-correlated
unobservable for any value of lambda. Estimates of the scholarship program’s effect will be con-
sistently estimated but rendered statistically insignificant when spatial correlation is above 0.50.
While rejection rates are acceptable at lower levels of dependence, they decline rapidly after this
threshold, especially when the number of clusters is small. Increasing the number of villages would
solve this problem because it augments statistical power. However, persistent spatial correlation
(λ ≥ 0.90) would still result in inefficiency regardless of program size. These findings also hold
for the k = 2 spatial network (Panel B in Table C.1). Therefore, omitting spatially-correlated
unobservables will cause inefficiency in small but not large RCTs.
Some of these results are well established in the spatial econometrics literature for cross-section
and panel data (Anselin, 1988, Arbia, 2006, Arbia et al., 2016). Recent research has studied
the effects of a spatially-correlated treatment variable in cross-section (Barrios et al., 2012) and
difference-in-difference settings (Dube´ et al., 2014, Delgado and Florax, 2015, Chagas et al., 2016).
Our approach takes a further step by incorporating spatial econometric models into differences-
in-difference scenarios that use individual-level data but where spatial correlation occurs at the
87
cluster-level, the latter which also happens to be the randomization unit.
These simulations provide evidence on how spatial correlation affects difference-in-difference
estimates of treatment effects given a reasonable sample size and number of clusters. On the one
hand, ignoring spatial correlation in the outcomes of interest will lead to bias and power issues.
On the other hand, omitting a spatially-correlated unobservable will not affect bias but hamper
power. Program size matters, since some of these consequences may be resolved by design if
conditions allow for larger rather than smaller RCTs. Given that most socioeconomic data reveals
the existence of geographic patterns, estimating the degree of spatial correlation is important to
further ensure the internal validity of randomized programs.
In the case of the pilot scholarship program example used here, researchers may estimate an in-
correct treatment effect (for a spatial lag) or be unable to detect a significant impact of the program
(spatial lag and error), conditional on program size. Either way, despite the rigorous randomiza-
tion, estimated results may be invalid and no policy lessons can be learned. Unaccounted spatial
correlation could thus lead policymakers to discard a successful program.
3.4.3 Correcting for spatial correlation
Suppose these researchers inspect the data for spatial patterns across villages and effectively en-
counter that geographic correlation is strong (above 0.50). What procedure could they use to avoid
the above issues and correctly estimate the scholarship program’s effect?
We test three alternatives on individual-level data: i) difference-in-differences with village
fixed effects, ii) difference-in-differences with individual fixed effects, and iii) spatial difference-
in-differences that controls for correlation in outcomes or unobservables. The analysis also con-
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siders specifications i) and iii) on aggregated data at the village-level. Performance is evaluated
by comparing the resulting bias and rejection rates for different degrees of spatial correlation. The
ideal solution would lead to no bias and a rejection rate of at least 80 percent.
Table 3.3 shows the performance of these procedures for the case of 50 villages. For either type
of spatial correlation, adding cluster or individual-level fixed effects to control for time-invariant
attributes does not provide visible gains with individual or village-level data.
The best performing alternative is the spatial difference-in-difference specification that controls
for correlation in the outcome or unobservable. This requires estimating Equations (3.3) and (3.6)
by maximum likelihood, using the expanded neighbors matrix at the individual-level to model
the spatial network. Spatial DD provides satisfactory results in terms of bias and rejection rates
compared to methods that ignore spatial correlation. Even with few clusters, the method allows
researchers to consistently estimate the effect of the scholarship program and identify statistically
significant effects. The results also apply when aggregating the data to the cluster-level, where
spatial DD provides unbiased estimates and higher statistical power.
All estimation methods perform better in terms of efficiency as program size grows, as shown
in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.16 However, when spatial correlation is strong (≥0.75) or persistent (≥0.90),
only spatial DD provides consistent estimates and correctly sized hypothesis tests. These findings
continue to hold when we consider a more complex spatial network.
Spatial correlation affects difference-in-difference estimates of a randomized program as well
as their precision. The most effective way to correct for these issues requires modeling the spatial
interaction. However, it is not the only possible solution. A common critique of spatial economet-
16Supplementary material for Chapter 3 Tables C.2, C.3, and C.4 provide the full estimates.
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ric methods is that they impose too many restrictions (Corrado and Fingleton, 2012, Gibbons and
Overman, 2012), but more flexible methods are available (Anselin and Florax, 1995, McMillen,
2012, Elhorst and Vega, 2013). ANCOVA methods that control for spatial correlation may also be
explored, since McKenzie (2012) has shown them to be more effective than DD under certain con-
ditions. Some of the losses generated by spatial correlation seem to affect statistical power. Sev-
eral researchers have been studying the benefits and costs of multi-way clustering (see Cameron
and Miller (2015) for an overview), which represents an interesting extension to spatial analy-
sis. Hierarchical methods also seem a natural extension when cluster-level processes influence
individual-level outcomes (Banerjee et al., 2003).
Overall, our results indicate that there are visible gains from incorporating spatial econometric
methods into randomized evaluations. While spatial difference-in-differences may not be relevant
in all RCT settings, researchers should rule out this possibility to ensure internal validity and
test the robustness of their findings. We therefore revisit publicly available data from Progresa,
Mexico’s conditional cash transfer program, to provide a guide for practitioners.
3.5 Spatial correlation in Mexico’s Progresa program
3.5.1 Program description
Mexico’s Programa de Educacio´n, Alimentacio´n y Salud (Progresa) began in 1997 and remains in
place today. It is the largest social program in the country and widely considered a landmark cash
transfer program.17 The intervention’s objective was to alleviate poverty and foster the accumula-
tion of human capital by providing transfers to eligible households conditional on regular school
17The program has been renamed over time, usually coinciding with its expansions. It is currently called Prospera.
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attendance and periodic health check-ups of beneficiary children.
We revisit the first phase of Progresa, that took place between 1997-1999. The advantage of
using this period is that 506 rural villages were chosen for randomized evaluation of the transfers.18
Eligibility was determined in two-stages. First, villages were randomly assigned to either receive
transfers or not. The resulting allocation selected 320 villages into treatment and 186 communities
to control. Second, households within treatment villages were classified as eligible or ineligible by
a poverty score, with the poorest becoming transfer recipients. On average, 78% of households in
treatment villages were eligible to receive the transfers.
3.5.2 Data and methods
Data for Progresa’s rural phase are publicly available on the website of the Mexican Ministry of
Social Development (SEDESOL). It constitutes a census of beneficiaries spanning four waves: a
baseline (September 1997 - March 1998) and three follow-ups in November 1998, March 1999,
and November 1999. For simplicity, we aggregate the data into two time periods, before and
after transfers. The data are geo-referenced using shapefiles from the National Statistics Institute
(INEGI), which contain the latitude and longitude of all villages in Mexico.19 The leftmost panel
of Figure 3.5 plots these locations. Targeted communities were mostly located in the central-south
states, roughly coinciding with some of the poorest areas in Mexico.
In order to gauge the importance of spatial correlation before transfers are paid out, we first
study baseline data. The analysis is restricted to outcomes previously evaluated in the literature,
18Progresa’s first phase covered approximately 2.6 million families in 50,000 rural villages nationwide, approximately
40% of rural households and 10% of all Mexican households (Gertler, 2004).
19The shapefiles we employ for geo-referencing villages are publicly available and may be downloaded here.
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including: enrollment, labor supply, and per capita income and consumption. Subsequently, we
return to the individual-level data to evaluate the program using difference-in-differences.
We use commonly employed methods in regional economics for our analysis.20 First, we
employ Moran’s I (Moran, 1948). This index is a correlation coefficient that takes values between
[−1, 1] and whose statistical significance may be tested.21 Second, given our simulation results, it
is critical to determine whether correlation occurs on the outcome or some unobservable attribute.
Anselin et al. (1996) developed a series of Lagrange multiplier tests based on the residuals from
OLS regressions. These tests are robust to local misspecification and are widely employed to
determine the source of spatial correlation. Based on the resulting evidence, we proceed to evaluate
the program using standard and spatial difference-in-difference methods.
3.5.3 Baseline spatial correlation
To compare with the Monte Carlo simulations, we model interactions between villages using a k-
nearest neighbor spatial network. Two relationships are considered: a village is related to its closest
neighbor, k = 1 or its two nearest neighbors, k = 2. A visual depiction of these interactions among
Progresa villages is shown in the two right hand panels of Figure 3.5.
Table 3.4 provides estimates of Moran’s I for the selected outcomes and spatial networks. First,
we notice that treatment assignment shows no significant spatial correlation. This finding provides
further confirmation that randomization was successful, since treatment status should not be cor-
related across villages. All remaining outcomes show positive and statistically significant spatial
correlation regardless of the chosen network, except for male labor supply. Most correlations are
20See Fischer and Getis (2009) for a textbook treatment.
21The index’s expected value under the null of no spatial correlation is E(I) = −1/(N − 1). Hence, it is not actually
zero, but tends asymptotically to this limit.
92
positive, implying that villages with better outcomes tend to be clustered together. For instance,
villages with higher enrollment rates tend to be near other villages that also have high enrollment
rates. Female labor supply, income, and consumption show slightly higher values of Moran’s I ,
indicating marked geographic patterns in this region of Mexico.
A statistically insignificant Moran’s I in the treatment variable is insufficient evidence that
SUTVA holds. We need to identify the source of the dependence to test its validity. A spatially-
correlated outcome indicates that outcomes in one village affect its neighbors, which violates the
assumption. A spatially-correlated unobservable will not affect whether SUTVA holds.
Table 3.5 presents p-values from Lagrange multiplier tests to determine the source of spatial
correlation in Progresa outcomes. These statistics compare OLS residuals to estimated errors from
spatial lag and spatial error models. Furthermore, they are independent, with statistics for spatial
lag robust to the presence of a spatial error process and viceversa.22 Results show that conditional
on the network, the source of spatial correlation varies. Several statistics are insignificant for the
nearest neighbor network but reveal stronger patterns for the two nearest neighbor network. For
this relationship, there seem to be spatially-correlated unobservables are likely across villages for
per capita consumption. Most of the remaining outcomes however, are consistent with evidence of
spatial correlation in the outcome itself.
These results suggest that the SUTVA assumption may be compromised. SUTVA does seem
to hold locally, since spatial correlation for the nearest neighbor network is weaker. This finding
was also highlighted by Delgado and Florax (2015) for the case of spatially-correlated treatment.
Therefore, the choice of spatial network matters. Educational outcomes may be affected by a
22The possibility that both forms of spatial correlation are present is also testable, but requires strict assumptions for
estimation. See Anselin (1988), LeSage and Pace (2010), and Arbia (2014) for these generalized spatial models.
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different set of neighbors than labor market outcomes. Researchers should assess the patterns of
regional dependence to determine which network is appropriate.
3.5.4 Accounting for spatial correlation in Progresa
Given these results at the village-level, we return to the individual-level data to implement our
empirical framework. We estimate difference-in-difference regressions with clustered standard
errors and their spatial counterparts on balanced data for two time periods. The village-level weight
matrices for k = 1 and k = 2 spatial networks are expanded following the procedure in Section
3.3. The choice of spatial lag or error model is based on the test statistics in Table 3.5. Since male
labor supply is uncorrelated over villages, we omit this outcome from the analysis.
Table 3.6 presents unadjusted and spatial difference-in-difference estimates of Progresa’s effect
on the selected outcomes. Overall, DD estimates are unaffected when controlling for spatial cor-
relation, as expected given the simulation results and the size of Progresa. In particular, estimated
spatial correlation parameters are below 0.20, denoting weak relationships across space. Estimat-
ing the same regressions at the village-level provides similar conclusions, but less overall power
due to losses from aggregation (see Supplementary material for Chapter 3 Table C.5). Therefore,
difference-in-difference estimates of Progresa’s impact are robust to spatial correlation when using
either individual or village-level data for different spatial networks.
Even though DD estimates are unchanged in Progresa when controlling for cross-sectional de-
pendence over space, spatial difference-in-difference estimators constitute an additional robustness
test. More visible benefits may be seen in smaller programs and in settings where spatial corre-
lation is stronger, as shown from our Monte Carlo simulations. In either case, these methods are
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implementable at low cost and provide many potential benefits to researchers.
Moreover, incorporating spatial methods into RCT evaluation can provide additional insight
into how programs work. Although we did not expand on the interpretation of coefficients, finding
significant spatial correlation in outcomes or unobservables informs us about possible spillovers.
For instance, secondary enrollment shows evidence of a spatial lag process, indicating that enroll-
ment in one village affects surrounding villages. Bobba and Gignoux (2016) found evidence of
such spillovers in Progresa. Future work can focus on how to accurately estimate these spillovers
and determine whether and how geographic mechanisms can lead to externalities similar to the
procedure used by Miguel and Kremer (2004).
3.6 Conclusion
This paper explores how ignoring spatial correlation in outcomes and unobservables at the cluster-
level affects difference-in-difference estimates at the individual-level. We derive predictions using
spatial econometric theory and then conduct Monte Carlo simulations to test these expectations.
Results show that ignoring spatial correlation in the outcomes of interest leads to upward bias
and low power, while omitting a spatially-correlated unobservable does not affect bias but reduces
power. Program size matters, since small RCTs are more sensitive to spatial correlation than
larger interventions. Researchers can account for spatial correlation using spatial difference-in-
differences, which is shown to outperform other commonly used specifications for all program
sizes, especially when spatial correlation is strong or persistent.
We analyze data from Mexico’s Progresa to gauge the extent of spatial correlation in a large
RCT and test our empirical framework. Many outcomes denote significant spatial correlation, al-
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though the degree of the estimated relationships are low. Most variables show evidence of being
spatially-correlated while fewer are consistent with the existence of a spatially-correlated unob-
servable. Given our simulation results, we find that difference-in-difference estimates are robust to
spatial correlation when using either individual or village-level data for different spatial networks.
Therefore, our estimates for Progresa agree with existing empirical evidence.
Given that most socioeconomic data reveals the existence of geographic patterns, account-
ing for these relationships may help us better understand individual and household behavior. Data
collection in the field has improved substantially, with many programs now routinely collecting ge-
ographical coordinates of clusters and in some cases, even individuals. Researchers could analyze
their data for spatial correlation, test underlying assumptions, and determine the most appropriate
estimation method. Because the consequences of ignoring spatial correlation do not completely
disappear when program size increases, this applies to both small and large scale interventions. If
researchers find low levels of spatial correlation, then our empirical framework becomes an addi-
tional robustness test that validates using a simple approach. When spatial correlation is strong or
persistent, spatial difference-in-difference estimators provide reliable results in terms of bias and
power. Either way, incorporating spatial methods to the RCT literature provides several benefits at
relatively low costs.
Geo-referenced data is becoming more common and less costly to collect. Taking full advan-
tage of these data may help validate assumptions, determine an estimation strategy, allow estima-
tion of direct and indirect effects, and inform researchers about geographic mechanisms that drive
their results. This would allow for a more complete understanding of how randomized programs
work and help improve the design and evaluation of future interventions.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1. Survey of RCT studies
Total Number of RCTs 86
Randomization method
Individual-level 55
Cluster-level 31
Journal
AER 30
AEJ: Policy 7
AEJ: Applied Economics 17
JPE 6
QJE 21
REStud 5
Setting
Developing countries 42
Mexico 8
Kenya 8
India 7
Developed countries 44
USA 37
Main outcome
Education 34
Consumer Behavior 16
Health 7
Micro-credit 5
Insurance 4
Investment 4
Other 16
Notes: Authors’ calculations from a survey of published articles in six journals between 2000 and 2014:
the American Economic Review, the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, the American
Economic Journal: Policy Economics, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Political Econ-
omy, and the Review of Economic Studies. We define an article as a randomized controlled trial if it
estimates the impact of a randomly allocated treatment on one or more outcomes.
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Table 3.2. Difference-in-difference performance under spatial correlation
Spatial correlation parameter
0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Panel A: Spatially-correlated outcome
50 clusters
Bias (in %) -4.5 -5.2 -2.1 16.4 85.0 290.4
Rejection rate 80.7 75.7 74.5 64.4 47.2 32.1
100 clusters
Bias (in %) -5.0 -4.0 0.0 14.8 64.1 235.7
Rejection rate 97.0 97.6 96.9 91.7 65.2 45.8
200 clusters
Bias (in %) -4.2 -2.6 0.5 16.3 78.5 263.5
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 95.1 80.6
500 clusters
Bias (in %) -4.2 -3.9 -0.5 14.3 69.0 235.6
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.5
Panel B: Spatially-correlated unobservable
50 clusters
Bias (in %) -2.4 -4.2 -3.5 -3.4 -5.0 -1.8
Rejection rate 71.9 70.1 68.6 64.0 37.8 13.8
100 clusters
Bias (in %) -5.2 -3.1 -4.5 -5.3 -3.8 -5.3
Rejection rate 93.0 94.5 92.3 88.2 65.9 17.9
200 clusters
Bias (in %) -3.5 -5.2 -4.8 -3.8 -4.6 -5.5
Rejection rate 99.7 99.9 99.7 99.2 89.8 32.9
500 clusters
Bias (in %) -4.3 -4.6 -4.2 -4.5 -4.8 -3.9
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.9
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations.
Notes: Reported values are averages from the total number of replications. Bias is calculated as the difference
between the average estimate and the true value ([βˆ − β]/β)× 100. The rejection rate measures the percentage
that DD finds a statistically significant effect when the null hypothesis is false (equivalent to statistical power).
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Table 3.3. Alternative estimation procedures with 50 clusters
Spatially-correlated outcome Spatially-correlated unobservable
0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Using individual-level data
DD with village fixed effects
Bias (in %) -4.5 -5.2 -2.1 16.4 85.0 290.4 -2.4 -4.2 -3.5 -3.4 -5.0 -1.8
Rejection rate 79.9 75.2 73.7 63.1 46.2 31.3 71.3 69.4 68.1 63.6 36.5 13.4
DD with individual fixed effects
Bias (in %) -4.5 -5.2 -2.1 16.4 85.0 290.4 -2.4 -4.2 -3.5 -3.4 -5.0 -1.8
Rejection rate 51.7 48.4 45.4 34.7 18.4 11.7 41.0 39.3 39.7 32.6 14.5 2.8
Spatial DD
Bias (in %) -5.0 -6.3 -6.7 -5.3 -2.9 -4.0 -2.8 -4.1 -3.6 -3.0 -5.7 -2.7
Rejection rate 78.9 76.3 76.8 78.2 80.1 78.9 71.8 69.4 70.5 71.1 69.4 76.9
Using village-level data
DD with village fixed effects
Bias (in %) -4.5 -5.2 -2.1 16.4 85.0 290.4 -2.4 -4.2 -3.5 -3.4 -5.0 -1.8
Rejection rate 47.6 44.3 40.8 30.3 15.6 9.7 37.0 35.8 36.5 27.7 12.2 2.3
Spatial DD
Bias (in %) -5.0 -6.4 -6.8 -5.5 -3.4 -4.5 -2.8 -4.1 -3.7 -3.0 -5.7 -2.4
Rejection rate 81.2 77.4 80.0 79.9 81.0 80.6 74.4 71.3 72.5 69.7 59.8 62.1
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations.
Notes: Reported values are averages from the total number of replications. Bias is calculated as the difference between the average estimate
and the true value ([βˆ − β]/β) × 100. The rejection rate measures the percentage that DD finds a statistically significant effect when the null
hypothesis is false (equivalent to statistical power).
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Table 3.4. Spatial correlation in Progresa villages at baseline
1 nearest neighbor 2 nearest neighbors
Mean Moran’s I p-value Moran’s I p-value
Treatment status 0.632 -0.024 0.693 -0.020 0.653
Primary enrollment 0.965 0.114 0.039 0.148 0.000
Secondary enrollment 0.485 0.285 0.000 0.293 0.000
Male labor supply 0.929 0.014 0.771 0.077 0.050
Female labor supply 0.190 0.365 0.000 0.389 0.000
Log per capita income 5.25 0.427 0.000 0.436 0.000
Log per capita consumption 5.18 0.288 0.000 0.310 0.000
Source: Authors’ calculations from Progresa baseline data aggregated at village-level.
Notes: Reported p-values are obtained from conducting a two-tailed test of H0 : E(I) = −1/(N − 1).
Table 3.5. Robust Lagrange Multiplier Tests for source of spatial dependence
1 nearest neighbor 2 nearest neighbors
Outcome Unobservable Outcome Unobservable
Primary enrollment 0.095 0.148 0.156 0.394
Secondary enrollment 0.820 0.331 0.052 0.911
Male labor supply 0.972 0.975 0.672 0.879
Female labor supply 0.002 0.056 0.000 0.022
Log per capita income 0.002 0.276 0.000 0.085
Log per capita consumption 0.283 0.502 0.480 0.035
Source: Authors’ calculations from Progresa baseline data aggregated at village-level.
Notes: These tests are two-directional, distributed as χ22. See Anselin et al. (1996) for details. The reported
p-values are obtained from the following regression: yj = α + βTj + θXj + uj . Covariates in Xj include:
average village household size, fraction of male headed households, average years of schooling of the household
head, average number of children (0-17 years), average number of adults (+18 years), number of adult workers,
fraction of dwellings owned, fraction of precarious dwellings, and the fraction households that have: drinking
water, a toilet, sewer access, and electricity.
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Table 3.6. Difference-in-differences estimates for Progresa at the individual-level
Spatial DD
Unadjusted 1 nearest neighbor 2 nearest neighbors
Primary enrollment β 0.010 0.013 0.013
(Spatial lag) (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
ρ 0.003 -0.001
(0.000)* (0.000)
Observations 41,704 41,704 41,704
Secondary enrollment β 0.031 0.031 0.031
(Spatial lag) (0.014)** (0.014)** (0.014)**
ρ 0.053 0.089
(0.011)*** (0.015)***
Observations 20,080 20,080 20,080
Female labor supply β -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(Spatial lag) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
ρ 0.086 0.176
(0.068)*** (0.016)***
Observations 43,058 43,058 43,058
Per capita income β 0.053 0.053 0.053
(Spatial lag) (0.028)* (0.018)*** (0.018)***
ρ -0.001 0.003
(0.000) (0.001)
Observations 41,706 41,706 41,706
Per capita consumption β 0.083 0.083 0.083
(Spatial error) (0.028)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)***
λ 0.145 0.181
(0.016)*** (0.015)***
Observations 41,130 41,130 41,130
Source: Authors’ calculations from Progresa data at the individual-level.
Notes: We estimate Equation (3.1) on individual data with no controls and use expanded weight matrices
for spatial specifications. Each set of coefficients corresponds to a separate regression. Standard errors are
clustered at the village-level.
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
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Figure 3.1. Spatial correlation in secondary enrollment and household income in Progresa villages
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from Progresa baseline data aggregated at village-level.
Notes: The figure plots the village-level mean of secondary enrollment and per capita household consumption in a village and the average for its closest neighbor.
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Figure 3.2. Simulated spatial networks: 1 Nearest neighbor
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from simulated data.
Notes: This graph shows a random draw of villages by allocated treatment status. Lines between villages denote the
that two locations are neighbors.
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Figure 3.3. Alternative specification performance for spatially-correlated outcome
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Source: Authors’ calculations from 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations.
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Figure 3.4. Alternative specification performance for spatially-correlated unobservable
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Figure 3.5. Progresa village locations and selected spatial networks
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from official shapefiles from the Instituto Nacional de Estadı´stica, Geografı´a e Informa´tica (INEGI).
Notes: Progresa villages were identified by using the state, municipality, and village identifiers in the official program data downloaded from SEDESOL. Lines
between villages denote the that two locations are neighbors.
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Table A.1. Real hourly minimum wages by industry firm-size categories
Category Firm size 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Agriculture 1-15 6.01 6.43 6.69 6.55 10.43 10.10 9.77 9.88
16+ 7.78 8.12 8.31 8.20 10.97 11.10 10.28 10.48
Non-metallic mining 1-15 6.60 7.06 7.35 7.26 12.16 11.15 13.35 13.49
16+ 8.28 8.64 8.84 8.80 12.51 11.68 14.13 14.21
Metallic mining All 9.59 10.01 9.96 9.57 11.09 10.30 14.26 13.99
Manufacturing 1-15 6.60 7.06 7.35 7.26 12.48 11.88 13.69 14.61
16+ 8.28 8.64 8.84 8.80 12.70 13.00 14.23 14.21
Utilities All 9.59 10.01 9.96 9.92 12.19 12.09 14.45 14.75
Construction 1-15 6.60 7.06 7.35 7.26 12.29 11.73 14.14 15.11
16+ 8.28 8.64 8.84 8.80 12.83 12.63 14.05 14.11
Retail 1-15 6.60 7.06 7.35 7.26 12.86 12.37 14.00 14.83
16+ 8.28 8.64 8.84 8.80 13.21 13.19 14.17 14.31
Transport 1-15 7.52 8.04 8.37 8.19 12.51 11.73 14.07 14.86
16+ 8.03 8.38 8.57 8.54 13.09 13.27 14.24 14.41
Real Estate 1-15 7.52 8.04 8.37 8.19 12.97 13.06 14.26 15.00
16+ 8.03 8.38 8.57 8.54 12.89 13.63 14.72 14.61
Business Services 1-15 5.35 5.15 4.83 4.30 13.09 12.63 14.26 14.94
16+ 6.20 5.97 5.60 4.98 13.19 13.15 14.54 14.63
Financial Services 1-15 9.59 10.12 10.63 10.64 13.22 12.42 14.26 15.00
16+ 9.59 10.12 10.54 10.54 13.41 13.61 14.75 14.99
Communal and Personal
Services 1-15 6.60 7.06 7.35 7.26 12.63 12.12 14.08 15.18
16+ 8.28 8.64 8.84 8.80 13.19 12.84 13.79 13.88
Export All 9.59 10.01 9.96 9.57 9.02 9.25 9.80 9.94
Source: Honduran minimum wage decrees.
Notes: Real minimum wages are calculated from monthly values as Hourly MW=(Monthly MW/44 x 4.3) following Gindling
and Terrell (2009). Values are expressed in real Lempiras. The average real exchange rate for the period is 10 Lempiras per
$1 USD.
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Table A.2. Macroeconomic and labor market indicators, 2005-2012
Year GDP growth(real)
Inflation rate
(%)
Labor force
participation
Employment
rate
Unemployment
rate
2005 6.1 8.8 61.7 58.7 4.9
2006 6.6 5.6 59.9 57.7 3.6
2007 6.2 6.9 58.9 57.1 3.1
2008 4.2 11.4 59.0 57.2 3.1
2009 -2.4 5.5 61.3 59.3 3.3
2010 3.7 4.7 61.9 59.4 4.1
2011 3.8 6.8 59.9 57.2 4.4
2012 4.1 5.2 58.4 56.2 3.7
Source: Honduran Central Bank and EPHPM surveys.
Notes: Growth is calculated using constant GDP levels at December 1999 prices, the inflation rate denotes per-
centage changes in prices (inter-annual variation in December), and labor market indicators are weighted averages
computed from individual-level EPHPM survey data for adults (≥15 years old).
Table A.3. Changes in legal minimum wages by electoral preferences (municipal-level data)
(1) (2) (3)
2006×Voted for Zelaya in 2005 election -0.009 -0.005 0.000
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
2007×Voted for Zelaya in 2005 election -0.002 -0.005 -0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
2008×Voted for Zelaya in 2005 election -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
2009×Voted for Zelaya in 2005 election 0.007 0.007 0.009
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
2010×Voted for Zelaya in 2005 election -0.013 -0.000 -0.002
(0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
2011×Voted for Zelaya in 2005 election 0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
2012×Voted for Zelaya in 2005 election 0.022 0.022 0.011
(0.014) (0.010)** (0.007)
Municipality effects Yes Yes Yes
Survey wave effects Yes Yes Yes
Share of workers in each MW category No Yes Yes
Linear time trend in Share of Workers per Category No No Yes
R2 0.946 0.968 0.974
N 3,514 3,514 3,514
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys aggregated to the municipal-level and electoral results.
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Clustered standard errors by municipality in parentheses. Estimates
correspond to βˆ from the following regression: logMWdt = α+βt(Zelayad× δt) +φd + µ¯j + δt +udt. Covariates
include the share of males, average age, mean years of education, mean potential experience and its square, fraction of
urban residents, and the share of workers in each industry firm-size category.
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
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Table A.4. Valid minimum wage decrees at each survey wave
Year Wave Decree Number Setting Effective date
2005 September STSS-029-05 Negotiated January 1, 2005
2006 May 027-STSS-06 Negotiated January 1, 2006
September
2007 May STSS-041-07 Set unilaterally January 1, 2007
September
2008 May STSS-258-07 Set unilaterally January 1, 2008
September
2009 May STSS-374-08 Set unilaterally January 1, 2009
2010 May
September STSS-342-2010 Set unilaterally September 1, 2010
2011 May STSS-223-2011 Set unilaterally January 1, 2011
September
2012 May STSS-001-2012 Negotiated January 1, 2012
Source: National Statistics Institute (INE) and General Directorate of Wages (DGS).
Notes: Minimum wage decrees are available at http://www.trabajo.gob.hn/?page id=921.
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Table A.5. Yearly changes in real hourly minimum wages by industry categories
Category 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Agriculture 5.5 3.1 -1.7 45.2 -1.0 -5.4 1.5
Non-metallic mining 5.5 3.1 -0.8 53.6 -7.4 20.3 0.8
Metallic mining 4.4 -0.5 -4.0 16.0 -7.1 38.4 -1.9
Manufacturing 5.5 3.1 -0.8 56.8 -1.2 12.2 3.2
Utilities 4.4 -0.5 -0.4 22.9 -0.8 19.5 2.1
Construction 5.5 3.1 -0.8 56.4 -3.0 15.7 3.7
Retail 5.5 3.1 -0.8 62.3 -1.9 10.2 3.4
Transport 5.6 3.2 -1.3 53.1 -2.3 13.2 3.4
Real Estate 5.6 3.2 -1.3 54.7 3.2 8.6 2.2
Business Services -3.7 -6.2 -11.1 183.1 -1.9 11.7 2.7
Financial Services 5.5 4.6 0.0 25.8 -2.3 11.4 3.4
Communal and Personal Services 5.5 3.1 -0.8 60.7 -3.3 11.6 4.3
Export 4.4 -0.5 -4.0 -5.7 2.6 6.0 1.4
Average 4.4 1.5 -2.3 60.4 -2.3 14.4 2.1
Source: Own calculations from real hourly minimum wages aggregated at the industry-level.
Notes: The table shows percentage changes in legal minimum wages relative to the previous year.
121
Table A.6. Descriptive statistics by occupation, averages for 2005-2012
Wage earners Public sector Domesticworkers Self-employed
Unpaid
workers Employers
Employment, hours, and wages
Share of sample 0.393 0.067 0.028 0.396 0.093 0.024
Hours per week 44.62 39.13 49.16 34.52 30.66 44.54
Share full-time (≥44 hpw) 0.622 0.277 0.670 0.310 0.191 0.558
Real Hourly Wages 11.08 28.03 4.91 10.06 24.71
Household poverty status
Extremely Poor 0.307 0.075 0.319 0.478 0.562 0.158
Poor 0.562 0.247 0.562 0.676 0.730 0.320
Individual & household characteristics
Males 0.729 0.450 0.071 0.626 0.649 0.722
Married 0.483 0.595 0.216 0.700 0.215 0.756
Years of education 6.92 11.85 5.38 4.53 6.23 8.50
Potential experience 18.1 21.0 19.5 33.5 12.1 29.3
Household size 5.47 5.00 5.54 5.26 6.45 4.95
Is household head 0.392 0.451 0.200 0.612 0.032 0.671
Lives in urban area 0.569 0.794 0.656 0.386 0.286 0.681
Composition across industries
Agriculture 0.275 0.001 0.001 0.441 0.589 0.238
Non-metallic mining 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003
Metallic mining 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing 0.122 0.002 0.001 0.094 0.086 0.135
Utilities 0.005 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Construction 0.105 0.004 0.001 0.051 0.010 0.028
Retail 0.202 0.001 0.002 0.271 0.269 0.413
Transport 0.042 0.036 0.000 0.037 0.005 0.041
Real Estate 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005
Business Services 0.036 0.005 0.002 0.011 0.004 0.055
Financial Services 0.026 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003
Communal and Personal Services 0.088 0.904 0.992 0.065 0.025 0.061
Export 0.093 0.001 0.000 0.026 0.010 0.015
N 134,190 23,375 9,411 124,829 27,680 8,279
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: All statistics are weighted. Wages are expressed in real Lempiras. The average real exchange rate for the period is 10 Lempiras per $1 USD.
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Table A.7. Compliance with legal minimum wages (Monthly values)
Covered sector Uncovered sector
Large firm
wage
earners
Small firm
wage
earners
Public
sector
workers
Domestic
workers Self-employed Employers
A. Incidence measures
Below MW 0.237 0.661 0.104 0.628 0.731 0.284
At MW 0.221 0.101 0.095 0.097 0.055 0.068
Above MW 0.542 0.238 0.801 0.275 0.214 0.648
B. Depth measures
Shortfall from MW 0.368 0.550 0.443 0.506 0.715 0.582
C. Changes over time
(i) Share below MW
Pre (2005-2008) 0.195 0.546 0.075 0.465 0.620 0.173
Post (2009-2012) 0.290 0.778 0.134 0.796 0.824 0.393
Difference 0.095 0.232 0.059 0.331 0.204 0.220
H0 : Pre = Post 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(ii) Shortfall from MW
Pre (2005-2008) 0.253 0.466 0.365 0.366 0.665 0.490
Post (2009-2012) 0.258 0.543 0.303 0.531 0.705 0.531
Difference 0.005 0.077 -0.062 0.165 0.040 0.041
H0 : Pre = Post 0.801 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.135 0.035
Source: Own calculations from individual EPHPM surveys.
Notes: Incidence measures denote shares of full-time workers. Below includes individuals with earnings less than 0.90 of
the monthly MW; at counts those earning between [0.90,1.10] of the monthly MW, and above refers to those earning more
than 1.10 times the monthly MW. The depth of non-compliance is calculated as the shortfall indicator (Bhorat et al., 2013a),
which measures how far actual earnings are from monthly minimum wages. Changes in Share Below MW over time are
calculated by regression. Differences in the Shortfall from MW are estimated by block bootstrap with 100 replications.
Reported p-values are drawn from t-tests where the null hypothesis is that non-compliance rates and depth are unchanged
over time.
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Table A.8. Alternative specifications for labor market outcomes
Sector Occupation
Full Sample Covered Uncovered Wage earners Public sector
Domestic
workers Self-employed
Unpaid
workers Employers
A. Employment rate
(1) OLS -0.099
(0.018)***
(2) OLS -0.111
(0.018)***
(1) IV -0.132
(0.027)***
F-statistic 1,788.1
(2) IV -0.148
(0.031)***
F-statistic 485.9
Observations 327,764
B. Labor force composition
(1) Multinomial Probit -0.350 0.254
(0.094)*** (0.085)***
(2) Multinomial Probit -0.431 0.307
(0.087)*** (0.091)***
Observations 327,764
C. Log Hours per week
(1) IV -0.512 -0.205 -0.226 -0.111 -0.319 -0.441 -0.165 -0.682 -0.252
(0.174)*** (0.072)*** (0.185) (0.032)*** (0.011)*** (0.003)*** (0.204) (0.149)*** (0.183)
F-statistic 1,634.5 4,525.8 31.7 4,250.8 1,178.9 913,810.3 33.0 8.7 61.5
(2) IV -0.591 -0.225 -0.675 -0.121 -0.328 -0.443 -0.563 -2.220 0.097
(0.179)*** (0.075)*** (0.259)*** (0.032)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.337)* (0.667)*** (0.671)
F-statistic 494.6 1,234.2 66.2 891.0 641.1 1,603,362.0 54.1 23.6 35.5
Observations 305,441 153,695 151,746 123,173 21,797 8,725 116,955 26,930 7,861
D. Log Hourly Wages
(1) IV 0.220 0.272 -0.360 0.153 0.155 0.084 -0.352 1.252
(0.158) (0.098)*** (0.341) (0.043)*** (0.041)*** (0.005)*** (0.353) (0.569)**
F-statistic 1,934.1 4,485.3 28.9 4,213.2 1,229.3 1,103,095.3 27.1 51.6
(2) IV 0.275 0.306 0.295 0.172 0.168 0.085 0.335 4.449
(0.179) (0.108)*** (0.370) (0.056)*** (0.028)*** (0.006)*** (0.376) (1.533)***
F-statistic 554.6 1,221.8 61.8 885.0 682.8 1,743,636.0 56.5 32.3
Observations 261,004 151,769 109,235 121,669 21,426 8,674 102,172 7,063
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: See notes for Table 1.6. (1) controls for industry (or industry firm-size) and survey wave fixed effects and (2) includes linear category time trends. IV specifications use minimum
wages lagged one year as an instrument. The table reports first-stage F-statistics. All coefficients are marginal effects.
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
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Table A.9. Effects of legal minimum wages on labor market outcomes (industry firm-size panel data)
Sector Occupation
Full Sample Covered Uncovered Wage earners Public sector Self-employed Unpaid workers Employers
A. Log Employment
FE -0.065 -0.225 0.110 -0.170 0.877 0.171 -0.771 0.256
(0.157) (0.222) (0.223) (0.207) (0.589) (0.333) (0.434) (0.226)
299 299 257 299 128 232 129 226
FE-LDV -0.080 -0.254 0.190 -0.212 0.085 0.066 -0.490 0.272
(0.198) (0.243) (0.228) (0.238) (1.012) (0.235) (0.469) (0.248)
276 276 225 276 98 199 108 188
GMM-DIF -0.064 -0.258 0.194 -0.210 0.114 0.077 -0.549 0.221
(0.220) (0.259) (0.218) (0.255) (1.124) (0.246) (0.545) (0.237)
253 253 203 253 85 178 96 167
B. Log Hours per week
FE -0.041 -0.064 -0.259 -0.059 -0.013 -0.086 0.118 -0.180
(0.039) (0.071) (0.199) (0.070) (0.083) (0.160) (0.206) (0.099)*
299 299 257 299 128 231 129 226
FE-LDV -0.026 -0.054 -0.284 -0.049 0.060 0.038 0.036 -0.302
(0.045) (0.077) (0.293) (0.078) (0.111) (0.146) (0.206) (0.145)**
276 276 225 276 98 198 108 188
GMM-DIF -0.027 -0.052 -0.310 -0.046 0.048 0.047 0.047 -0.264
(0.045) (0.077) (0.342) (0.078) (0.152) (0.131) (0.247) (0.144)*
253 253 203 253 85 178 96 167
C. Log Hourly Wages
FE 0.198 0.215 -0.159 0.204 0.199 0.263 0.050
(0.068)*** (0.113)* (0.265) (0.115)* (0.236) (0.392) (0.392)
299 299 256 299 128 231 222
FE-LDV 0.233 0.256 0.051 0.249 -0.115 0.355 -0.165
(0.071)*** (0.117)** (0.270) (0.120)** (0.298) (0.398) (0.399)
276 276 224 276 98 198 183
GMM-DIF 0.245 0.262 0.063 0.253 -0.064 0.365 -0.270
(0.066)*** (0.117)** (0.288) (0.120)** (0.370) (0.422) (0.366)
253 253 202 253 85 178 163
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys aggregated to the industry firm-size level.
Notes: Clustered standard errors by industry firm-size categories in parentheses. Panel A uses the log of weighted employment for each industry firm-size category. Panels
B and C use weighted means of hours and wages. The specifications are: the within estimator (FE), the within estimator including a lag of the dependent variable (FE-LDV),
and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator that uses lags of the dependent variable as instruments (GMM-DIF). All regressions control for the share of males, average years of
education, mean potential experience and its square, share of urban workers, the logarithm of industry-level IMAE index (by month) and value added (by year), industry-firm size
effects, survey wave effects, and linear category-specific time trends.
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
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Table A.10. Alternative specifications for poverty
Sector Occupation
Full Sample Covered Uncovered Wage earners Public sector
Domestic
workers Self-employed
Unpaid
workers Employers
A. Extreme poverty
(1) OLS 0.044 -0.008 0.176 -0.012 0.090 0.277 0.179 0.136 0.185
(0.021)* (0.017) (0.026)*** (0.019) (0.007)*** (0.003)*** (0.033)*** (0.032)*** (0.034)***
(2) OLS 0.039 -0.007 0.082 -0.012 0.096 0.277 0.087 0.056 0.104
(0.030) (0.021) (0.034)** (0.026) (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.035)** (0.020)** (0.064)
(1) IV 0.027 -0.024 0.305 -0.033 0.108 0.293 0.333 0.329 -0.133
(0.035) (0.028) (0.085)*** (0.034) (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.111)*** (0.093)*** (0.147)
F-statistic 2,067.5 5,789.6 40.4 3,405.1 2,014.9 15,527,689.2 39.0 9.5 80.1
(2) IV 0.027 -0.022 0.494 -0.032 0.111 0.293 0.651 0.542 -0.581
(0.043) (0.032) (0.191)*** (0.041) (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.201)*** (0.327)* (0.264)**
F-statistic 537.8 1,363.6 71.1 784.2 1,255.7 11,493,050.9 61.2 29.9 40.8
Observations 313,852 165,035 148,817 133,156 23,137 9,364 115,674 24,653 7,868
B. Poverty
(1) OLS 0.044 0.015 0.141 -0.003 0.081 0.339 0.147 0.075 0.076
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)*** (0.013) (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.031)*** (0.051) (0.025)**
(2) OLS 0.047 0.024 0.067 0.006 0.085 0.339 0.081 0.022 -0.021
(0.032) (0.027) (0.024)** (0.017) (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.029)** (0.027) (0.058)
(1) IV 0.037 0.009 0.253 -0.015 0.117 0.361 0.261 0.188 -0.082
(0.034) (0.032) (0.085)*** (0.022) (0.011)*** (0.002)*** (0.094)*** (0.113)* (0.086)
F-statistic 2,067.5 5,789.6 40.4 3,405.1 2,014.9 15,527,689.2 39.0 9.5 80.1
(2) IV 0.044 0.018 0.419 -0.005 0.119 0.362 0.499 0.282 -0.339
(0.040) (0.034) (0.257) (0.028) (0.014)*** (0.002)*** (0.292)* (0.252) (0.274)
F-statistic 537.8 1,363.6 71.1 784.2 1,255.7 11,493,050.9 61.2 29.9 40.8
Observations 313,852 165,035 148,817 133,156 23,137 9,364 115,674 24,653 7,868
Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: See notes for Table 1.7. (1) controls for industry (or industry firm-size) and survey wave fixed effects and (2) includes linear category time trends. IV specifications use
minimum wages lagged one year as an instrument. The table reports first-stage F-statistics. All coefficients are marginal effects.
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
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Figure A.1. Trends in minimum wages by industry firm-size categories
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Source: Own elaboration from Honduran minimum wage decrees.
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Figure A.2. Minimum wage changes by industry firm-size category before and after 2009
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Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys aggregated to the industry firm-size level.
Figure A.3. Number of labor inspections, 2005-2012
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Source: Honduran Ministry of Labor (UPEG, 2016).
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Figure A.4. Kernel densities of log earnings minus log monthly minimum wages
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Notes: These densities are average distributions from 2005-2012 and are centered so that MW = 0.
Figure A.5. Kernel densities of log wages minus log minimum wages, before and after 2009
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These densities are centered so that MW = 0.
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Figure A.6. Kernel densities of log earnings by sector
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Source: Own calculations from EPHPM surveys.
Notes: These densities are average distributions from 2005-2012.
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Student Handout
La relación entre estudios e ingresos
La educación superior es un factor determinante de la 
situación económica y por tanto la calidad de vida de las 
familias. En el siguiente gráfico se presentan los salarios 
promedio por nivel educativo en Bogotá. 
Como se puede observar, mayor educación se traduce 
en salarios más altos. Sólo con terminar el Bachillerato 
se pasa de ganar 457.000 a 574.000 por mes. El salto 
es más evidente para aquellos con un título de nivel 
superior, ya que el salario promedio mensual crece a 
1.482.000. Estas estadísticas presentan un mensaje 
claro: vale la pena estudiar.
¿Cómo puedo averiguar cuanto ganaría en la carrera 
que a mí me interesa?
Es probable que usted ya tenga una idea sobre las 
carreras que le interesarían y la institución donde 
quisiera realizar estos estudios. Si es así, ¿hay algu-
na manera de saber cuánto puede esperar ganar en 
su situación específica?
Existen dos lugares donde pueden consultar el salario 
promedio de los graduados por institución y carreras. 
Estas son:
1. Calculadora de salarios promedios para graduados: 
www.finanzaspersonales.com.co  
Esta página cuenta con una herramienta que le permite 
consultar el salario promedio por región, institución edu-
cativa, programa de estudio y género de las personas 
que obtuvieron su título entre 2001-2011.
¿Cómo funciona?
• Acceda al enlace y busque la Calculadora de Salario 
por profesión para Graduados
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• Escoja la región donde quiere realizar la búsqueda 
(por ejemplo, Bogotá)
• Seleccione la institución donde quiere realizar sus es-
tudios y el programa que planea cursar
2. Observatorio laboral del Ministerio de Educación: 
www.graduadoscolombia.edu.co
Está página también provee información sobre los sala-
rios promedios de personas con título de educación su-
perior para toda Colombia. Además, le permite conocer 
las perspectivas laborales del programa de estudio de 
su interés.
¿Cómo funciona?
• Acceda al enlace y busque el botón rojo que dice Sis-
tema de información del Observatorio Laboral.
• Si quiere conocer el número de graduados por car-
rera, acceda a la pestaña que dice “Perfil nacional”. 
Después, escoja el departamento donde planea es-
tudiar y obtendrá los datos de graduados por área de 
estudio.
Si desea saber cuántos individuos en su área de interés 
tienen un empleo formal (cotizando a la seguridad so-
cial) y cuanto ganan en promedio vaya a ¨Vinculación 
laboral recién graduados¨. Aquí tiene la opción de bus-
car por institución o por carrera.
Recuerde que estas páginas le permiten conocer el 
salario promedio de los profesionales graduados en su 
área de interés.
¿Qué necesito para entrar a la Universidad y la car-
rera que me interesa?
1. Buenos resultados académicos: Uno de los crite-
rios más importantes a la hora de buscar admisión a 
una institución de educación superior es el rendimiento 
académico. Muchas instituciones utilizan el puntaje del 
ICFES (SABER 11), y otras instituciones como la Uni-
versidad Nacional que tienen su propio examen de ad-
misión. En cualquier caso, estudiar aumenta las posibi-
lidades de ser admitido y también las posibilidades de 
acceder a becas o financiación. 
2. Financiación: Existen varias maneras de financiar la 
educación superior en Colombia. En general, tendrán 
preferencia los alumnos de escasos recursos y buen 
desempeño académico. Las siguientes son algunas op-
ciones a tener en cuenta:
•  Becas proveídas por cada institución por mérito aca-
démico y/o escasos recursos. Consulte las políticas 
de beca ya que estas son diferentes para cada in-
stitución.
• ICETEX: http://www.icetex.gov.co
•  Secretaría de Educación de Bogotá (Banco de cupos, 
Fondo de Financiamiento de Educación Superior de 
Bogotá): http://www.sedbogota.edu.co/index.php/ed-
ucacion-superior.html
Fuente: Encuesta de Hogares 2011, DANE
¡La educación superior paga!
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Post-­‐secondary	  education	  pays!	  
	  
The	  relation	  between	  studies	  and	  income	  
	  
Higher	  education	   is	  a	  determining	  factor	  of	  wages	  and	  the	  
quality	   of	   life	   of	   families.	   The	   following	   figure	   presents	  
average	  wages	  by	  level	  of	  completed	  education	  in	  Bogotá:	  
	  
	  
Clearly,	   more	   education	   is	   related	   with	   higher	   wages.	   By	  
only	   finishing	   high	   school,	   wages	   move	   from	   457,000	   to	  
574,000	   pesos	   each	   month.	   The	   difference	   is	   even	   more	  
marked	  for	  those	  with	  a	  college	  degree,	  since	  their	  average	  
monthly	   wage	   increases	   to	   1,492,000.	   These	   statistics	  
present	  a	  clear	  pattern:	  studying	  is	  worth	  it.	  
	  
How	   can	   I	   learn	   about	   how	   much	   people	   earn	   who	  
finished	  the	  degree	  I’m	  interested	  in?	  
	  
It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  you	  already	  have	  a	  good	  idea	  about	  the	  
degrees	   and	   institutions	   where	   you	   would	   like	   to	   pursue	  
your	   studies.	   If	   this	   is	   true,	   is	   there	   a	   way	   to	   know	   how	  
much	  I	  could	  expect	  to	  earn?	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  places	  where	  you	  can	  obtain	  information	  on	  
average	   wages	   for	   graduates	   by	   institution	   and	   degree.	  
These	  are:	  
1.   Average	   wage	   calculator	   for	   graduates:	  
www.finanzaspersonales.com.co	  
This	   website	   counts	   with	   a	   tool	   that	   allows	   to	   calculate	  
average	  wages	  by	  region,	  institution,	  degree	  and	  gender	  of	  
people	  who	  graduated	  between	  2001	  and	  2011.	  
	  
How	  does	  it	  work?	  
-­‐   Visit	   the	   website	   and	   search	   for	  Wage	   calculator	   by	  
degree	  for	  Graduates.	  
	  
-­‐   Select	  the	  region	  where	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  searching	  (e.g.	  
Bogotá)	  
-­‐   Select	   the	   institution	   and	   the	   degree	   you	   are	   interested	   in	  
evaluating	  
2.   Labor	   Observatory	   of	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Education:	  
www.graduadoscolombia.edu.co	  
This	  website	  also	  provides	   information	  about	  average	  wages	   for	  
the	   whole	   country.	   Additionally,	   you	   can	   learn	   about	   the	   labor	  
prospects	  for	  your	  degree	  of	  interest	  
	  
How	  does	  it	  work?	  
-­‐   Visit	   the	   website	   and	   click	   on	   the	   red	   button	   reading	  
Information	  System	  of	  the	  Labor	  Observatory	  
-­‐   If	   you	   would	   like	   to	   know	   the	   number	   of	   graduates	   by	  
degree,	   click	   on	   the	   “National	   Profile”	   tab.	   Next,	   select	   the	  
department	  where	  you	  plan	   to	   study	  and	  you	  will	   find	  data	  
on	  graduates	  by	  degree.	  
	  
If	   you	   are	   interested	   in	   the	   number	   of	   individuals	  who	   pursued	  
your	   degree	   of	   interest	   who	   have	   a	   formal	   job	   (paying	   social	  
security)	  and	  how	  much	  they	  earn	  on	  average,	  select	  “labor	   link	  
of	   recent	   graduates”.	   Here	   you	   have	   the	   option	   to	   search	   by	  
institution	  and	  degree.	  
	  
Remember	  that	  these	  websites	  allow	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  average	  
wages	  of	  recent	  graduates	  for	  your	  degree	  of	  interest.	  
	  
What	  will	   I	   need	   to	  enroll	   in	   a	  University	   and	   in	  my	  degree	  of	  
interest?	  
	  
1.   Good	   academic	   results:	   One	   of	   the	   main	   criteria	   for	  
admissions	   in	   University	   if	   academic	   performance.	   Many	  
institutions	   use	   the	   ICFES	   (SABER	   11)	   score,	   and	   other	  
institutions	   like	   the	  National	  University	   also	   have	   their	   own	  
admissions	   test.	   Nevertheless,	   studying	   will	   increase	   the	  
probability	  of	  being	  admitted	  and	  also	  of	  obtaining	   financial	  
aid	  or	  financing.	  
2.   Financing:	  There	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  finance	  higher	  education	  
in	   Colombia.	   In	   general,	   financing	   institutions	   have	  
preferences	   for	   students	  of	   low	   income	  and	  good	  academic	  
performance.	   The	   following	  are	   some	  organizations	   to	   keep	  
in	  mind:	  
-­‐   Scholarships	   provided	   by	   each	   institution	   according	   to	  
academic	   merit	   of	   financial	   need.	   Consult	   the	   scholarship	  
policies	  for	  each	  institution	  given	  that	  they	  may	  differ.	  
-­‐   ICETEX:	  http://www.icetex.gov.co	  
-­‐   Secretary	   of	   Education	   in	   Bogotá	   (FDFESBO):	  
http://www.sedbogota.edu.co/index.php/ed-­‐	   ucacion-­‐
superior.html	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Table B.1. Descriptive statistics for universe of students in Bogota´, by public and private schools
Public schools Private schools Difference
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p-value
A. Student attributes
Male 0.458 (0.498) 0.492 (0.500) 0.007
Age 17.641 (0.873) 17.648 (0.907) 0.825
Parent completed secondary 0.395 (0.489) 0.288 (0.453) 0.000
Parent completed higher education 0.156 (0.363) 0.580 (0.494) 0.000
Family income (<1 minimum wage) 0.144 (0.351) 0.028 (0.165) 0.000
Family income (1-2 minimum wages) 0.559 (0.497) 0.246 (0.431) 0.000
Family income (>2 minimum wages) 0.297 (0.457) 0.726 (0.446) 0.000
B. SABER 11 exit exam
Overall Score 0.138 (0.841) 0.864 (1.192) 0.000
Math 0.046 (0.884) 0.708 (1.231) 0.000
Language 0.156 (0.870) 0.702 (1.060) 0.000
C. Higher education choices
Enrolled 0.426 (0.495) 0.571 (0.495) 0.000
Academic degree (4-year) 0.098 (0.298) 0.370 (0.483) 0.000
Vocational degree (2-year) 0.328 (0.469) 0.201 (0.400) 0.000
Public College 0.278 (0.448) 0.147 (0.354) 0.000
Private College 0.148 (0.355) 0.424 (0.494) 0.000
Top-10 College 0.011 (0.106) 0.160 (0.366) 0.000
STEM field 0.054 (0.227) 0.211 (0.408) 0.000
Total number of students 37,787 37,068
Total number of schools 570 790
Source: Authors’ calculations from administrative data.
Notes: These statistics include the universe of public and private schools offering an academic track. SABER
11 exam scores are standardized with respect to the national average. The last column presents the p-value for
a difference in means test between public and private schools.
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Table B.2. Attrition diagnostics
Surveys: Baseline
to Follow-Up
Baseline survey to
ICFES
Baseline survey to
ICFES-SNIES
(1) (2) (3)
A. Attrition Rates
Baseline N 6,601 6,601 6,601
Final N 5,503 6,323 6,303
Attrition Rate 0.166 0.043 0.046
B. Random attrition tests (OLS)
Treatment 0.015 -0.012 -0.012
(0.027) (0.013) (0.014)
Source: Authors’ calculations from surveys matched to administrative data.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the school-level.
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table B.3. Average effects on perceived earning errors with alternative reference point
Vocational Academic
Reference earnings by:
College, degree &
field
Public/private college,
degree & field
College, degree &
field
Public/private college,
degree & field
A. ANCOVA
Treatment 0.009 -0.001 0.010 -0.010
(0.024) (0.023) (0.038) (0.037)
Adjusted p-value 0.829 0.989 0.884 0.893
Observations 2,782 3,972 2,802 4,009
B. Difference-in-differences
Treatment × Post 0.033 0.039 0.038 0.049
(0.029) (0.028) (0.040) (0.040)
Adjusted p-value 0.356 0.228 0.444 0.297
Observations 5,691 8,152 5,715 8,196
Baseline mean 0.096 0.217 0.944 1.147
Source: Authors’ calculations from survey data.
Notes: Each column and panel correspond to separate OLS regressions. Panel A presents coefficients of ANCOVA regressions that control for student
and household-level attributes (male, age, age squared, family income, and parental education), school characteristics (average scores on exit exam in
previous years, has computer lab, shift indicators, and school size), and neighborhood fixed effects. Panel B presents coefficients for difference-in-
difference regressions that control for individual fixed-effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at school-level. We report adjusted p-values
for multiple hypothesis testing using a Bonferroni correction that accounts for correlation among outcomes in a group (see Section 2.4.2 for details).
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table B.4. Average effects on educational aspirations
Aspirations
College Academic Private Top-10 STEM
enrollment degree college college field
A. ANCOVA
Treatment 0.002 0.010 0.004 0.010 0.015
(0.003) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013)
Adjusted p-value 0.982 0.967 1.000 0.909 0.757
Observations 5,503 5,503 5,503 5,503 5,503
B. Difference-in-differences
Treatment × Post -0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.007
(0.004) (0.016) (0.023) (0.013) (0.014)
Adjusted p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.983
Observations 11,006 11,006 11,006 11,006 11,006
Baseline mean 0.983 0.228 0.449 0.877 0.410
Source: Authors’ calculations from survey data.
Notes: Each column and panel correspond to separate OLS regressions. Panel A presents coefficients of AN-
COVA regressions that control for student and household-level attributes (male, age, age squared, family income,
and parental education), school characteristics (average scores on exit exam in previous years, has computer lab,
shift indicators, and school size), and neighborhood fixed effects. Panel B presents coefficients for difference-
in-difference regressions that control for individual fixed-effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at school-level. We report adjusted p-values for multiple hypothesis testing using a Bonferroni correction that
accounts for correlation among outcomes in a group (see Section 2.4.2 for details).
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table B.5. Minimum detectable effects
MDE in MDE in
Outcome standard deviations percentage points
Knowledge
Knows Labor Observatory 0.0520 0.0138
Knows ICETEX 0.1219 0.0562
Knows FESBO 0.0535 0.0203
Perceived earnings error
Vocational 0.0955 0.1441
Academic 0.1019 0.1272
Test scores
Overall score 0.1981
Math 0.2154
Language 0.1869
Higher education choices
College enrollment 0.1043 0.0518
Academic degree 0.0953 0.0281
Private college 0.0888 0.0317
Top-10 college 0.0389 0.0040
STEM field 0.0690 0.0153
Source: Author’s calculations from survey and administrative data.
Notes: These calculations follow Duflo et al. (2008). We assume 50 students per school (6000/115), calculate
intra-cluster correlations from the data and set the test level at 0.10 and statistical power at 0.80.
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Table B.6. Heterogeneous effects on knowledge and beliefs, perceptions and risk aversion
Knowledge Perceived earnings error
Labor Observatory ICETEX FESBO Vocational Academic
A. Perceived academic ranking
Low 0.000 0.065** 0.008 0.042 0.002
(0.012) (0.022) (0.019) (0.045) (0.039)
High -0.016 0.016 0.002 0.029 0.077
(0.015) (0.024) (0.021) (0.051) (0.049)
p-value (Low=High) 0.986 0.520 1.000 1.000 0.826
Observations 10,480 10,780 10,514 10,524 10,578
B. Perceived self-efficacy
Low 0.004 0.024 0.015 0.041 0.009
(0.011) (0.022) (0.017) (0.044) (0.040)
High -0.025 0.083*** -0.013 0.027 0.076
(0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.058) (0.053)
p-value (Low=High) 0.697 0.230 0.977 1.000 0.958
Observations 10,473 10,773 10,504 10,514 10,571
C. Risk aversion
Low -0.048 0.047 0.085 0.013 -0.072
(0.028) (0.042) (0.037) (0.102) (0.078)
High 0.004 0.047 -0.002 0.031 0.043
(0.010) (0.019) (0.015) (0.041) (0.037)
p-value (Low=High) 0.529 1.000 0.221 1.000 0.858
Observations 10,194 10,487 10,229 10,248 10,300
D. Perceived likelihood of enrollment
Low -0.030 0.098 -0.009 0.112 0.112
(0.022) (0.039) (0.039) (0.095) (0.083)
High 0.002 0.038 0.010 0.031 0.024
(0.011) (0.020) (0.016) (0.039) (0.038)
p-value (Low=High) 0.854 0.720 1.000 0.997 0.985
Observations 10,083 10,372 10,118 10,137 10,196
Source: Authors’ calculations from survey data.
Notes: Refer to Table 2.4
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table B.7. Heterogeneous effects on test scores and higher education choices, perceptions and risk aversion
Test scores Higher education choices
Overall College Academic Private Top-10 STEM
score Math Language enrollment degree college college field
A. Perceived academic ranking
Low 0.015 0.066 -0.010 0.005 0.016 0.005 0.007 0.004
(0.045) (0.049) (0.042) (0.025) (0.013) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
High -0.002 0.038 0.024 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.008
(0.047) (0.050) (0.043) (0.027) (0.018) (0.005) (0.015) (0.011)
p-value (Low=High) 0.993 0.768 0.692 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
Observations 6,268 6,268 6,268 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248 6,248
B. Perceived self-efficacy
Low -0.034 0.032 -0.052 0.003 0.014 0.004 0.002 0.000
(0.044) (0.049) (0.039) (0.023) (0.013) (0.003) (0.011) (0.008)
High 0.076 0.091 0.094* 0.005 0.012 0.008 0.021 0.013
(0.048) (0.051) (0.046) (0.027) (0.017) (0.005) (0.012) (0.010)
p-value (Low=High) 0.103 0.423 0.011 1.000 1.000 0.973 0.892 0.871
Observations 6,257 6,257 6,257 6,237 6,237 6,237 6,237 6,237
C. Risk aversion
Low 0.020 0.081 0.039 0.031 0.019 0.016 0.032 0.032
(0.085) (0.090) (0.074) (0.039) (0.024) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015)
High -0.012 0.035 -0.015 -0.002 0.011 0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.040) (0.041) (0.036) (0.022) (0.013) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
p-value (Low=High) 0.992 0.762 0.668 0.950 1.000 0.720 0.719 0.200
Observations 6,085 6,085 6,085 6,066 6,066 6,066 6,066 6,066
D. Perceived likelihood of enrollment
Low -0.039 0.014 -0.057 0.015 0.004 -0.001 0.008 -0.001
(0.056) (0.058) (0.062) (0.032) (0.016) (0.003) (0.014) (0.008)
High 0.001 0.044 0.002 0.005 0.015 0.007 0.010 0.007
(0.039) (0.044) (0.036) (0.023) (0.014) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007)
p-value (Low=High) 0.941 0.831 0.539 1.000 0.994 0.313 1.000 0.980
Observations 6,023 6,023 6,023 6,004 6,004 6,004 6,004 6,004
Source: Authors’ calculations from surveys matched to administrative data.
Notes: Refer to Table 2.5
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Figure B.1. Geographic distribution of 115 treatment and control schools
Source: Authors’ elaboration from Secretary of Education’s school census and survey data.
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Figure B.2. Quantile treatment effects for SABER 11 test scores
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from surveys matched to administrative data.
Notes: 90% Confidence intervals in black dashed/red dotted lines. OLS estimate in red line.
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Appendix C
Supplementary material for Chapter 3
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Table C.1. Difference-in-difference performance under spatial correlation, 2 nearest neighbors
Spatial correlation parameter
0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Panel A: Spatially-correlated outcomes
50 clusters
Bias (in %) -5.4 -2.5 -1.5 7.6 40.8 132.6
Rejection rate 78.4 79.4 78.1 68.7 50.7 27.2
100 clusters
Bias (in %) -4.0 -4.0 -3.4 6.1 34.7 112.8
Rejection rate 97.5 96.5 97.2 94.4 78.1 44.2
200 clusters
Bias (in %) -4.4 -4.4 -2.1 5.9 34.2 105.5
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.6 96.1 73.3
500 clusters
Bias (in %) -4.3 -4.0 -2.5 7.5 39.3 124.8
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.3
Panel B: Spatially-correlated unobservables
50 clusters
Bias (in %) -2.8 -5.2 -3.2 -2.6 -4.6 -4.0
Rejection rate 71.7 68.9 69.3 66.8 51.5 25.1
100 clusters
Bias (in %) -3.8 -3.6 -4.4 -4.8 -4.4 -3.7
Rejection rate 94.7 94.5 94.7 90.6 80.2 38.0
200 clusters
Bias (in %) -4.3 -4.0 -3.4 -4.0 -4.9 -5.2
Rejection rate 99.9 99.8 99.7 99.6 97.5 63.1
500 clusters
Bias (in %) -4.9 -3.9 -4.1 -4.5 -3.9 -4.0
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.9
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations.
Notes: Reported values are averages from the total number of replications. Bias is calculated as the difference
between the average estimate and the true value ([βˆ − β]/β)× 100. The rejection rate measures the percentage
that DD finds a statistically significant effect when the null hypothesis is false (equivalent to statistical power).
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Table C.2. Alternative estimation procedures with 100 clusters
Spatially-correlated outcome Spatially-correlated unobservable
0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Using individual-level data
DD with village fixed-effects
Bias (in %) -5.0 -4.0 0.0 14.8 64.1 235.7 -5.2 -3.1 -4.5 -5.3 -3.8 -5.3
Rejection rate 97.0 97.4 96.6 91.1 64.2 44.8 92.9 94.1 91.7 87.7 65.2 17.6
DD with individual fixed-effects
Bias (in %) -5.0 -4.0 0.0 14.8 64.1 235.7 -5.2 -3.1 -4.5 -5.3 -3.8 -5.3
Rejection rate 87.4 86.5 84.7 68.8 34.2 19.9 75.0 77.2 74.4 65.1 34.1 5.6
Spatial DD
Bias (in %) -5.1 -4.6 -3.7 -3.9 -3.6 -3.1 -5.2 -3.1 -4.5 -5.4 -4.5 -4.8
Rejection rate 97.1 97.9 97.6 98.2 97.4 97.0 93.8 94.0 92.6 92.7 91.5 92.4
Using village-level data
DD with village fixed-effects
Bias (in %) -5.0 -4.0 0.0 14.8 64.1 235.7 -5.2 -3.1 -4.5 -5.3 -3.8 -5.3
Rejection rate 86.5 85.6 83.8 67.2 32.6 18.0 73.8 75.5 72.6 62.9 32.3 5.2
Spatial DD
Bias (in %) -5.1 -4.6 -3.7 -4.0 -3.8 -3.4 -5.3 -2.9 -4.6 -5.4 -3.9 -4.8
Rejection rate 97.2 97.9 97.7 98.2 97.7 97.5 93.6 95.4 92.3 88.4 66.4 18.8
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations.
Notes: Reported values are averages from the total number of replications. Bias is calculated as the difference between the average estimate
and the true value ([βˆ − β]/β) × 100. The rejection rate measures the percentage that DD finds a statistically significant effect when the null
hypothesis is false (equivalent to statistical power).
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Table C.3. Alternative estimation procedures with 200 clusters
Spatially-correlated outcome Spatially-correlated unobservable
0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Using individual-level data
DD with village fixed-effects
Bias (in %) -4.2 -2.6 0.5 16.3 78.5 263.5 -3.5 -5.2 -4.8 -3.8 -4.6 -5.5
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 94.7 80.0 99.7 99.9 99.7 99.1 89.6 31.9
DD with individual fixed-effects
Bias (in %) -4.2 -2.6 0.5 16.3 78.5 263.5 -3.5 -5.2 -4.8 -3.8 -4.6 -5.5
Rejection rate 99.5 99.7 99.6 97.4 79.1 53.2 98.5 98.2 98.5 96.6 69.0 10.8
Spatial DD
Bias (in %) -4.2 -3.3 -3.6 -4.2 -4.4 -5.3 -3.5 -5.2 -5.0 -3.9 -3.7 -5.2
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 99.8 99.7 99.9 99.6 99.4
Using village-level data
DD with village fixed-effects
Bias (in %) -4.2 -2.6 0.5 16.3 78.5 263.5 -3.5 -5.2 -4.8 -3.8 -4.6 -5.5
Rejection rate 99.4 99.7 99.5 97.2 78.2 52.0 98.4 98.2 98.5 96.6 68.1 10.3
Spatial DD
Bias (in %) -4.2 -3.3 -3.6 -4.3 -4.5 -5.5 -3.5 -5.2 -4.9 -3.8 -4.6 -5.4
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.9 99.7 99.3 90.5 33.6
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations.
Notes: Reported values are averages from the total number of replications. Bias is calculated as the difference between the average estimate and the
true value ([βˆ−β]/β)× 100. The rejection rate measures the percentage that DD finds a statistically significant effect when the null hypothesis is false
(equivalent to statistical power).
147
Table C.4. Alternative estimation procedures with 500 clusters
Spatially-correlated outcome Spatially-correlated unobservable
0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Using individual-level data
DD with village fixed-effects
Bias (in %) -4.2 -3.9 -0.5 14.3 69.0 235.6 -4.3 -4.6 -4.2 -4.5 -4.8 -3.9
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.4
DD with individual fixed-effects
Bias (in %) -4.2 -3.9 -0.5 14.3 69.0 235.6 -4.3 -4.6 -4.2 -4.5 -4.8 -3.9
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.5 91.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.3 39.4
Spatial DD
Bias (in %) -4.3 -4.5 -4.2 -4.6 -4.4 -4.8 -4.3 -4.6 -4.2 -4.5 -4.9 -3.4
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Using village-level data
DD with village fixed-effects
Bias (in %) -4.2 -3.9 -0.5 14.3 69.0 235.6 -4.3 -4.6 -4.2 -4.5 -4.8 -3.9
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.5 91.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.3 38.7
Spatial DD
Bias (in %) -4.3 -4.5 -4.2 -4.6 -4.4 -4.9 -4.3 -4.5 -4.2 -4.5 -4.8 -3.8
Rejection rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 67.4
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1,000 Monte Carlo Simulations.
Notes: Reported values are averages from the total number of replications. Bias is calculated as the difference between the average estimate and the true value
([βˆ − β]/β) × 100. The rejection rate measures the percentage that DD finds a statistically significant effect when the null hypothesis is false (equivalent to
statistical power).
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Table C.5. Difference-in-differences estimates for Progresa at the village-level
Spatial DD
Unadjusted 1 nearest neighbor 2 nearest neighbors
Primary enrollment β 0.007 0.007 0.006
(Spatial lag) (0.004)* (0.005) (0.005)
ρ 0.097 0.179
(0.024)*** (0.032)***
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,010
Secondary enrollment β 0.010 0.008 0.009
(Spatial lag) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024)
ρ 0.155 0.224
(0.023)*** (0.030)***
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,010
Male labor supply β -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(No spatial correlation) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
ρ 0.004 0.017
(0.010) (0.015)
Observations 1,012 1,012 1,012
Female labor supply β -0.011 -0.012 -0.011
(Spatial lag) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
ρ 0.024 0.069
(0.016) (0.023)***
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,010
Per capita income β 0.040 0.038 0.035
(Spatial lag) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044)
ρ 0.153 0.254
(0.023)*** (0.030)***
Observations 1,012 1,012 1,012
Per capita consumption β 0.082 0.080 0.087
(Spatial error) (0.026)*** (0.039)** (0.038)**
λ 0.127 0.238
(0.024)*** (0.031)***
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,010
Source: Authors’ calculations from Progresa data aggregated at village-level.
Notes: We estimate Equation (3.1) on village data with no controls and use regional weight matrices for spatial
specifications. Each set of coefficients corresponds to a separate regression. Standard errors are clustered at the
village-level.
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent.
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Figure C.1. Simulated spatial networks: 2 nearest neighbors
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l Treatment Control
50 villages
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l Treatment Control
100 villages
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l Treatment Control
200 villages
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l Treatment Control
500 villages
Source: Authors’ elaboration from simulated data.
Notes: This graph shows a random draw of villages by allocated treatment status. Lines between villages denote the
that two locations are neighbors.
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Figure C.2. Minimum detectable effects for simulated scholarship program
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